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Pass the word of Good


Where is their honour?

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A Child Could Do This Case

Your Honour,

1.) The landlord broke the insurance contract by failing to repair on time breaching 2a and 2b of the insurance policy, expresses in my lease contract as clause 7 (2), to keep all risks insured at all times.

He contractually left me uninsured.

2.) The landlord then broke into my premises to forget about the claim and make me disappear, committing a trespass! Even though I had paid the rent and here is the proof, never denied since 2008.

That is the long and short of a 5 years court case… simple!!!!


A copy of the letter Oliver in evidence says he can't remember seeing!!! A week before the trespass!


One Housing Group
100 Chalk Farm Road
London NW1 8EH


Jo Gavin & Chantal Cracy
32 Tonbridge House
Tonbridge Street
London WC1H 8BZ



Date: 24 October 2008

By fax and post


By fax on 020 7428 4201

For the attention of Oliver Barnett and Mick Sweeney



Dear Sirs

Re: 104 Cromer Street & 106-108 Cromer Street, London WC1H 8BZ

1.  We are in receipt of two letters dated 20 October 2008 from your Commercial Property Officer, Monique Jamera, serving us with rent demands for both of the above mentioned properties. We would like to quote the words of our solicitors, Steeles Law, in their letter addressed to you on 21 August 2008, in direct response to similarly worded rent demands dated 14 August 2008 and sent to us by the same officer: “taking the action threatened in your letters would be wholly unreasonable and entirely inappropriate. If our client is put to taking Court action to prevent bailiff action or forfeiture, we shall include a claim that you pay our client’s cost (and naturally, would bring this letter to the attention of the Court).”

2.  As you know there have been severe matters of disrepair affecting both premises and we have suffered financial losses as a consequence of disrepair to the subject properties which dates back some 4 ½ years. Some of these matters are still the subject of a claim with your insurers Royal Sun Alliance.

3.  Since January of this year we have been prevented to operate our business from the premises at 104 Cromer Street because Oliver Barnett has been refusing to repair serious damage to the floor, an insured risk, as a consequence of the 2005 flood that is part of the claim with RSA.

4.  Since May 2008, we have also been unable to operate our business from the premises at 106-108 Cromer Street because of two separate water ingress affecting the premises and the resulting finding that the property has never had any ventilation fitted in during its complete refurbishment back in 2000. Not only the fitting of ventilation is legally required for any building by general UK Building Regulations but the provision of natural ventilation is also a minimum requirement for A3 planning. While the water ingress have been partially stopped and some of the repairs carried out over the summer, the lack of ventilation, together with the question of liability for it, was simply rejected in writing by Monique Jamera in August 2008.

5.  As advised by our solicitors, we would draw your attention to Clause at 6(3) of the leases in respect of both properties. You will see that this clause is headed “Cessor of Rent” and reads as follows:

“If the Demised Premises or any part thereof shall be destroyed or so damaged by fire or any other risk for which the Landlord is indemnified under the insurance of the Demised premises so as to be unfit for occupation or use then unless the insurance of the Demised Premises shall have been vitiated by the act neglect default or omission of the Tenant the rent hereby reserved or a fair proportion thereof according to the nature and extent of the damage sustained shall be suspended and cease to be payable until the Demised Premises or damaged portion thereof shall have been reinstated or made fit for occupation or until the third anniversary of such destruction or damage whichever shall be the sooner.”

6.  In the circumstances, it has been made clear to us that we should not have been paying rent for the period during which we have been unable to operate our business from the demised premises and/or since the premises have been unfit for use or occupation whether in part or in its entirety. Notwithstanding this, we have paid rent from April 2004 to July 2008 in the sum of £59,500.00 in total.

7.  Given the effect of the Cessor of Rent clause, it is our solicitors’ view that we have continued to pay rent when we are not legally obliged to. We therefore should consider that as landlord, you are holding the sum of £31,292.00 (the equivalent in rent of 22 months of business interruption at 104 Cromer Street and 29.5 months of business interruption at 106-108 Cromer Street) on trust for us.

8.  However, considering the succession of events in the last 4 ½ years and the overall response from CHA and One Housing Group, we have no choice but to come to the conclusion that trust has been taken out of our relationship as Landlord and Tenants. In light of the above, we ask that this situation be rectified and that the above quoted sum of £31,292.00 be refunded to us. We think it is reasonable to expect return of your payment within 14 days of this letter, failure to do so on your behalf will only force us to seek court action in order to re-cover what we have firm reasons to believe is legally due to us.

9.  We also suggest that any further rent demand are cancelled and that the 12thJanuary 2009 deadline for Lease renewal at 104 Cromer Street given in your recent Notice under Section 25 is extended until current matters of pending repair and liability have been fully resolved.


Yours faithfully




Jo Gavin & Chantal Cracy

Of course there was no response to yet another letter so we had to pay as usual..

But here is the reason that CHA (One Housing Group) did not deal with us as the insurers did not have to pay them and also were in a satellite dispute as to if it was the building insurers UKU, POL Property Owners Liability or the RSA public liabiliy.  So they all joined forces in a David and Goliath battle to date as none of them wanted to pay.. Big Boots and Deep Pockets... Is that legal?



Meanwhile CHA in 2007 when all this behind the scenes chaos was going on, the CHA landlord pretended to us that they were the good guys and were expediently chasing the claim as they are expressly ought to in our lease contract with them. All that rent they pumped out of us while they knew we never be paid!!




The courts, the property owner’s liability building insurers as well as the public liability insurers require proof of losses as is standard in these cases. This evidence is 1743 enquiries from Aug 2008 to Sept 2013, for potential bookings of both the art, exhibition, conference hire and serviced office hires at both highly refurbished (by us) spaces 104 & 106-108 ‘CROMER ST’, London Kings Cross, Scarlet Maguire www.scarletmaguire.com& spaceshift… www.spaceshift.co.uk.

Due to the nature of the court case dealing with raw sewage, foul waste and breaches in building regulations the enquiries have been redacted and censored during the court case to protect the confidentiality and brands of the companies that have enquired.  spaceshift… and Scarlet Maguire brand has not escaped that.

Only one selected example of an enquiry each month is shown. However the insurers and the landlord have the full 1743 enquiries not censored/redacted.

No marketing whatsoever of the spaces took place after the Nov 2008 trespass.

The case continues with no resolve for the claimant’s and no compensation paid.

The leases are commercial so no legal-aid. I have represented myself throughout.

Sept 2008

Date/Time Sent:            09/09/2008 14:27:12
Applicant Name/s:            Ms Sarah Conkay
Company Name:            CEBR (Centre for Economics and Business Research)
Type of Business:            Economic Research
Preferred Locations:            kings Cross Islington Old street Farringdon and surrounding areas
Number of Occupants:            15 (They would look at different rooms)
Size of Area Req:            1500
Interested In: (centre/s)            Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Total Price Limit Pcm:            considering options
Move Date:            3-6 months
Duration Required:            ongoing

Oct 2008

Date sent             10/10/2008
Time Sent             16:21
Email             stephen.preston@officebroker.com
Tel             0870 112 7890
Client Details:
Company Name:             Prospect Publishing
Client Name:             Andy Hawkins
Position:            
Company Address:             2 Bloomsbury Place
             
              London             WC1A 2QA
Nature Of Business:             Media & Communication
Telephone Number:             0207 255 1281
Mobile:             0207 255 1281
Email:             andy@prospect-magazine.co.uk
Web Site:             www.prospect-magazine.co.uk
Workstations / Sq ft:             15/1000-2000
Locations Requested:             bloomsbury
Required By:             Within 3 Months
Required For:             6 to 12 Months
Budget:             Economical

Nov 2008

Date sent             03/11/2008
Time Sent             09:12
Email             Richard.Nash@officebroker.com
Tel             0870 112 7890
Client Details:
Company Name:             Catalyst Fund management & Research Ltd
Client Name:             Rodney schwartz
Position:            
Company Address:            
             
                         
Nature Of Business:             Banking and Finance
Telephone Number:             0207 2815948
Mobile:            
Email:             rod@catfund.com
Web Site:             www.catfund.com
Workstations / Sq ft:             15/Not Selected
Locations Requested:             Kings Cross, London
Required By:             Within 3 Months
Required For:             12 Months Plus
Budget:             Professional

Dec 2008

Date/Time Sent:            08/12/2008 14:02:43
Applicant Name/s:            Steve Dennis
Company Name:            CSD Global Ltd
Type of Business:            security company
Preferred Locations:            West End, Mid Town, SE1 area
Number of Occupants:            10/12
Size of Area Req:            1200- 1500
Interested In: (centre/s)            Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Total Price Limit Pcm:            considering options
Move Date:            ASAP
Duration Required:            ongoing
Facilities Needed:            couple of open plan spaces. Dedicated.
Reasons for Moving:            new business
Email:            stephendennis1@aol.com

Jan 2009

Contact First Name:             Maxwell           
Confirmation of Applicant Introduction
Contact Last Name:             Wilson           
Company name :             Shine Ltd
Care Of:             DTZ
Address:            
Office tel:             0207 534 8418
Email:             maxwell.wilson@dtz.com
Website:             http://www.dtz.com
Nature of Business :             Real Estate Broker
           
Location(s) of Interest:             Kings Cross                        Require 6 small offices and 1 open plan space. Should be around 1,000 sq ft in total.
Number of people:             1,000 sq ft
Approx move in date:             February 2009
Approx Duration:             1 year
Type of space required:             Serviced Offices.
Production company require 1000 sq ft from January 2009 - can you assist

Feb 2009

Date/Time Sent:            23/02/2009 15:43:37
Applicant Name/s:            Mr NIck Summers
Company Name:            SC Davies and co
Type of Business:            Investment
Preferred Locations:            ec4, sw1, wc2, wc1, w1, w2 and surrounding areas
Number of Occupants:            20 (They would look at different rooms)
Size of Area Req:            2000
Interested In: (centre/s)            Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Total Price Limit Pcm:            considering options
Move Date:            2-3 months
Duration Required:            ongoing

March 2009

Contact Last Name:             Theodore Tetteh           
Company name :             Unistream Uk Ltd
Address:            
Office tel:             07949685916
Email:             t.tetteh@unistream-uk.com
Website:             http://www.unistream-uk.com
Nature of Business :             Other
           
Location(s) of Interest:             Kings Cross                       
Number of people:             8
Approx move in date:             ASAP
Approx Duration:             12 months
Type of space required:             Serviced Offices

April 2009

Date/Time Sent:            20/04/2009 15:22:17
Applicant Name/s:            Amy Thomson
Company Name:            Xray Touring
Type of Business:            Music Reps
Preferred Locations:            Great Portland Street, W1, Islington, Great Eastern Street. and surrounding areas
Number of Occupants:            5 (They would look at different rooms)
Size of Area Req:            n/a
Interested In: (centre/s)            Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Total Price Limit Pcm:            economical - mid range
Move Date:            ASAP
Duration Required:            ongoing

May 2009

Dear Chantal,

I spoke to you some months ago about serviced office space. Could you possibly let me know if you have any for a staff of 8 with a small four person meeting room and what your charges are?

thank you,

Kind regards,
Natalie.

Natalie Pendigrast

Business Development Manager
Information Edge
34-36 High Holborn


June 2009

Design Company

Hi there,

We currently work in Cromer Street and are looking to move offices in the next few months. Therefore I was wondering if the Scarlet Maguire would be a possibility for an office? We ideally would be looking for a minimum of 3 years, so if you could let me know if it is of any interest this would be greatly appreciated,

Many thanks



Steve Verity



Stephen Verity | Director

Fever Design Ltd


July 2009

Hello there

I am working on a drama for BBCSwitch called "The Cut", which is due to begin transmission in September on BBC2 and online. We are looking for a gallery to use for a scene where two of the characters are invited to a photography exhibition. At the moment, we have filming dates booked for 3rd to 9th August, 7th to 13th September and two weeks in October. We don't have a finalised schedule as yet but I can confirm the exact dates within the next week.

Would it be possible to use your space for filming? If so, could you confirm the rate for a couple of days' filming and if there are any specific dates during our filming schedule when it will not be possible to film?

You can find more info about the programme here http://www.bbc.co.uk/switch/thecut but let me know if you have any queries and if it would be possible for us to use the space.

Thank you for your time and I hope to hear from you soon.

Kind regards

Martina


Martina Silcock | Production Coordinator
The Cut
Room G10, Grafton House, 379-381 Euston Road , London , NW1 3AU
020 7765 0499
07989 514002


Aug 2009

Date sent:             03/08/2009
Time sent:             12:09
Email:             Emma.Harris@officebroker.com
Tel:             0870 112 7890

Client Details:
Company Name:             Gymnastics England
Client Name:             Brenda Thomason
Position:             National Development Coordinator
Company Address:            



Nature of Business:             Charity /Voluntary Organisation
Telephone Number:             0845 1297 129
Mobile:            
Email:             brenda.thomason@gymnasticsengland.org
Website:             www.gymnasticsengland.org
Workstations / Sq ft:             4/Not Selected
Locations Requested:             Holborn, Station
Required by:             Within 3 Months
Required for:             12 Months Plus
Budget:             Professional


Sept 2009


Date sent:             02/09/2009
Time sent:             13:12
Email:             Brad.Ievers@officebroker.com
Tel:             0870 112 7890

Client Details:
Company Name:             Smarta
Client Name:             Hayley Conick
Position:             Partner
Company Address:             33-34 Alfred Place

London
WC1E 7DP

Nature of Business:             Education services
Telephone Number:             02076314003
Mobile:             02076314003
Email:             hayley@smarta.com
Website:             www.smarta.com
Workstations / Sq ft:             15/Not Selected
Locations Requested:             kings cross, london
Required by:             Within 3 Months
Required for:             12 Months Plus
Budget:             Prestigious

Oct 2009

Date sent:             07/10/2009
Time sent:             17:48
Email:             Richard.Nash@officebroker.com
Tel:             0870 112 7890

Client Details:
Company Name:             Frontroom
Client Name:             Natalie
Position:            
Company Address:             101 Farm Lane

London
SW6 1QJ

Nature of Business:             Marketing
Telephone Number:             0207 384 5400
Mobile:             0754556155
Email:             natalie@frontroom.com
Website:             www.frontroom.com
Workstations / Sq ft:             15/1000-2000
Locations Requested:             euston station
Required by:             Within 3 - 6 Months
Required for:             12 Months Plus
Budget:             Professional
The following client has expressed an interest in receiving a current price and availability for your building.
Company Name: Frontroom
Centre name: Spaceshift - Cromer Street
Please contact the client as soon as possible if you have any suitable office space.

Richard Nash

Nov 2009

Date/Time Sent:            12/11/2009 12:03:30
Applicant Name/s:            Roman Casella
Company Name:            Stylesight
Type of Business:            Fashion
Preferred Locations:            Soho, Noho, Goodge St and Kings Cross and surrounding areas
Number of Occupants:            10
Size of Area Req:            1500-2000 sqft
Interested In: (centre/s)            Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Total Price Limit Pcm:            premium
Move Date:            2-3 months
Duration Required:            ongoing

Dec 2009

Date/Time Sent:            01/12/2009 09:40:12
Applicant Name/s:            Ms Madhu Bedhan, Mr Sunil unknown
Company Name:            IBPC
Type of Business:            Conference Organisers
Preferred Locations:             West Hampstead,baker st, london bridge, kings cross, islington, kilburn
Number of Occupants:            8-10 (They would look at different rooms)
Size of Area Req:            400-600
Interested In: (centre/s)            Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Total Price Limit Pcm:            considering options
Move Date:            ASAP
Duration Required:            ongoing
Facilities Needed:            need space by end of December. In workspace at the mo, ideally want a lease but are considering serviced also.

Jan 2010

Date/Time Sent:            12/01/2010 10:03:18
Applicant Name/s:            Leanne Kendall
Company Name:            JJ Stereo
Type of Business:            TV production company.
Preferred Locations:            Camden, Soho, Noho, West End and surrounding areas
Number of Occupants:            20 + occasional freelancers (They would look at different rooms)
Size of Area Req:            2500
Interested In: (centre/s)            Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Total Price Limit Pcm:            economical - mi d range
Move Date:            ASAP
Duration Required:            ongoing

Feb 2010

Date/Time Sent             10/02/2010 @ 05:46:06            
Preferred Locations             Covent Garden, strand, Holborn, Farringdon,
Applicant Name/s             Jonathan Parry           
No. of Occupants             20 (They would look at different rooms)
Company Name             Verdantix           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Sustainability            
Total Price Limit Pcm             considering options
Move Date             ASAP
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             jparry@verdantix.com           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             changing rooms shower facility, dedicated meeting room if possible, furnished, serviced requirement.
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross

March 2010
           
23/03/2010 @ 12:42:50             Preferred Locations             Kings Cross
Applicant Name/s             Etsuko hardingham           
No. of Occupants             10 (They would look at different rooms)
Company Name             Sosei           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Biopharmaceuticals            
Total Price Limit Pcm             considering options
Telephone 1             02076912081            Move Date             2-3 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             ehardingham@sosei.com           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             Considering some serviced options around Kings Cross station. Gathering some info on price, gave a rough quote. Internet, telecoms. Would consider open plan or separate rooms. Please contact via email.
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross.

April 2010


Date/Time Sent             08/04/2010 @ 11:45:11            
Preferred Locations             embankment, waterloo, soho, covent garden
Applicant Name/s             Ms Caroline Penman           
No. of Occupants             8 expanding into 12
Company Name             Queensborough           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Project Management            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical
Move Date             ASAP
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             denis.cutts@queensborough-group.co.uk           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             The client is expanding and looking for a space for 8 staff expanding into 12. Are looking at leased and flexible agreements
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross.

May 2010

Date/Time Sent             14/05/2010 @ 11:03:28            
Preferred Locations             W1, WC1, Soho
Applicant Name/s             Robert Pirouet           
No. of Occupants             n/a
Company Name             The Outfit UK           
Size of Area Req             1,000 to 1,4000
Type Of Business             Design            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical
Move Date             ASAP
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             rob@theoutfituk.com           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             the client is looking for a core team of 4 persons but will have 4 or 5 ad hoc people over the course of the week so need space for them also open plan creative space of up to 1000sqft, it has to be non-corporate.
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross.

June 2010

Date/Time Sent             01/06/2010 @ 10:22:46            
Preferred Locations             Islington down the Circular to Aldgate
Applicant Name/s             Mr Hasan Saglik           
No. of Occupants             8-10
Company Name             H & S Group (UK)           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Construction            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical
Telephone 1             07860 573 589           
Move Date             ASAP
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             info@hsworldcorporation.com           
Reason for Moving             Satellite office
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             CLIENT IS LOOKING TO SIGN THIS WEEK. Serviced office for 8-10 people any where along the ring road from islington to algate
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Comments             please contact URGENTLY client directly with availability and pricing.

July 2010

Contact First Name:             Frederic           
Contact Last Name:             Opsomer           
Company name :             Tait Technologies
Job Title:             CEO
Address:            
Email:             frederic@taittechnologies.com
Nature of Business :             Corporate Entertainment
           
Location(s) of Interest:             Kings Cross                       
Number of people:            
Occupancy timing:            
Approx Duration:            
Type of space required:             Serviced Offices

Business Centres Selected
[5015] Spaceshift & Scarlet Maguire - Cromer St, WC1 - King's Cross St Pancras

Aug 2010

Date/Time Sent             03/08/2010 @ 09:41:48            
Preferred Locations             Camden and Surround
Applicant Name/s             Mrs Annie Prior           
No. of Occupants             8
Company Name             Finch and Partners           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Publishers            
Total Price Limit Pcm             considering options
Telephone 1             07703 459 494           
Move Date             within 2 months
Telephone 2             n/a            
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             annie.prior@mac.com           
Reason for Moving             new business
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             the client are a start-uplooking for standard serviced space for 8 persons...need to occupy in the next 3 months, good quality required.
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Comments             please contact client directly with availability and pricing.

Sept 2008

Date/Time Sent             08/09/2010 @ 10:07:15            
Preferred Locations             Kings Cross station
Applicant Name/s             Mrs Rose Chaffe           
No. of Occupants             30 (They would look at different rooms)
Company Name             Stroud Consulting           
Size of Area Req             2000-3000sqft
Type Of Business             Consultancy Industrial            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical
Move Date             3-6 months
Duration Req             ongoing
Email             R.chaffe@stroudconsulting.com           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             Kitchen, WC, showers are a bonus. Restaurant’s and pubs, lively area. Client is looking to get a feel for the market and considering options for budget at this stage. Looking for something high spec.
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross

Oct 2010

Date/Time Sent             08/10/2010 @ 12:53:35            
Preferred Locations             Kings Cross, Euston, Islington
Applicant Name/s             Mr Liam McEntegart           
No. of Occupants             n/a
Company Name             Real Fundraising           
Size of Area Req             1800sqft
Type Of Business             Fundraising            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical
Move Date             ASAP
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             lmcentegart@realfundraising.co.uk           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             the client is looking for space to house up to 12 desks, with a large training room and storage space.

Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross

Nov 2010

Date/Time Sent             30/11/2010 @ 10:41:07            
Preferred Locations             Kings Cross
Applicant Name/s             Mrs Noreen Zini           
No. of Occupants             10
Company Name             Noreen Zina           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Music            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical - mid range
Telephone 1             07956460450           
Move Date             within 2 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             nzini@candi.ac.uk            Reason for Moving             Satellite office
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             the client is looking for space to house 10 persons, fully serviced and looking to move asap
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Comments             contact client directly with pricing and availability.

Dec 2010


Date/Time Sent             17/12/2010 @ 12:45:52            
Preferred Locations             Islington, Kings Cross, Euston, Camden
Applicant Name/s             Miss Clarissa Sajbl           
No. of Occupants             n/a
Company Name             Be Memorable           
Size of Area Req             2000-2500 square feet
Type Of Business             Branding            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical
Move Date             2-3 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             clarissa@bememorable.co.uk           
Reason for Moving             new business
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             we are a branding agency currently consisting of 9 employees however we will be growing next year....we would also need a small extra studio for our photographer. 2 parking spaces would also be required.

Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross

Jan 2011

Date/Time Sent             14/01/2011 @ 10:35:06            
Preferred Locations             Camden, Islington, Kings Cross, Primrose Hill
Applicant Name/s             Mrs Lisa Richmond           
No. of Occupants             15 (They would look at different rooms)
Company Name             Lisa Richmond           
Size of Area Req             1800-2500sqft
Type Of Business             Design            
Total Price Limit Pcm             considering options
Telephone 1             07815 324 959           
Move Date             ASAP
Duration Req             ongoing
Email             hellolcr@gmail.com           
Reason for Moving             not specified
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             Needs space for conference room, cutting mates. Something with character,
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Comments             Client is happy to be contacted directly if you have something suitable.

Feb 2011

Contact First Name:             Judi           
Contact Last Name:             Steel           
Company name :             Adva Optical Networking
Address:            
           
Location(s) of Interest:             Kings Cross                       
Number of people:             10
Approx move in date:             April 2011
Approx Duration:             12 Months
Type of space required:             Serviced Offices
Space:             1000 sq.Feet

Business Centres Selected
[5015] Spaceshift & Scarlet Maguire - Cromer St, WC1 - King's Cross St Pancras

Mar 2011

Date/Time Sent             21/03/2011 @ 06:14:21            
Preferred Locations             Kings Cross
Applicant Name/s             Mr Martin Taylor           
No. of Occupants             6 expanding
Company Name             Martin Taylor           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             New Business            
Total Price Limit Pcm             considering options
Telephone 1             01634290300           
Move Date             within 2 months
Duration Req             ongoing
Email             martintaylor@icservice.uk.com           
Reason for Moving             new business
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             the client is a new business looking to take space for initially 6 persons with a view to expanding rapidly to over 20 persons... they are considering their options at the moment and are looking at leased and serviced spaces
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross
Comments             please contact client directly with availability and pricing.

April 2011

Date/Time Sent             21/04/2011 @ 12:10:16            
Preferred Locations             Angel, Highbury and Islington
Applicant Name/s             Mr Simon Dale           
No. of Occupants             12 + meeting room (They would look at different rooms)
Company Name             Blue Compass           
Size of Area Req             1000-2000sq ft
Type Of Business             Online recruitment            
Total Price Limit Pcm             considering options
Telephone 1             02077004994           
Move Date             2-3 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             simon@blue-compass.com           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Facilities Needed             n/a
Requiring Info             Looking at something with a separate room for meeting room that is already or can be partitioned - must have this. 1-2 floors is fine. July move date. Must have good natural light.
Interested In             Cromer Street, Kings Cross

May 2011

Date/Time Sent             31/05/2011 @ 16:53:03            
Preferred Locations             Islington, Kings Cross, Shoreditch, Clerkenwell
Applicant Name/s             Ms Samantha Marshall           
No. of Occupants             3
Company Name             Nova           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Fashion PR            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical
Telephone 1             07970432410           
Move Date             within 2 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             sam@novalondon.com           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Requiring Info             internet, basic space, looking for something a bit rough round the edges, not too corporate a feel.
This organisation is not client facing
Interested In             Cromer Street

June 2011

Date/Time Sent             24/06/2011 @ 15:43:12            
Preferred Locations             Victoria, Soho, Euston, Kings Cross, Oxford Street, Holborn,
Applicant Name/s             Ms Lorraine Espinoza           
No. of Occupants             6
Company Name             Prepaid Services Company Limited           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Online Payment            
Total Price Limit Pcm             5000
Telephone 1             02033267089           
Move Date             ASAP
Telephone 2             n/a            
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             l.espinoza@paysafecard.com           
Reason for Moving             not specified
Requiring Info             secure, reception area, modern and contemporary, meeting rooms, other financial companies in the building would be a bonus. Area wise anywhere with good transport links particularly with links to the Victoria or Piccadilly lines would be good
This organisation is client facing
Interested In             Cromer Street

July 2011
Date/Time Sent             19/07/2011 @ 16:43:41            
Preferred Locations             Covent Garden, Kings Cross, Bloomsbury, Fitzrovia , Goodge Street,
Applicant Name/s             Mr Ian Mewth           
No. of Occupants             n/a
Company Name             Count Geo physics           
Size of Area Req             600-1000sqft
Type Of Business             Exploration and development for oil gas.            
Total Price Limit Pcm             £40k PA
Telephone 1             02076278433           
Move Date             3-6 months
Telephone 2             07718734247           
Duration Req             ongoing
Email             ian@countgeo.com           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Requiring Info             Light, security. Critical factors. Must be a nice building, for clients visiting. Up to 8-9 people. Has large workstation’s to work on so need 1000sqft for 8-9 people. Variable amount of number of people there.

This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

Aug 2011

Date/Time Sent             03/08/2011 @ 11:03:24            
Preferred Locations             Kings Cross, Kings Cross, Euston
Applicant Name/s             Mr Leo Soloman           
No. of Occupants             8
Company Name             career analysts.           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Psychotherapy            
Total Price Limit Pcm             considering options
Move Date             3-6 months
Duration Req             ongoing
Email             leo@careeranalysts.co.uk           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Requiring Info             the client is looking for a unit of circa 600sqft in the Kings Cross area. Ideally they would need 2 or 3 meeting spaces also as they are a team of psychologists. Are happy to look at serviced space if within budget
This organisation is not client facing
Interested In             Cromer Street

Sept 2011
Date/Time Sent             29/09/2011 @ 09:48:03            
Preferred Locations             Soho, Old Street, Bloomsbury, kings Cross, Victoria
Applicant Name/s             Mr Shaun Rutland           
No. of Occupants             15
Company Name             Hutch Games           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             PC Games            
Total Price Limit Pcm             5000
Telephone 1             07931387725           
Move Date             within 2 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             shaun@hutchgames.com           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Requiring Info             Looking for space for 15 people but willing to high dense. Ability to expand. Looking for a deal. Happy to go anywhere in central London but these are the ideal locations. This is the final budget and cannot pay more than this - would like to pay a good deal less.
This organisation is not client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

Oct 2011

Contact First Name:             Terry           
Contact Last Name:             Hadley           
Company name :             The Beauty Academy
Address:            
Office tel:             01638 666656
Email:             mail@terryhadley.com
Website:             http://www.terryhadley.com
Nature of Business :             Beauty
           
Location(s) of Interest:             WC1                       
Number of people:             1800 sq ft.
Approx move in date:             ASAP
Approx Duration:             12 months
Type of space required:             Serviced Offices

Business Centres Selected
[5015] Spaceshift & Scarlet Maguire - Cromer St, WC1 - King's Cross St Pancras

Nov 2011

Date/Time Sent             11/11/2011 @ 15:18:59            
Preferred Locations             Euston, Kings Cross, Bloomsbury,
Applicant Name/s             Mr Robert Slade           
No. of Occupants             n/a
Company Name             Beurer UK           
Size of Area Req             250-350sqm
Type Of Business             Health and well-being            
Total Price Limit Pcm             considering options
Telephone 1             01618203452           
Move Date             07/03/2012
Duration Req             1-3 months
Email             robert.slade@beureruk.com           
Reason for Moving             Satellite office
Requiring Info             ***Looking to rent the space for 1 month*** from the 7th March to the 7th April.

Will be used as a showroom and client meeting room space during a month long industry conference

This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street.

Dec 2011

Date/Time Sent             13/12/2011 @ 11:38:36            
Preferred Locations             Kings Cross, Hoxton, Camden, Shoreditch, aldgate East, Islington
Applicant Name/s             Mr Michael Harm           
No. of Occupants             n/a
Company Name             Invisible Woman           
Size of Area Req             1000-1500sqft
Type Of Business             Film Production            
Total Price Limit Pcm             £3500
Telephone 1             07956317882           
Move Date             3-6 months
Duration Req             ongoing
Email             michaelharm@me.com           
Reason for Moving             Satellite office
Requiring Info             Cutting tables and sewing machines. Looking for somewhere to design costumes, loading and unloading space. They're costume designers for films and want somewhere to make costumes for 6 months. Do a lot of delivery between Camden and Rotherhithe
This organisation is not client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

Jan 2012

Date/Time Sent             05/01/2012 @ 15:24:23            
Preferred Locations             Mayfair, W1, Holborn, Covent Garden, Farringdon, Euston, Kings Cross, Victoria, Paddington, Soho,
Applicant Name/s             Mr Robert Wigman           
No. of Occupants             4-5
Company Name             Pholio             Size of Area Req            .
Type Of Business             Photography Networking / Agency            
Total Price Limit Pcm             £2500 - £4000 Mayfair,
Move Date             02/04/2012
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             robert.wigman@pholiouk.com           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Requiring Info             Client looking is for a 4-5 Person Space in Central London close to the transport links of the major train lines, Client is looking for something modern/funky, bright, spacious.

This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

Feb 2012

Date/Time Sent             29/02/2012 @ 09:14:09            
Preferred Locations             Covent Garden, Holborn, Kings Cross, Euston, Chancery Lane,
Applicant Name/s             Ms Samina Shad           
No. of Occupants             10
Company Name             Workality           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Charity            
Total Price Limit Pcm             8000
Move Date             asap
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             privacy requested           
Reason for Moving             not specified
Requiring Info             Looking for space for 10 people very quickly expanding to 20 within the first few months, looking for a 6 or 12 month contract and ideally looking to be around Covent Garden or Holborn, but will consider surrounding areas and anywhere in central London where they can get a good deal.
This organisation is not client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

March 2012

Date/Time Sent             19/03/2012 @ 16:27:08            
Preferred Locations             Victoria, Euston, Kings Cross, Paddington, London Bridge
Applicant Name/s             Miss Jo Rhodes           
No. of Occupants             n/a
Company Name             Geezer Telecom Ltd           
Size of Area Req             300-400sqf
Type Of Business             Telecoms            
Total Price Limit Pcm             no budget given - £2000
Move Date             ASAP
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             j.rhodes@geezertelecom.co.uk; m.rogers@geezertelecom.co.uk; baldelep.chandhoke@gmail.com           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises

Interested In             Cromer Street
April 2012

Date/Time Sent             26/04/2012 @ 15:22:16            
Preferred Locations             Camden, Oxford Circus, Kings Cross, Euston,
Applicant Name/s             Miss Ling Kim           
No. of Occupants             10 people
Company Name             Ling Kim           
Size of Area Req             additional space for storage
Type Of Business             Internet Shopping            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical
Move Date             asap
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             Jiny9241@gmail.com           
Reason for Moving             not specified
Requiring Info             Big Language Barrier - Client is looking for a large space for 10 People between Camden -> Oxford street, they take lots of deliveries so they would prefer something with good access, preferably on the ground floor, require good internet, 24x7 access
This organisation is not client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

May 2012

Date/Time Sent             21/05/2012 @ 10:50:26            
Preferred Locations             Archway, Tufnell Park, Kings Cross, Shoreditch, Old Street, Farringdon, Clerkenwell
Applicant Name/s             Miss Laura Dixon           
No. of Occupants             9
Company Name             Forever Beta           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Creative Agency            
Total Price Limit Pcm             quoted £300 a desk Archway and starting from £400 a desk shoreditch
Move Date             2-3 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             laurad@forever-beta.com           
Reason for Moving             not specified
Requiring Info             Speculative enquiry looking for pricing differences between Archway and Shoreditch, probably wont be looking to secure something for a while, looking for pricing on 9 Desks, looking for a Lively environment, needs to be close to transport links, 24x7 access, parkings options (nearby is fine), communal outdoor area would be a bonus

This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

June 2012
Date/Time Sent             07/06/2012 @ 09:21:51            
Preferred Locations             Baker Street, Great Portland Street, Marylebone, Euston,
Applicant Name/s             Mr Arwin Fakey           
No. of Occupants             10-12
Company Name             E Brokers           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Financial Brokers            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical
Telephone 1             07970934550           
Move Date             2-3 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             afakey@ebrokersuk.com           
Reason for Moving             not specified
Requiring Info             Looking for a very economical space for 10-12 people with air con. Looking to try and get all in for £3500, may consider a high-densed option. Would look at serviced or leasehold but would like a flexible contract.

This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

July 2012
Forgive me for putting this on not finished there is alot of interference with my Mac today..



July 2012

Date/Time Sent             11/07/2012 @ 14:36:05            
Preferred Locations             Soho, Russell Square, Bloomsbury, Regent Street, Goodge Street, Oxford Street, Tottenham Court Road, Kings Cross, Euston,
Applicant Name/s             Ms Yasamin Ghazizadeh           
No. of Occupants             30-35
Company Name             WRG           
Size of Area Req             1500-2000sqft
Type Of Business             Creative Communications Agency            
Total Price Limit Pcm             £10,000 PCM
Move Date             ASAP
Duration Req             1-3 months
Email             yasamin.ghazizadeh@wrg.uk.com           
Reason for Moving             not specified
Requiring Info             office for 30-35 people, project team, need to all be on one floor- ideally open plan, 3 MONTHS, 18th july until 2nd october term. BUDGET DRIVEN £10K PER MONTH
This organisation is not client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street


Aug 2012

Date/Time Sent             01/08/2012 @ 16:00:34            
Preferred Locations             Clerkenwell, Russell Square,
Applicant Name/s             Mr David Waddock           
No. of Occupants             10
Company Name             Development Finance International           
Size of Area Req             800sqft
Type Of Business             Aid and Foreign Development Charity            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical
Move Date             3-6 months
Duration Req             3+ years
Email             mail@dri.org.uk           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Requiring Info             Looking for around 800sqft open plan with a directors office. Looking to move around the end of November and they are looking for space for a charity so cost is the most important thing.
This organisation is not client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

Sept 2012

Date/Time Sent             05/09/2012 @ 16:22:01            
Preferred Locations             EC1, Kings Cross, SE1,
Applicant Name/s             Mr Andrew Dick           
No. of Occupants             12-14
Company Name             Garage Sale Trail           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Charity Events Company            
Total Price Limit Pcm             £4500
Telephone 1             07763402071           
Move Date             3-6 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             andrew.dick@gmail.com           
Reason for Moving             not specified
Requiring Info             Looking for space for 12-14 people for a company looking to move around the end of the year and happy to look at both short term and long term contracts. Very open with areas as long as its a good quality area in central London. Should be smart but not over the top. They are part lottery funded so cannot be seen to be in too impressive a building. He has to wait until the first week of November before he can commit to any space as that is when he will be finding out about his funding.
This organisation is client facing
Interested In             Cromer Street

Oct 2012

Date/Time Sent             03/10/2012 @ 14:08:32            
Preferred Locations             Kings Cross, Waterloo, Vauxhall, Brixton, Wandsworth,
Applicant Name/s             Mr Ben Hume-Paton           
No. of Occupants             4-8
Company Name             Goucho Productions           
Size of Area Req             1000sqft
Type Of Business             Production making corporate film            
Total Price Limit Pcm             £2200 pcm
Telephone 1             02030581190           
Move Date             within 2 months
Telephone 2             07973887451           
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             ben@gouchoproductions.com           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Requiring Info             their office is £16k per year going up to 24k- between £16-20 per sq ft and or all in £26000 per year all in, if there are partitioned bits for editing suites, december move, looking for longevity, parking for 1 would be useful
This organisation is not client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

Nov 2012

Date/Time Sent             05/11/2012 @ 11:03:53            
Preferred Locations             Kings Cross, Euston,
Applicant Name/s             Miss Jocelyn Palmer           
No. of Occupants             7
Company Name             Hermes Medical Solutions           
Size of Area Req             .
Type Of Business             Software development            
Total Price Limit Pcm             no budget provided
Move Date             01/01/2013
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             jocelyn@hermesmedical.com           
Reason for Moving             not specified
Requiring Info             7 workstation office walking distance of Kings X, preferably split over 2 rooms - part meeting room/break out area, happy to look at 4/3 - 5/2 - 4/4 setups, kitchenette facilities/lunch area would be great. would look at serviced / unserviced, presentable and cost effective, currently renting with Avanta serviced offices.
This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street


Dec 2012

Date/Time Sent             13/12/2012 @ 15:38:05            
Preferred Locations             Paddington, Euston, Marylebone, Fitzrovia ,
Applicant Name/s             Miss Kim Staplehurst           
No. of Occupants             9
Company Name             Roberts And Partners           
Size of Area Req             1000
Type Of Business             Accountants            
Total Price Limit Pcm             40K per just for rent
Telephone 1             02074862060           
Move Date             06/03/2013
Telephone 2             07932080221           
Duration Req             3+ years
Email             k.staplehurst@robertsandpartners.net           
Reason for Moving             not specified
Requiring Info             9 people, 1000sqf, non serviced (has own phones/internet)- will consider managed as they would prefer reception/ad hoc meeting room access, Paddington, Euston, Marylebone, Fitrovia - close to transport links, post offices and banks, 9 people, meeting room, Will consider Open plan/separated rooms, access to a meeting room for 4 people. Can sign for 5 years, 40K for just for rent - unsure of all in budget at this stage.

This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street


Jan 2013


Date/Time Sent             31/01/2013 @ 09:25:56            
Preferred Locations             Marylebone, Westbourne Grove, Baker Street, Noho,
Applicant Name/s             Mr Kenneth Walsh           
No. of Occupants             8
Company Name             London Relocation           
Size of Area Req             600
Type Of Business            
Residential letting.             Total Price Limit Pcm             £6000pcm
Move Date             3-6 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             kenneth@londonrelocation.co.uk           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Requiring Info             west end, west london, Fully serviced, Ideally corner office with loads of natural, modern or period, Client facing. likes 'Village' style areas such as Westbourne grove and Marylebone.

This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street



Feb 2013

Date/Time Sent             12/02/2013 @ 15:53:27            
Preferred Locations             Old Street, Angel, Clerkenwell, Kings Cross,
Applicant Name/s             Mrs Pathika Martin           
No. of Occupants             10
Company Name             Reproductive Health Matters           
Size of Area Req             750
Type Of Business             Publisher            
Total Price Limit Pcm             economical - mid range
Move Date             08/07/2013
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             pmartin@rhmjournal.org.uk           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Requiring Info             Clerkenwell, angel old street. 700sqft, 6x person, Open plan separate meeting room. Ad-hoc meeting room and perm meeting room. They will consider leased/Serviced/Managed but they would like to take advantage of the lack of business rates for Charities.

This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

Mar 2013

Date/Time Sent             20/03/2013 @ 11:22:36            
Preferred Locations             Baker Street, Marylebone, Paddington, Euston, Oxford Street, Kings Cross, Great Portland Street,
Applicant Name/s             Mrs Luisa Gottardo           
No. of Occupants             15-20
Company Name             Fielding and Nicholson           
Size of Area Req             1000-1500sqft
Type Of Business             Bespoke Tailors           
Total Price Limit Pcm             10-12k pcm
Move Date             within 2 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             luisagottardo@btinternet.com           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Requiring Info             15-20x person Baker street, plus storage or light industrial sewing machines, Phones and internet, Document and storage, Open plan for office but fitting room not much noise. Flexible on the look and feel space. fully manned reception, ad-hoc meeting rooms,
This organisation is client facing
Interested In             Cromer Street


April 2013

Date/Time Sent             29/04/2013 @ 18:45:56            
Preferred Locations             Euston, Kings Cross,
Applicant Name/s             Mr David Brown           
No. of Occupants             20
Company Name             Gentrack           
Size of Area Req             1500
Type Of Business             Software company            
Total Price Limit Pcm             14,000-16,000pcm
Move Date             3-6 months           
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             davidb@gentrack.com           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Requiring Info             Euston, St Pancras, 20x person, Serviced, Open plan but would consider over two rooms. Good standard and ad-hoc meetings. Must be close by if they are split over two rooms.

This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

May 2013

Date/Time Sent             29/05/2013 @ 16:04:05            
Preferred Locations             Warren Street, Great Portland Street, Euston Square, Euston,
Applicant Name/s             Mr Sujuru Amakubu           
No. of Occupants             8-12
Company Name             Orb Global           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Business Consultancy            
Total Price Limit Pcm             £5000-£7000pcm           
Move Date             ASAP
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Reason for Moving             not specified
Requiring Info             My client is looking for an 8-12 person serviced office but would like to furnish it themselves. Other than furniture, they'd like all other services provided. Look and feel isn't too important but they'd like to have good transport links and need to be as close to Warren Street as possible for an ASAP move in date.

This organisation is not client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

June 2013

Applicant Name/s             Mr Wing Chan           
No. of Occupants             25
Company Name             Market Invoice Ltd           
Size of Area Req             1200sqft
Type Of Business             Invoice Financing            
Total Price Limit Pcm             £15000pcm all inc           
Move Date             within 2 months
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             w.chan@marketinvoice.com           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Requiring Info             My client is looking for a 25 man managed office with access to a meeting room for 4-5 and another for 15. The office would need to be fairly presentable and they need good access to public transport for a move in date of late August. They initially wanted a conventional lease but they need the flexibility the and he quick move date of a serviced/managed so we've agreed to consider managed options.

This organisation is client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

July 2013

Date/Time Sent             02/07/2013 @ 11:50:28             Preferred Locations             Liverpool Street, Moorgate, Marylebone, Euston, Kings Cross, Bank,
Applicant Name/s             Ms Irene Mateides           
No. of Occupants             20
Company Name             FMS           
Size of Area Req             1500
Type Of Business             Publishing            
Total Price Limit Pcm             11,000pcm
Move Date             asap
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Requiring Info             20 people at a maximum all needing desks. They ideally want to buy for 500K but they will also happily rent. They currently have two offices in Hertfordshire and Mayfair but there have been issues with communication so they want to combine both offices into one. The office needs to be very accessible by tube. Liverpool Street is their 1st preference.
This organisation is not client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

Aug 2013

Date/Time Sent             13/08/2013 @ 10:27:27            
Preferred Locations             Euston, Paddington, Marylebone, Kings Cross, Soho, Noho,
Applicant Name/s             Ms Adriana Gorneanu           
No. of Occupants             14
Company Name             Creative Instore Solutions           
Size of Area Req             1000-1500sqft
Type Of Business             Design Manufacturing            
Total Price Limit Pcm             8,000pcm
Move Date             asap
Duration Req             3+ years
Email             adriana@creativeinstore.co.uk           
Reason for Moving             problems with current premises
Requiring Info             1000-1500sqt. Two rooms on for 4-6 person office and the other will be a display area for their fridges and designs. Both rooms has to be next to each other.

Interested In             Cromer Street

Sept 2013

Date/Time Sent             10/09/2013 @ 17:43:42            
Preferred Locations             Chiswick, Hammersmith, Kensington, Knightsbridge, Mayfair, Victoria, Mayfair, Marylebone, Noho, Soho, Kings Cross, Euston,
Applicant Name/s             Ms Lara Selby           
No. of Occupants             10-15
Company Name             Pivot London           
Size of Area Req             n/a
Type Of Business             Digital Strategy            
Total Price Limit Pcm             7000pcm
Move Date             asap
Duration Req             6-12+ months
Email             lara@pivotlondon.com           
Reason for Moving             expansion
Requiring Info             10-12 person and ideally a small break out area and ideally a private meeting room for 6 around table but will consider communal meeting room. The rooms have to be interconnected. They like blank canvass white walls, mutual flooring, bright and clean office space.
This organisation is not client facing

Interested In             Cromer Street

Short Version of the Case

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Case Short Version

There is enough is this case to establish a liability in common law and in contract law as well as in the Landlords and Tenant’s Act law which is established within the terms of the two property leases for 104 & 106-108 Cromer Street, London, WC1H 9PB.

Further there is within this case an important matter of public interest that will need to be determined by this court and that is:

 “Can a landlord break the terms and conditions, of a building’s and liability insurance policy, this making a leaseholder, being the person who has suffered building damage and business interruption effectively and in other words left without any compensation at all, therefore completely, through no fault of their own, uninsured?”

This despite the leaseholder paying the landlord for insurance.

I am here to establish the case that has held my entire life up since 2004, when I first made an application to my landlord to pay me for the damage he suffered me, that was covered under the terms of our joint insurance that he breached and not I.

I want all the money owed to me to be totted up in a fair manner including interest and substantial damages paid to me forthwith and this case to be finally put to bed within the fair and established laws of this country.

I am not seeking revenge nor to smear any characters, who may have been involved in holding up the case. I am here to get my money back.

Number 1 Article in the Human Rights Act is the protection of property.

Number 6 Article in the Human Rights Act is the right to a fair trial.

From England to Europe, from America to Australia and the world over we have always held as sacred the protection of our property.

And England is held up in high regard throughout the world in chancery (i.e. money), that said and also the common persons right to be treated as equal in the eyes of the law.

So I Commence battle in proving my case:

1. Contract – In my contract also known as my “leases of two properties”, it is established that my landlord has to insure the properties. 
The insurance covers all risks at all times including, any repairs and consequential losses and liabilities resulting from damage. 
It is established that I pay my landlord to insure my property as is very common throughout the world. 
In contract the insurance is not written up and nor is it necessary to be spelled out, as a repairing instrument, it is just called insurance and it does cover repairs as one can read in the insurance policy. 
In the most important case in this country regarding a contract of building and liability insurance, the words, “to keep in repair ‘at all times’” those words were carefully deciphered. 
It is the most important precedent of a case called ‘British Telecommunications v Sun Life PLC’ and the outcome was that “to be kept in repair, at all times” meant quite literally “at all times”. 
These words are very important to the common man and woman, as it is about the ‘construction of words’ in a contract and what that means under normal terms and conditions that we all may find ourselves in from time to time, especially in property contracts.
Why it became so important as a leading authority case was that someone could sue, ‘from the moment of damage’, which is quite right and fair. 
So British Communications v Sun Life PLC is a good law. 
Liability is established from the moment of damage in common law, in contract law and in Landlords and Tenants law.
So to conclude my first point, as I had insurance for all risks, I was covered for repairs, damage and liability for damage or consequential losses including business interruption “at all times” thanks to the law of British Communications v Sun Life.

2. Bearing in mind I am right about that, lets look now at my contract. In my contract it says that under no circumstances should I do any act that would render the insurance invalid 
5(22) TO PAY COST OF REBUILDING IF INSURANCE AVOIDED
In the event of the Demises Premises or the building in which they are situate or any neighboring premises or any of them or any part thereof being destroyed or damaged by any of the Insured Risks and the insurance money under any policy of insurance effected thereon by the Landlord being by reason of any act neglect default or omission of the Tenant wholly or partially irrecoverable forthwith in every such case to pay to the Landlord on demand the cost of rebuilding and reinstating the building or buildings so destroyed or damaged such rebuildingworks to be carried out by and in accordance with the requirements of the Landlord and theTenant being allowed towards the expenses of so doing (upon such rebuilding and reinstatementbeing completed) the amount (if any) actually received by or on behalf of the Landlord (other than in respect of loss of rent) under any such insurance as aforesaid in respect of such destruction or damage
  or I will pay to the landlord the cost of rebuilding as if the insurance had been in place. However it says nothing in the contract a legally binding document also known as my lease, that the landlord should not do any act to invalidate the insurance.

“And a contract is a contract and I signed it never thinking once of a scenario where the landlord would invalidate the insurance.”

However luckily for me, two laws that this country made which, save me, in terms of what is fair in the eyes of the law.

a) Because my landlord in the contract has an expressed ‘contractual duty’ to insure, if he leaves me through his acts uninsured then he has not fulfilled his contractual duty to insure as I am now uninsured. And its not in my part of contract to insure with a reputable insurer, I only contractually have to pay him to insure and that is my side of the contract fulfilled. So I have done that and that’s not in dispute but he hasn’t insured me!! The why’s and wherefores, are utterly irrelevant, he has broken the contract with me and with them the insurers.

“So here is a landlord somewhat in a bad position, having broken both contracts and I still need to be paid.”

I therefore only need to prove I was covered for insurance “at all times”and that the landlord failed to insure me. He has broken my contract in law.

b) Other laws that assist me, are – How this country views property – and there has been much argument, considering it is the Number 1 Article in the Human Rights convention, “Protection of one’s Property”, regarding property leases, again, ie, contracts but we’ll use the word lease contract here to explain how the law is again in my favour regarding “workable” lease contracts. 
Here, I not only have a precedent, in law, in my favour, I must point out that additionally, this law went as far as the House of Lords to be properly established and to make law. So it is a hard one to argue with, since all the Lords had a lot to say about it, unless we are here today to change this, well-established law.
Lord Cross of Chelsea said: that a contract in the form of a lease should be “workable”.The word ‘workable’, like (being kept in repair) “at all times” as cited before, is the key to this law.
And I abbreviate here, 

“where a ‘contract’ or ‘agreement’ between a large landlord and tenant of ‘separate’ occupation to the larger dwelling, does not embody ‘the complete agreement’ between the parties the court maybe willing to supplement the written document by implying terms, placing obligations on one party or another.”
Lord Wilberforce, said, 

“the test was no more or no less than that of necessity.”
Lord Cross then said that the court, and I quote; 

“must be able to say that the insertion of the term is necessary to give” as he put it, “business efficacy (meaning workable business) to the contract and that ‘if it’s absence’ had been pointed out at the time both parties- assuming them to be reasonable men- would have agreed without hesitation, to it’s insertion”

“business efficacy to the contract and that ‘if it’s absence’ had been pointed out at the timeboth parties- assuming them to be reasonable men - would have agreed without hesitation to it’s insertion”

And herein lies my case.

When signing that contract it said in clause 5(22) of my lease, that I must not under any circumstances break the insurance or I pay the landlord as if insurance was in place.

Assuming the landlord to be a reasonable man, he would have agreed had either of us spotted it’s lack of insertion in the lease or imagined the scenario of him breaching the insurance, we would both have reasonably agreed that he pay me as if the insurance had been in place, adding in then – vice versa – to clause 5(22).

It is therefore a duty and ‘necessity’ in all the laws I quoted that the courts “without hesitation” and with the power vested in it and as stated by Lord Cross ‘court maybe willing to supplement the written document by implying terms, placing obligations on one party or another’ the courts must simply add in the implied term, that the landlord cannot break the tenants insurance.




Long Version of the Case - written by me all day!!

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Long Case Version

In challenging the Judgment of the Court of Appeal 24th May 2013 and submitting the pending case to the Supreme Courts in June 2013 for permission to appeal here is my argument.

There were no arrears and therefore no set-off needs to be established as there were no arrears in rent whatsoever.

Evidence; Receipt of payment of rent Oct 2008 to Jan 2009
Point 19 of court of appeal judgment

The only arrears that had built up were liability insurance monies owed to us, causing a rift in relations between landlord and tenant. The eminent Mr Jan Luba QC was the first to mention the term ‘set off’

Evidence; Email between Mr Jan Luba and Ms Jo Flores (nee Gavin) stating to correct the advocates statement as there was no ‘set off’ which was an important legal term. It meant we were saying we would not pay the rent as the amount owed to us from the landlord was ‘set off’ against the rent. We never played that game. We always paid the rent. So the ‘break in’ was a trespass. End of. No set off! Therefore, ‘set-off’ needs to be struck out, as administratively incorrect and as never pleaded, before pro-bono help and is incorrect in facts anyway as proved in receipt of rent payments up to date.

Lord Justice Ward ordered us the claimants to have pro-bono assistance.

Evidence; Permission to Appeal Judgment Order.

Yet our 4 pages document read to by Ms Flores to LJ Ward at the previous May 2012 permission to appeal hearing was so concise, quoting Vural Ltd v Security Archives, Barrett v Lounova, Hargroves Aronson & Co v Hartopp also addressing each error of fact in the original trial with irrefutable evidence and showing evidence of the collaboration between the landlord and the insurers adequately convinced LJ Ward to say that another oral hearing would have to take place but this time with ordered pro-bono assistance to formulate the grounds of appeal. So although all facts were correct LJ Ward wanted a QC to put it in legal language.

Lord Justice Ward’s final point at the end of that hearing in May 2012 was and I quote;

“all damage that took place at the claimants premises came from sources outside of the demised premises, not in the claimants control and legally speaking there has got to be something in that”

It was a very fair and legal point and did later prove to be very accurate.


So to return to the point of “set off” in that then 4 years history of the case in the courts, not a soul had used the word ‘set off’ – in fact the nick name for this case printed on garments merchandise is logoed as ‘Trespassed’

Evidence; Red Trespassed Hoodie.

The forfeiture was then illegal so no need to apply for relief from forfeiture, as a landlord who has trespassed you is not going to give you relief, is he? And further the after the claimants broke back in having showed proof of payment the landlord again trespassed on the 4thNov, so this is not a landlord who is not playing fairly as he had no grounds whatsoever for the second break in as he knows there is no rent owing and what possible reason could he then have for breaking the locks and wanting us out. The second trespass 4th Nov 2008 led to us taking two injuctions, granted by Judge Wilkie on the same day, for protection of property. The losses are running from April 2004 the point of damage to the premises with insurance monies withheld, further to the point of trespass, then to wrongful eviction in Sept 2010 trial judgment and consequently to this very day.

Evidence; The letter that Oliver Barnett says he cannot recall in his witness evidence, to CHA on 24th Oct 2008 warning not to illegally forfeit – 5 days before the trespass.

The law, which has to be maintained, is Vural v Security Archives. This case is about harassment, insurance payments were delayed by the landlord, to put the tenant out of business, so that the landlord could evict the tenant. As held. I wrote that law for the skeleton argument I & II and said it at the oral hearing so I wouldn’t change it to ‘set-off’ and I don’t.

Point 20 of Court of Appeal Judgment

The ‘Grounds’ are clear – they are not simply about an implied obligation for a ‘repairing covenant’ they are about an implied covenant to keep the ‘repairing instrument’, the insurance in place– it’s the and/or point in the grounds that won permission to appeal that are so very clear so they read in effect like this if precise;

‘To keep in repair at all times: Such parts of the building as might if defective, lead to occurrence of damage covered by an insured risk”

Evidence; Email evidence between solicitors Bircham Dyson Bell and I regarding the transcripts of the Court of Appeal.

Ms Flores 23rd July 2013
I wonder if you could tell me whether you recall me advocating two things. 1. That absolute liability was catered for as I was insured for repairs at all times and 2. That I asked for an implied obligation to 5(22) that the landlord could not (like myself) breach the insurance?

Ms McIntyre 29th July 2013
In response to your questions, I can confirm that you argued the two points you mention below.  The transcript of the hearing will reflect this. 

However, I should point out that these two points did not necessarily fall within the scope of the grounds for which permission to appeal was granted on 4 December 2012, particularly your point about an implied covenant based on clause 5(22) of the lease.  

Ms Flores

Thanks you for your response and for kindly confirming that these were my two points argued.

Just to add that the clause 5(22) related to a repairing obligation under a different construction.

Therefore it falls within the grounds that were accepted for implied obligations to repair.

Just to add further that the landlord had a proprietary obligation to lay out insurance for repairing at all times and my insurance cover means that they can still (or should have done at the time) enforce this obligation with the insurance.

As long as I did not break the terms they still have a claim on my behalf.


That makes the ground clear and how it is written by the eminent QC Mr Jan Luba (below), amounts to the same ‘scope’ from within the grounds that were given permission to appeal hearing on the 4thDec 2012 for me to argue 5(22) as the necessary implied ‘repairing instrument’ covenant;

The judge misdirected himself in law as to the landlord’s liability for disrepair under the leases held by the tenants in this case. He ought to have held that the tenants’ obligations to repair in respect of the demised premises, were matched by a correlative implied obligation on the landlord to keep in repair, “at all times: (1) the parts of the building retained in its ownership and control, defects in which may affect the demised premises; and/or such parts of the building as might, if defective, lead to the occurrence of damage covered by an insured risk.”


Further it must be stated to make more logic of the situation that we don’t repair either, our repairs are covered too by the same ‘all risks’ insurance policy as the ‘repairing instrument’. So it makes the point so clear there is no matched repairing obligation, only a matched obligation to make insurance claims for repairs, as that is the system and the remedy.  

The (above) ground’s, were accepted by Lord Justice Ward and I am sure his honour understood them as they were written and pleaded.

If the clause 7(2) of the lease is insurance and insurance is the instrument of repair then the implied insurance obligation is clause 5(22), to be the repairing instrument in place, amounting to a repairing covenant, under a different construction – but the same thing in reality.

Point 21 Court of Appeal Judgment

Going back to the Lord Justice Ward giving us the Claimants legal assistance, this brings in Article 6 of the Human Rights Act, if that assistance missed out a major primary fact and at the time of the legally assisted oral hearing, no advice had been given to the claimants, one could say the claimant could only be forced to trust that all grounds from their previous skeleton I & II were catered for.

Since Ms Flores is not the type to simply trust the advisors she stood and covered that base or loophole as she saw it at the time by asking Lord Justice Ward to accept that there may well be grounds not covered in the advice (when she got it) and that she would be at liberty to add any that had been missed out.

In the original trial HHJ Cowell said that the claimants had not complained of the want of the structure to be repaired.

Evidence N244 submitted to the Court of Appeal before the hearing on the 2nd May 2013 attaching all documents with irrefutable evidence proving the claimants had repeatedly asked for structure to be repaired.

So Ms Flores asked that this be added into the grounds of appeal and she produced all the evidence so that even a fool could see she was absolutely correct in evidence and to appeal it, as one of the grounds. Transcripts cannot be necessitated when evidence produced stares one in the face. The Court of Appeal simply dismissed a large part of the claim amounting to 10’s if not 100’s of thousands of pounds by not accepting this as a ground that Mr Jan Luba QC had inadvertently left out. This does not take into proper consideration Ms Flores suspected lack of trust and unfairly dismisses, off hand, with no good reason, a ‘primary fact’ with irrefutable evidence.

The structure was illegal. It breached building regulations. In the famed Southwark V Mills case, the local authority were reprimanded (although they won the case) and lessons were meant to have been learned for a public landlord from this case so that as of the year 2000, no building regulation in a development or new build (as was in our case with 17m public funds given over in 1999 for rebuild) was allowed to be breached.

In this case only 1 year later the CHA public landlord have famously and flagrantly have breached the law and are going to great lengths to cover this spending in legal costs more than the claim itself was originally.
This ground, then cannot be simply thrown to the side just because the Court of Appeal feels like it with no justification. This ground must morally, socially and legally be put back into the claim. If not this is not a fair trial.

So that deals with the structure and breach of building regulations, the largest part of the claim so now since we are dealing with the issues let’s just quickly deal with point 18 of the Court of Appeal judgment while it is still nearby at the head of the judgment.

Point 18 of the Court of Appeal Judgment

I think it is important to address, “set off” first, then clearing the matters of the grounds of appeal, then the misdemeanors of what constitutes a fair trial and how large parts of a claim cannot be simply removed in a very manipulative manner and then forgotten about which lead us adequately into that important building regulations issue the structure of the building and it’s illegality, so as I said just to deal with point 18 whilst it’s still nearby, that is also a building problem which forms part of our claim.

It is an issue of leaks (covered by insurance) coming into the property via an inadequate bitumen sealant on the street pavement that requires bi-annual maintenance to prevent water ingresses occurring every two years.

Now HHJ Cowell, the Judge at the original trial, held that the pavement did belong (as proved by us) to the defendant landlord, as they insisted throughout it did not. We the claimants can’t then in law be expected to ‘relieve the landlord’ of his legal ‘duty’ to get it fixed as HHJ Cowell suggested we might.

Firstly we did not have the means to do so and even if we did and had mitigated the losses ourselves, we were actually forbidden to do so, as it was a public pavement as well as the landlord in this case expressly forbade us to contact their contractors Kingsbury Construction (when we called them, as seen in evidence). But most importantly our contractual obligations were not to cover repairs outside of the demised premises.

The 7 months delay in fixing the first pavement leak cannot be justified as there was nothing to trace before remedy. Now if in this Judgment of the Court of Appeal, you are referring to another 3 years leak into the high voltage electricity cupboard then further as in the law of Woodfall;

Evidence; Woodfall

‘Bad Contractors’ is in no way a legal defence for the 3 year leak.

So to conclude that deals with;

-       the structure which was illegal
-       the pavement which leaked every two years
-       and now the pipes leaking into the electrical room for 3 years.
So I’ll move on now to the next point and that is point 23 of the Court of Appeal Judgment.

Point 23 of the Court of Appeal Judgment

This point deals with ‘notice’ to the landlord of disrepair and in turn adds to the fact that this was ignored in judgment by the Court of Appeal breaking Article 6 of the Human Rights Act, the right to a fair trial. Like the issue of the structure being manipulatively set aside the ‘notice’ to the landlord part of this case has simply been ignored by the Court of Appeal.

One cannot simply make judgment accepting up to 3 years delay in repairs. In the law of Hargrove, a ground accepted by the permission to appeal hearing, damages were awarded after 2 days ‘NOTICE’but in our case, even the insurers said, that after NOTICE the landlord committed ‘an act of omission’ by failing to repair on time.

So if we take Hargrove as a benchmark on ‘notice’ and in that case liability was established when the claimants having given just 2 days ‘notice’ before any damage was caused won the case, then in our case, if we apply the same principle to 16 cases of disrepair over 4 years, (many at the same time in different place, so subsumed as in can’t be claimed for twice in the same period even though they were different incidences but nevertheless), then after ‘notice’ repairs should be completed relatively quickly in law.

However and we have evidenced this throughout so it is not in dispute either and we still contend that repairs took, 4 months, 7 months, 24 months, 3 years, 3.2 years, another 3.2 years + others and some never got fixed at all, so that the benchmark and president in law for Hargroves Aronson v Hartopp is by far exceeded.

Why then has this been ignored in Judgment by the court of appeal.

Notice is a major part of the law!!!

And upon giving ‘notice’ a landlord then is legally required by ‘duty’ in common law.

But as I said and I keep saying, it matters not in ‘duty’, ‘common law’ or even ‘notice’ as I was insured, so landlords and tenants has no place in this case.

Ironically the UKU building insurance has no cover for any ‘landlords and tenants’ dispute as they simply deal with our contract of insurance with the landlord and ourselves through the landlord, so they don’t pay legal costs for a trespass case, yet they are paying CHA’s legal costs alongside the additional RSA public liability insurers, mixing it up to defend the insurance claim (as a commercial decision ‘yes’ apparently they are allowed make according to the financial ombudsman, that is if FOS is anything to go by but there it is). At this stage they should check the legal merit and the win, which has to be more than 50%, then they should pay us and recover with all their might from the landlord who is well able to defend himself as this case is a legally unfounded case and they can only hope to win by tactics either to wear us out and keep us in court as long as possible, hoping we may slip up or die or starve or whatever game plan they have with all their mighty resources between them all. The landlord seems to have played that card maybe the insurers have too. Well everything has a funny way of being exposed in this case!

But it is in their interest to keep us on our knees, to help the landlord strip us of our shops, our money or of any way we can further a ligitimate insurance claim. Us disappearing would save them a claim. So there must be some way a court can observe that and address it, at least by commenting on it.  

Or every leaseholder in the country should worry that a standard policy of joint landlords and tenants insurance means nothing, as the bigger party will be unfairly armed and that is a commercially viable option available to insurers, especially to a large account holder such as a public landlord with widespread connections as is just most recently legally recognised as having such widespread connections by Europe.

The insurers dropped this landlord so as not to pay them to pay us yet is legally defending them still now at the Supreme Court stage.

The insurers said the landlord failed to repair on time after NOTICE.

They know the law but here is some more of the law for those to be convinced still…
In Cockburn v Smith (where Hart v Rogers which is no longer an authority was a supplemental case that the landlord who retained a roof was under an absolute duty to repair, stressing the word ‘absolute’ duty), it was held that the landlord was under an obligation to take reasonable care once he had ‘notice’ BUT in that case the landlord had some expressed obligations to repair the common parts.

In our case the landlord had no express obligations to repair (EXCEPT To: Keep the demised, my shops, and the common parts above the shops and enveloping them, called “the development” insured against all risks) and that was never argued in the Court of Appeal so it cannot now be said in Judgment that it was said. I never said they have a ‘duty’ to repair-never-not once-because I know they don’t!

NOTICE, however was argued (as in common law notice) and the ‘duty’ to take ‘reasonable care’ but the most important thing which is about notice really (as it certainly played a large part in the insurers decision that the landlord had created an act of omission BY failing to repair on time after notice) but the most important thing, I contended at the Court of Appeal, which brings us straight back to the law of Hargrove is that in Clause 5(22) of the leases there was an implied obligation for the landlord not to break the terms of the insurance – so that – in the landlords expressed obligation, monies could be laid out, once damage was done from the premises, retained by the landlord and outside of my premises and control.

All parties were simply insured against the occurrences that took place. The insurers have said the landlords wrong in notice and so MUST the courts.

I don’t care if the insurers pay and then recover the costs from the landlord, they are huge businesses and by the time, if this case is anything to go by, in terms of them sorting it out among themselves and in terms of the cost of doing that happens then I’ll be long gone – it is simply NOT MY PROBLEM!!! In terms of them stacking up £500,000 worth of legal costs against me, when my claim could have been settled for much less – are they simply nuts the pair of them – or as suspected this case is certainly bigger than me and if that is the case… well it is of public interest as, in future, my law will effect every leaseholder in this country- and they should be worried.

And if you find it is the case, then I better get loads of damages because I’ve just saved loads of tenants and leaseholders throughout the country and nearly half killed myself doing it, doing 1000’s of hours of work, nearly losing my eyesight, not being able to have children, losing my businesses, living on nothing, losing my relationship, nearly financially ruined for life facing half a million pounds costs and never being able to recover who I was as an independent professional and the time lost!!

No- the damages are substantial! And there has to be something said for a professional lawyer who under an oath to the law did not drop this case out of ethics – when she knew – I AM RIGHT!!!

Point 24 Court of Appeal judgment

So onto point 24 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal – Again here to
deal with notice based law – Sedleigh Denfield v O’Callaghan again this was a case where a blocked drain caused trespass in foul sewage to the claimant. It was held that the defendant failed to make the drain safe and adopted the nuisance over a three year period, so despite notice, damage was eventually caused and held as such.

In our case it is important to look at the notice periods given, did the landlord continue a nuisance by not only failing to repair but by also failing to make insurance claims in a timely manner?

An ‘act of omission’ doesn’t exist if they informed the insurers and made claims –

I mean does the Court agree that the landlord had a ‘duty’ as in Sedleigh Denfield v O’Callaghan, upon notice to make insurance claims, to repair? Insurance being a repairing instrument and obligation the same thing under a different construction?

Point 25. Court of Appeal Judgment.

In the Court of Appeal they said in Judgment that it was not argued by me that it was a Rylands v Fletcher case and it did not form part of the grounds of appeal. Yet ground 1 of the amended grounds of appeal is that: the Judge ought to have directed himself that the landlord was liable to the tenant for all loss (and forgive me for being thick here but all loss is Rylands v Fletcher) caused by the defendant and not simply for loss as suffered after the landlord has had knowledge of it etc and further in paragraph 46 of our skeleton argument for the Court of Appeal it says; -

“The judges error was to hold that the landlords only duty was to repair the defect in the retained premises ‘as soon as reasonably practicable after he knows it is causing damage to the demised premises’ (and I quote the words of the eminent Mr Jan Luba QC): “with respect that cannot be law”. It is not impossible to imagine cases and this case may be a paradigm, in which a series of defect, each in turn repaired reasonably promptly by the landlord, successively causes such damage to the demised premises that they are rendered worthless and the landlord escapes liability…”

And before I continue – I have made copious references to Rylands v Fletcher as a ground (because as we all know the only two out of twelve grounds that failed to get permission to appeal were the forfeiture and the stay at the premises) in my case and I remind those of us that were there at the Oral hearing for permission to appeal Lord Justice Ward was quite tickled that Mr Jan Luba QC (who gave some pro-bono help at that hearing) was going to try to reinstate the law of Rylands v Fletcher as an authority-

So I will explain- Rylands v Fletcher having learned it like the back of my hand; the Rylands v Fletcher case is about ‘absolute’ liability-

Rylands mine was flooded by Fletcher, when Fletcher was building a reservoir and for reasons best known to his builders they failed to block up some old mine shafts, before filling his reservoir with water. Of course the water then weaved it’s way to the working mine of Fletcher rendering his business flooded and worthless hence the law:-

‘When someone keeps an artificial construction on his land and it causes mischief on another’s property, he must keep that thing that may escape and cause damage, at his own peril”.

This was the birth of ‘absolute’ liability and in some respects if not the actual very case – it’s precious re-instatement would cost insurers like it used to until just recently, as was fair and right. Liability in insurance terms anyway is from the point of damage or why else have insurance?

So back to me without any doubt that I mentioned the Rylands v Fletcher case (because I was covered by in my view by ‘absolute’ liability because I was insured for liability contractually with my landlord)
So I continue- in the grounds accepted in the permission to appeal hearing in paragraph 48 of our skeleton argument it said:


“The Judge ought to have used the ‘duty’ he identified in Duke of Westminster v Guild as a basis for holding that the liability of such a landlord arises as soon as the defect in the part retained by him causes damage to the demised premise:- this is summarised in the law of Woodfall, “where a lessor (landlord) retains in his possession and control something ancilliary to the premises demised, such as a roof or staircase, the maintenance of which in proper repair is necessary for the protection of the demised premises or safe enjoyment of them by the tenant, the lessor is under an obligation to take ‘reasonable care’ that the premises retained in his occupation are not in such a condition as to cause damage to th tenant or to the premises demised”

Kind of a long-winded version of Rylands v Fletcher – you know NOT to cause damage – reasonable care etc

Okay so…

In Hargrove, Aronson & Co v Hartopp a gutter gets blocked up, landlord fails to clear out after a few day’s – held to be in breach of ‘duty of care’. Cockburn v Smith – very similar held liable – guttering of roof landlord retained control of roof. Lord Justice Scrutton in the case considered that the landlords duty was based on that modified doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher (again actually mentioned in the grounds and skeleton again)

Artificial construction

Becomes a source of danger

To the tenant

Then Lord Justices Bankes & Sargant, preferred not to say whether the relevant ‘duty’ arose out of ‘contract’ or whether it was a ‘duty’ imposed by ‘law’ upon an occupier of premises to take ‘reasonable care’ that the condition of his premises does not cause damage-
BUT they expressed NO DOUBTthat the relevant ‘duty’ existed
and I think it is important to point out that yet at the Court of Appeal three Judges quashed not only what Bankes & Sargant LLJ’s  had said but overturned a judgment by HHJ Cowell the original trial judge that the landlord had a ‘duty’ to repair on time as one outweighed the other so the court of appeal now seems to think.

So where Bankes & Sargant LLJ’s were specific that the relevant ‘duty’ existed, preferring not to say whether that was in common law or in contract, the court of appeal has now preferred contract saying none of the landlords and tenant act matters as the contract overshadows all duties in common law-

So contract here in this case has won the day and new law has been made


So this case isn’t worth arguing in landlords and tenants anymore, those laws are worthless and my case is thereby concluded with this evidence

Insurance Evidence: The landlord made me un-insured and broke his obligation in contract to insure
All Documents proving the dispute with the insurers between the landlord and themselves already shown at the court of appeal, the oral hearing and the original trial.

But since I don’t think one can set aside common law since Bankes & Sargant highly regarded Judges and used all the time in court cases expressed that they had no doubt the relevant duty existed- I shall continue on my absolute liability Rylands v Fletcher point- In paragraph 49 of our skeleton argument for the court of appeal and the grounds of appeal accepted at the permission to appeal hearing, it states;

“That the Judge seems to have imported requirements that, before any liability can arise there must be:
(1)  Knowledge or notice of a need for repair on the point of the landlord; and
(2)  a reasonable opportunity for repairs to be carried out.
That puts the tenants of an ‘enveloped’ premises in a seriously vulnerable position. The correct approach would be that the landlord is (and again here we have it Rylands v Fletcher echo’s) absolutely liable, if a defect in the non-demised premises caused damage to the premises demised.

As Lord Justice Carnwath said in the Earle v Charalambous case;

“In applying a standard (landlords) lessors repairing covenant, the law draws a distinction between disrepairin the demised premises themselves and disrepair in other parts of the building within the lessors control”.

Paragraph 54 of the claimants skeleton argument for the Court of Appeal.

Lord Justice Carnwath continued:

“In the latter case the ‘general ruleapplies: that is, the ‘covenant’, requires the (landlord) lessor, to ‘keep the premises, in repair at all times’ and he is in breach immediately a defect occurs. (British Telecommunication v Sun Life Plc).
Although it can be said the landlord has no expressed covenant in the leases to repair, they do have an expressedin the leases to insure- against ‘all risks’ that could cause damage to the demise, which can be said to be the same thing under a different construction-

Earle v Charalambous and BT v Sun Life being the famous authorities and cases won that deciphered the meaning in construction, “to keep in repair at all times” within a contract, actually means “at all times”– the minute you damage- you pay!

“General Rule” is established (in common law and in contract) and so liability insurers, who get a claim of damage that came from outside the premises demised, would accept absolute liability immediately as that is what the cover is for. Damage covered“at all times”.

If this case is said not to be anything to do with common law as there was a ‘contract’ of insurance, then luckily we were covered for “all risks”, “all damage”, “at all times”-

Further: In the lease contract the landlord retained rights to enter our premises and repair and the original Judge said that the law of nuisance was “sufficiently pleaded in terms of fact”.

So all these points I’ve made do suggest that at the Court of Apppeal, ‘Rylands v Fletcher’ formed part of the groundsand I will not give way to cheap tactics, technicalities or errors that suggest that I did not suggest Rylands v Fletcher ie ‘absolute liability’ from the point of damage. To say it wasn’t in the grounds is breaching Article 6 of the Human Rights Act, the right to a fair trial, when it was!

And further for the Judges in the Court of Appeal on May 24th 13’ to suggest no stricter liability in common law (-when NONE was pleaded anyway-) for an implied obligation to repair, then what already was contractedin the lease and has remedy– oh dear is beyond belief-

because they don’t say yes insurance was in place but then the landlord scuppered the remedy-

they don’t say ummm but the landlord breached the “expressed” need to insure in the lease contract, they don’t mention, the medicine was gone- the remedy- didn’t exist-
but prefer to say the law should “not be stricter than the” non-existent “remedy”.. it beggars belief and IS NOT FAIR, RIGHT OR LAWFUL!
The judgment then gets rather long-winded off on a tangent about implied obligations and the explains suddenly why a ground that was excepted to be used at the Permission to Appeal hearing NOW cannot be used and that was the law of Barrett v Lounova..

Because you see in that case, it say’s that if I fix the inside and no one is contracted in the lease to repair the outside well the ‘implied obligation’ common sense ‘obligation’ would be as judged in that case that the landlord who has control of the outside exterior must by ‘implied obligation’ fix it or else my fixing the inside just becomes a futileexercise when his outside is continuously causing me damage-

But we used Barrett v Lounova not for want of the landlord to repair the outside himself, we used Barrett v Lounova for the PRINCIPLE and the precedent of the need for an ‘implied obligation’ and this case adequately helps draw a parallel in our own case-

If we repair the inside and the landlord doesn’t get his act together to make insurance claims for the outside to be repaired, a contractual expressed obligation as in the insurance which are the ‘special facts’ of our case-

Like the same as a repairing obligation, Barrett v Lounova, assists to make a fair judgment.

It’s the same, same, but different.. Everyone in legal advice since the beginning say’s it’s a Barrett v Lounova case and it is-

Barrett  Lounova is the same except one is a chopstick and the other is a fork, same, same but different.

In the Court of Appeal the Judges suggested we asked for a fork but we asked for chopstick it’s the same instrument, it does the same job.

The Judges can’t say oh we can’t have Barrett v Lounova because ‘insurance was in place as the remedy’ when the chopstick was broken.

Barrett v Lounova is the principle in law, it cannot be an identical case, ‘no case can be identical’, they all have ‘special facts’ so for the Judges to actually say we asked for something we didn’t and didn’t want, is a lie, blatant, it just did not happen!!! Again Article 6 Human Rights Act, Right to a fair trial. It’s just twisting facts and pleadings, to suit dismissal of the case and making some far-fetched analysis that there is a lack of comparable law in the Barrett case, where clearly there is.

No- implied obligation to repair was NOT requested-
An implied obligation to keep insurance in place clause 5(22) of the lease was requested to be implied-
In simple language for the landlord not to break the insurance as we under 5(22) cannot

-VICE/VERSA-
-SAME, SAME BUT DIFFERENT-
-TWO REASONABLE MEN WOULD IMPLY WITHOUT HESITATION-

The Court of Appeal in Judgment says that at the original trial the laws that were relied upon by HHJ Cowell at the original trial were Gordon v Selico LTD – BUT – this was a case of fraud committed by a third party-

Nothing to do with the landlord and tenant, it was a 3rd party builder, they should have sued the builder directly-

Duke of Westminster v Guild was cited –BUT- in that case the nuisance came from the  claimants own premises and actually caused a trespass in foul waste to the landlords land.

Bankes & Sargant LLJ’s in the case of Cockburn v Smith was cited and explains a want of ‘reasonable care’ after notice, where he is given notice and fails to repair.

The Court of Appeal Judgment say’s HHJ Cowell at the original hearing cited further authorities such as Carstairs v Taylor – BUT – this was a case where an animal caused the said leak and this was deemed in Judgment to be an ‘Act of God’ not the fault of the landlord.

HHJ Cowell had mentioned Hargroves v Hartopp but that was actually a case where it was judged that it was too late for the landlord to say that the defendant should have insured against damage and the landlord was liable.

The Court of Appeal continued but now from their own point of view in Judgment quoting Lord Justice Scrutton and his concerns over whether the issues arise in tort or in contract (tort being individual cases of damage) and the Court of Appeal in Judgment wonders about the legal implication left open?

But they conclude that Lord Justice Scrutton in a previous case, thinks the legal implication is tort and a ‘duty’ to take ‘reasonable care’ not to cause nuisance.

As for the legal implication left open as to ‘tort’ or ‘contract’ the Court of Appeal mentions another case that merits a possible answer to that legal implication, Gordon v Selico and say’s that L. Goulding expressed the view of whether ther was a gap in the instrument (ie the lease) and said it was more natural to fill the gap by implication ie ‘AN IMPLIED OBLIGATION’ than by the laws of tort (as I said individual cases of damage)-

So here they quote another law which is actually a very well known leading authority Liverpool v Irwin – In that case where an ‘implied covenant’ was preferred over matters of individual tort. This case is now used in effect to make the system now workable for good rather than spending huge amounts of time and money on individual tort cases. So using, a ‘implied obligation’ in the absence of a complete contract is a more effective longstanding decision in law. The facts that made this case, a precedent, were in torts in cisterns overflowing and vandalism on a large dwellings estate. It was a case, due to it being a public landlord of large dwellings where the housing act 1961, Section 32 came into play and although there were noexpressed obligations on the landlord to repair, the Court decided in their absence and to make sense of the contract/instrument to keep the ‘common parts in repair and easements in working order’ to complete the contract by implying obligation on the landlord as the contract necessitated it! 

Point 26. Court of Appeal Judgment.

Here we jump from domestic water supply or lavatories (not mentioning they would have to be an easement ie for our use too) saying and I quote, “it is well established that tenants cannot sue under Rylands v Fletcher for damage caused by defective guttering or leaks in water pipes in the

Evidence: Pictures of nine foot of shit coming down the walls.

absence of proving negligence” and I quote again, “the same PRINCIPLEMUSTapply to SOIL PIPESin this case” –

How’s that then as each is quite hugely different, one carries domesticwater and the other domestic waste ie toilet sewage! SO HERE WE ARE QUICK TO USE PRINCIPLE IN LAW!! –although the comparison from a fork to a chopstick is quite clear, I cannot compare water with excrement easily or at all.

And that concludes my Rylands v Fletcher point clearly in the grounds in response to the Court of Appeal Judgment point 25 and a bit of 26 and 29 in Carstairs v Taylor also Lord Buckman preferred not to say the ‘duty’ arose out of ‘common law’ or ‘contract’ too-

Point 32.Court of Appeal Judgment.

So I move to point 32 in the Court of Appeal Judgment made on the 24th May 2013 currently in application for permission to appeal at the Supreme Court.

On this point the court of Appeal decided that due to, Gordon Teixeira v Selico LTD, which we the claimants apparently and according to the Court of Appeal anyway, follow this line of authority, therefore we cannot plead, they say, an ‘implied repairing obligation’- In Gordon v Selico which I might just add in here was only produced on the first day of the trial as an authority- so we had a night to learn it – it say’s;

 “that the implied obligation to repair should be absolute in nature in the sense that the landlord became liable for the consequences of disrepair as soon as it occurred, regardless of whether he had or should have had notice of the defect”

BUT as I quickly point out, the case pleaded is for a repairing obligation and also the special facts in this case are it was a fraud case committed by a third party, namely the landlords builders.

In our case the third party is the insurers but in our lease contract it caters for the landlords third parties and they are named as it’s servants and agents. The insurers, unlike the builders in this case are at loggerheads with the landlord but the landlords only duty in contract is to us to insurers the premises at an insurer of good repute. The landlords 3rd party is nothing to do with us, we don’t choose who they are. If this was a game of poker and the landlord owed us money it would not matter how he got that money or his fight with a 3rd party though he was a fool to lose money in a poker game so would not pay then it cannot be, that the landlord does not fulfil his “expressed” debt.
The contract is fair. I might add that it is his ONLY expressed contractual obligation to insure us in theses leases. And we paid him to do so. He cannot get off the hook by teaming up with his 3rdparty to beat us up. We have done nothing wrong and are owed a debt that is rising by the day.

We have no contract with his 3rdparty except limited contact through the landlord in producing essential evidence to show the losses.

I cannot see that Gordon v Selico is an authority we would need, as the third party is not our concern,

We contend and have throughout that the landlord was ‘absolutely liable’ because insurances were in place for Property Owners Liability P.O.L. for short and we showed the policy in the Court of Appeal and its not ever been disputed never mind mentioned by the other sides solicitors and lawyers, that the policy covered us all for damage, including business interruption because of any insured risks OUTSIDE of the demise affecting the demised premises.

The only implied covenant requested was them not to vitiate the insurance like we can’t in 5(22).

I cannot believe the case pleaded has been turned into something not pleaded or even said.

But if we are to follow Gordon v Selico common law aspect of the case which so much time was focused on and apply it in PRINCIPLE to what we did ask for 5(22) the landlord not to void the repairing instrument of insurance then in Gordon v Selico it say’s “ The courts of appeal decided in those cases that any liability derived from the position of the landlord as an adjoining occupier is based on negligence and notice!

Well one, the insurers won’t pay because of the landlords negligence and two, it flows that they won’t pay as the landlord took too long to repair after notice- so that according to Gordon v Selico it is an authority in our favour for an ‘implied covenant’ for the instrument of insurance, that serves to repair to be kept in place, as expressed in the contract.

At the Court of Appeal the lawyer for the landlord said an implied obligation for the insurance not to be voided may have been deliberately left out by the architect of the leases however that is not a good argument and has no place legally in the case and further is only a secondary point to the ‘expressed’ obligation to insure in the lease and no insurance was in place because the landlord voided it.

So to conclude the landlord in breaking the terms of the insurance has left us paying the rent, bills and business rates whilst being unable to trade. The landlord in fact made no application for ‘cessor of rent’ a cover in the insurance policy whether in part or in full when we were wholly unable to trade and he still continued to demand rent.

This unduly enriched the landlord whilst they and we were covered elsewhere in contract by insurances.

All the Judges to date have accepted that the landlord breached the insurance except the Court of Appeal who have just failed completely to state it at all.

Therefore an implied covenant is still required as is right to keep the contract from being ‘absurd’ without it. ‘ABSURD’ is a legal term, for an ‘UNWORKABLE’ lease contract, it is then not worth the paper it is written on.

“If it is absurd in our case, it will become a stupid case that every leaseholder in the country should worry about. Landlords effectively doing nothing to repair with insurance, not making claims and getting way with it”

Or landlords going around their leaseholders houses/flats/shops/businesses and saying;

“well I had a look and that was (very legal term here) ‘reasonable’ of me and that then gave me as much time as I needed to get the job done after I called into you” - “I have complied with my part of the law after (another legal term) ‘notice’ therefore, since I looked the next day or soon after - you have to give me however long I want to repair. Oh and I might just do a DIY job myself and not bother the insurance company, saving myself a claim.”

So does anyone in this Supreme Court or in the country want to be a victim of that mentality, I don’t think so – You MUST convict this landlord of negligence after notice and making claims so late (and then only when the ceiling flooded and had to be replaced so they could not avoid making a claim but before they did we had to pay £3,000 to replace it ourselves) so as to void the policy and finally for triggering the legal defence in the policy to avoid the claim for 5 years.

Further when material damage was caused by the landlords demised premises and we paid for the damage ourselves for example £3,000 ceiling, we were reimbursed ‘directly’ only because the landlord did not repair themselves, as they should have mitigating losses according to the contract.

Point 33. Court of Appeal Judgment.

The Court of Appeal in Judgment stated ‘by contrast’ an authority, the one and only ‘authority’ O’Brien v Robinson, which is the exception to the general rule. The ‘special facts’ of this one ‘exceptional’ case to the ‘general’ rule, has often been criticized. Lord Justice Norse explains that there can be exceptions to the rule like when an occurrence of damage is wholly outside of the landlord’s control.

And we see this in the case of O’Brien v Robinson, where the ‘special facts’, in this ONE case made an ‘exceptional rule’, to the ‘general rule’, ‘that before a breach of duty can arise notice must be given’.

BUT since that ruling has often been criticized as being the exception rather than the general rule, it is odd that it makes this appearancein the COURT OF APPEAL PLUS IT BEARS ABSOLUTELY NO RELATION TO THE SPECIAL FACTS IN OUR CASE. In O’Brien v Robinson a hairline crack on the ceiling of a tenants bedroom was not visible to the tenant but they did give the famous notice as they complained that the ceiling ‘might’ fall down with all the dancing that was going on upstairs for years. They then won the case as that was regarded as notice. The landlord had had a ‘reasonable’ opportunity to investigate.

It was an odd case as notice was based still on the crack being invisible even to the landlord.

This was never our case, our case is very straight forward and all damage was visible. Notice was given, yet repairs were not carried out within a reasonable time or in terms of the structure, at all until after we were illegally evicted. The evidence of all of the repairs are in the joint surveyors reports

Mike Parrett damp surveyors report as the joint witness surveyor.

The structure did not comply with building regulations.

Therefore the general rule must apply to our case, as it is not an exception to the rule and the occurrences of damage were not invisible.

The general rule must be in construction with regard to insured risks. This is then absolute liability as covered by insurance from the day of damage, especially since the damage came from outside our premises. Notice cannot be therefore given to defects outside of our premises. We would have to have x-ray vision or be psychic to give notice of an event in the neighbours flat.

In our case we simply tell our landlord damage has occurred, he makes an insurance claim to compensate us for any damage and any consequential losses. This is normal and is ‘absolute liability’ when the insurance is in place covering all risks including flooding and leaks.

Point 34 & 35 in the Court of Appeal Judgment.

The Court of Appeal debated in Judgment if, as in the case of British Telecom v Sun Life, which was the case about construction of words and what to ‘keep in repair’ “AT ALL TIMES” meant and “at all times” meant exactly that, “liability from the day of damage”, “absolute liability” or simply ‘in repair, at all times”, - but the Appeal Court in our case, concluded that- as stated before and wrongly I might add that the original Judge had decided in our case that he would import requirements to give ‘notice’ and allow them a ‘reasonable’ opportunity to fix the damage. The Court of Appeal pretty much dismisses BT v Sun Life PLC, to ‘keep in repair, at all times’ as this could give rise to the need to have the landlord repair immediately, which may in turn allow the Court of Appeal to imply a repairing covenant and again sorry something we didn't ask for- anyway so the whole exercise is very invalid but the conclusion by the Court of Appeal is that “no stricter liability can be given before notice and a reasonable opportunity to repair” backing the first Judge who wrongly in law imported these requirements.

But if we are to ignore all that and apply BT v Sun Life plc to what we did ask for which is to honour the landlords expressed (in contract and leases) obligations to keep insurances in place, then we would be covered for damage ‘at all times’ and not only is that an expressed covenant in the leases as a landlords ‘expressed duty’ but if we were to get what we asked for which the law allows that would be the implied covenant to not breach clause 5(22) which would be not to vitiate the insurance cover, as we can’t so it must be implied that they can’t either. And using BT v Sun Life plc that compensation is due at the point of damage, as the landlord is to keep insurance covering “all risks”, “at all times” and that is “expressed” in our lease contract, with an insurance policy inextricably forming part of the lease contract, attached to the leases.

Point 36. Court of Appeal Judgment.

The Court of Appeal draws our attention to Liverpool v Irwin and quotes Lord Wilberforce saying about the necessity to have an implied clause as opposed to what an occupier, can do for themselves.

In that case the contract needed an ‘implied obligation’ as the contract was incomplete as to who was responsible for the common parts, lifts, stairs, chutes being in good working order etc and the contract was incomplete. I think this case shows a necessity for an implied clause in our case and should work in our favour.

Point 37. Court of Appeal Judgment.

Further the Court of Appeal quotes Lord Edmund-Davies who pondered on the question of whether it is an absolute duty to repair, the common part or whether it is qualified by special facts as to amount to a breach in the landlords obligations.

Lord Edmund-Davies looked at Hart v Rogers (no longer an authority) where the landlord did not repair the roof that had leaked into the claimant’s premises and since that was outside of the claimant’s control, it was seen as an absolute liability case.

Lord Justice Scrutton in the Hart v Rogers case looked at another case of Miller v Hancock when deciding the outcome. It was held in that case, where a claimant’s visitor fell down the stairs because they were worn and defective, that there was a ‘duty’ to keep the stairs and common parts in repair.

However later cases Dunster v Hollis, Cockburn v Smith, decided that there was only a ‘duty’ to take ‘reasonable care’.

In our case there was no ‘easements’ meaning common use or common parts as we are commercial leaseholders and nothing to do with resident ‘tenants’, so these laws which are actually statues, under something called Section 11 and are carefully drawn up in statue for similar cases of dwellings of multiple occupation, but as commercial leaseholders and nothing to do with residents, Section 11 does not apply to our case at all.

We just happened to have leased from a landlord underneath a multiple occupation development, where section 11 special facts and enjoyments are applicable to the residents in their tenancy agreements.

But it has to be said that most shops in every high street are generally underneath (enveloped) a residential occupation.

The large public landlord should be warned that laws and privilege’s that apply to residents are certainly not the same with commercial leaseholders, who can ill afford to casually wait for a reasonable time in ‘duty’ for a landlord to repair as they somewhat completely differently are losing actual cash by the day and the consequences are that without cash flow the commercial leaseholder can be put out of business and owe creditors, in bills, business rates and any other duties they may have to their clients. The consequences of a lack of repair ‘at all times’ are clearly distinct from that of a resident who may face ill health or discomfort.

This is the laws of Chancery (a Court of equity) and the maxims of equity (Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy).

A landlord when dealing with a commercial tenant must insure and claim compensation for all the losses ‘at all times’ – (one just has visions of a concert hall or national newspaper going out o business for a day. The losses could be catastrophic by the day) and that is business for you! Insurance has to stay in place! The massive public landlord with connections in the judiciary cannot get off scot-free just because they have power and influence or we should all be worried!!

Email evidence obtained and given to the Supreme Court in this pending application that the highest judges in the land were involved in this small business case showing a want to bury the case and also a completely illegal family conflict of interest.

That is a nightmare scenario!!!!!!!

I had people to let down and compensate too.

This is of National public importance.

Point 38. The Court of Appeal Judgment.

The Court of Appeal say’s it is said, but doesn’t say or explain we said it and further we were referring to clause 5(22) of our lease contracts, that the case of Barrett v Lounova was cited and this was suggested as a law, (approved as a ground of appeal at the permission to appeal hearing) to suggest we could get an implied covenant to 5(22).

However in using this case as a precedent it does not indicate by any stretch of the imagination that another case and their special facts would be exactly the same. This law is used as a PRINCIPLE, the same outcome, ie to get an implied obligation to clause 5(22) as without one (apart from the expressed obligation to stay insured) the lease is unworkable.

This similarity to our case in the case of Barrett v Lounova is striking.

Barrett v Lounova is the case where a tenant had some repairing obligations, to repair inside of their premises, known as the interior. The landlord in the lease had ‘no repairing obligations’ so that when damage which was caused by the outside of the premises, known as the exterior and then damages the interior, it was said that without repairing obligations to the exterior, repairing the interior could become a futile exercise. The courts decided that repair of the exterior had to fall on someone and since in contract the interior was catered for by the tenants, it went without saying that the exterior was the landlords implied obligation to repair so as not to cause damage to the interior from repairs outside of the demised premises and control.

So the same PRINCIPLE applies in that if the landlord has no repairing obligations as in our case, they at the very least must have an implied obligation to keep the instrument of insurance in place to fix damage caused by the exterior for which we as leaseholders in contract have no obligation to fix.

This is similar to an implied repairing covenant as in Barrett v Lounova because in it’s absence of an implied obligation to 5(22) a disrepair condition of the premises makes the commercial premise unworkable in contract without insurance being in place for disrepair and all risks associated in disrepair.

The Court of Appeal then somewhat ironically say’s;

“There is no suggestion that the implied obligation to repair was absolute in nature and the court was not faced with a lease that imposed on the landlord the insurance obligations contained in clause 7(2). In this case it cannot be said that the tenant is left without remedy in the case of disrepair to the structure. That constitutes an insurable risk and the landlord is REQUIRED under the terms of the leases of 104 & 106 to apply the insurance monies in making good the damage and disrepair

So in that sentence we see the irony. 'The tenant' or in our case leaseholders 'is not left without remedy' cannot be more far from the situation in this case and the obligations to insure in 7(2) are the ONLY expressed landlords obligations in the entire lease. It is a vital sentence.

And it goes back to “the ‘reasonable man would have if they had seen a gap in the contract before they’d signed it” argument that being “they both being reasonable men would have agreed without hesitation to its insertion” (into the contract).

If the remedy expressed in the contract has been vitiated, voided, broken, by the landlord, then the remedy is broken.

We are left with one thing only in this contract to address and that is clause 5(22) and it necessitated an implied obligation to the clause to keep the remedy in place.

But further since it is expressed in the clause 7(2) as a landlords obligation to insure then the court can prefer not to say if it should be an implied obligation to 5(22) or it is a breach of the ‘expressed obligation’ by the landlord to keep the premises insured and that stands on it own in contract law as an outright victory in the case of a breach of contract.

Either way the relevant ‘duty’ exists, to insure, against damage and disrepair ‘at all times’ and is absolute in nature by virtue of the instrument of building and liability insurance.

Point 39.Court of Appeal Judgment.


The Court of Appeal referred to the case involving insured repairs and that was the case of Adami v Lincoln Grange Management BUT again this was a case where an implied REPAIRING obligation was pleaded which I have made clear is not what we have pleaded. The Court of Appeal looks at the case of Gordon v Selico again and quotes Lord Justice Slade as referring to Mr Sunnucks saying, “if the defendants are in breach of any of those expressed provisions relating to repair and maintenance, the proper remedy, (in his submissions is) by refernce to the agreed system and NOT by reference to suggested implied covenants to which the parties never agreed”

Lord Justice Slade then said;

“Where a tenancy agreement relating to a flat, forming part of a larger building in multiple occupation, manifestly does not embody the complete agreement between the parties, the court may well be willing to supplement the written document by implying terms placing obligations on one party or the other. Such a case was Liverpool v Irwin, where the ‘condition of the tenancy’ where tenants were required to sign related only to the obligations on the part of the tenants, not of lessors council”.

However Lord Wilberforce then said, “such obligations should be read into the contract, as the nature of the contract itself implicitly requires no more, no less: a test in other words of necessity.

And Lord Cross of Chelsea, which I cited at the Court of Appeal said:

“That the Court must be able to say that it’s insertion of the term is necessary to give- as he put it- ‘business efficacy’ to the contract and that, if it’s absence had been pointed out at the time both parties – assuming them to be reasonable men – would have agreed without hesitation to it’s insertion”

The Adami v Lincoln Grange Management and Gordon v Selico case both have special facts as each case is different but the sentiment of the Lords remain the same.

In Gordon v Selico a third party covered up dry rot before the leaseholder took the lease on. There could be no implied term for fraud of the third party covered in contract between the parties.

In Adami v Lincoln Grange Management a tenant had gone along with an insurance scheme and no implied term could apply to give him extra monies for subsidence, when the insurance policy covered for it and he had decided to undertake the work himself.


In each case the suggested implied covenant to repair does not require one or merit one, as the insurance provides remedy.

In our case however it is that the instrument of insurance has been broken.

This leaves us un-insured.

It is therefore possible for the Court to imply a covenant to clause 5(22) to not allow the landlord to destroy the remedy.

This protects our position and completes the contract for all the same reasons as the Lords applied in the House of Lords.

In Adami v Lincoln Grange Management case Jutice Vinelott said;

“More generally I can see no grounds for importing any obligations on the part of the lessor to carry out works of repair to the block from causes which are not covered by an insurance policy effected pursuant to the terms of the lease, in particular damage which might result from deterioration of the structure during the term of the lease.”

In Duke of Westminster v Guild, Lord Justice Slade approved a passage by Woodfall, landlords and Tenant’s Act 28thEdition (1978) Vol I para 1/465 page 618 in these terms:

“In general, there is no implied covenant by the lessor of an unfurnished house or flat or of land, that it is or shall be reasonably fit for habitation, occupation or cultivation or for any purpose for which it is let. No covenant is implied that the lessor will do any repairs whatsoever”

BUT… in our case it is an absolute requirement to keep the demised premises and the development in repair and fit for human habitation, with fire certificates in place, with building regulations complied with and at an insurance office of good repute. This forms an integral part of the lease contract and is most importantly with reference to the laws just quoted, it is ‘expressed’ in the lease contract making either a ‘duty’ in law or ‘an implied obligation’ NOT NECESSARY AT ALL!! However where the gap in the contract needs an implied covenant, as common sense and just to spell it out, is that the landlord cannot void the insurance, as we cannot in clause 5(22) then it should be necessary to put in the implied obligation.

5(22) TO PAY COST OF REBUILDING IF INSURANCE AVOIDED
In the event of the Demises Premises or the building in which they are situate or any neighboring premises or any of them or any part thereof being destroyed or damaged by any of the Insured Risks and the insurance money under any policy of insurance effected thereon by the Landlord being by reason of any act neglect default or omission of the Tenant wholly or partially irrecoverable forthwith in every such case to pay to the Landlord on demand the cost of rebuilding and reinstating the building or buildings so destroyed or damaged such rebuildingworks to be carried out by and in accordance with the requirements of the Landlord and theTenant being allowed towards the expenses of so doing (upon such rebuilding and reinstatementbeing completed) the amount (if any) actually received by or on behalf of the Landlord (other than in respect of loss of rent) under any such insurance as aforesaid in respect of such destruction or damage

Point 42.Court of Appeal Judgment.

The Court of Appeal takes the same view about implied 'repairing' covenants although I am at pains to say we did not plead this nor can I find where they take this from that we did but nevertheless the Court of Appeal takes the view that the contract would be improved with a repairing covenant and we agree!

The case of Belize v Belize is then cited as a modern day case about articles of association being written up so badly as to allow people with little or no consequence to a company in charge of it by virtue of others retiring or leaving. In this contract the Court found it was legally ‘ABSURD’. The architect of the contract had not thought of certain situations arising that then occurred causing the case Belize v Belize. The contract required an implied term and thankfully one was implied by the Court’s. This made the contract workable.

In our case the Court of Appeal says here;

“Although there was no express repairing covenant imposed on the landlord, the repair of the structure of the building is catered for through the provision of the clause 7(2). In the face of these provisions there is no reason based on necessity or business efficacy to alter the balance of the scheme by imposing an implied covenant to repair on the landlord, let alone one under which his liability to repair is made absolute”

Yet the Court of Appeal does not deal with the implied covenant request to clause 5(22) “to keep the development and the demise insured at all times”.

It is our case and has been agreed by the trial Judge as primary fact that the insurers said that the landlord committed ‘an act of omission’, which had the direct effect of us being stopped from claiming on the P.O.L. Property Owners Liability cover and that the landlord failed to claim on the ‘cessor of rent’ for times when the premises, as the claimants have contended throughout, were either partially or wholly unfit as set out in the schedule of loss, preferring to instead save on claims and extort money in rent from us when we could not trade due to disrepair.

We continued to pay the rent and stated it was a good-will gesture until such times as the landlord could get the money back from the insurers and mainly we paid the rent so as not to break the landlords and tenants act and find ourselves in serious trouble but we believed that the rent we paid amounting to £39,000 not owed was being held in trust until the ongoing insurance claim was resolved and we were reimbursed.

At the time we did not think we were paying rent not to be reimbursed by the insurance cover and this was a hugely stressful time financially.
The landlord knew they had committed an ‘act of omission’ so that the insurance money would never be paid, until they either resolved their differences with the insurance company or sued them to pay us as was their proprietary duty contractually to apply monies as effectively although we had joint cover, we should in the policy be seen as insuring separately as part of the same policy cover. Hence the reason they kept making rent demands but all the time leaving us in the position of ‘indifference’ and never telling us about the dispute with the insurers for years, just letting us wait and further making out they were actually chasing the claim.

Then when they absolutely knew they could not reimburse us they go and break in with them owing us £39,000 in rent for a 4 days late rent payment, again not our fault because they lost the cheques due to reception having lots of cheques going missing at the time we were told.

They ignored letters warning them not to take action to forfeit after sending threats in rent demands from new management and in witness testimony the new management said they cannot recall getting the faxed and posted legal letters.
Further when we proved just a day later we had paid the rent on time they without any just cause broke in again!! This was an act of violence and Ms Flores flead immediately to the high court within hours and obtained two injunctions for the protection of her property. The injunctions prevented the landlord from breaking in or they would be imprisoned. Ms Flores showed rent payment to get these injunctions. It said that the terms of the leases and quiet enjoyment was granted until trial. Yet this landlord did not observe the terms and still left the premises legally unusable for the two years that lead to trial. They at no point addressed the disrepair as they were contractually bound to do so in the leases and in the terms of the injunctions, to give quiet enjoyment and comply with terms of the leases. Were they stupid or just cocksure in their connections?

Point 43. Court of Appeal Judgment.

We very much agree that the existence of what the parties intended should be a;
“Comprehensive scheme for the repairs of both the demise and the retained parts of the building is sufficient to exclude from their legal relationship, any liability, at common law in tort which the landlord might otherwise be subject to in relation to the retained premises”

Point 44. Court of Appeal Judgment.

In the circumstances it is unnecessary to consider the landlords alternative argument of Caveat Lesse (‘buyer beware’ or a lessor can ‘let a tumbled down house’) law in terms of the leaks into the pavement, as the Court of Appeal said and we agree. But more principally as ‘our argument’ to that Caveat Lessee argument it can have no application in the case anyway, where defects were in the retained parts and covered by the insured risks.

The Court of Appeal said since there was no ‘duty’ in common law, the original (that the judge could hardly avoid) finding of negligence at the trail for 3 weeks excrement down the walls overflowing into the premises, cannot be now held.

This astonishingly small award of just £100 for the original finding of negligence is therefore quashed and the landlord succeeds on taking the £100 and finding of negligence back.

The Court of Appeal added that the trial judge had found that no bookings had taken place in the same 3 weeks.

We contend that that is an imbalanced view, as was written in our skeleton argument and that the original assessment of £100 for the three weeks of negligence finding of damage was extraordinary on the Judges own findings of fact not least that at one point he said the “smell was really bad in 106-108” and the recurrence of repeated ingresses of water, he said, must have been “quite enough to daunt the bravest of spirits.”

In his own judgment on quantum/money, the judge approached the assessment as a simple matter of looking at the lost income for bookings during the exact three-week period when he found that the premises could not be used for display or hire. Such approach takes no sensible account of the impact on the shops ability to attract customers, to display their art or hire the exhibition area, or of the fact that the premises recurrently had a foul or damp smell and/or were damp as a result of ingresses of water, foul water or sewage.

Further, on the Judges own findings, the tenants had had to make repeated claims on the insurance policy. In relation to each claim there had been a, £100 excess. That excess was a loss, which they suffered by reason of the landlords default in his own premises and it is not lawful to make us pay £100 which we did, every time the landlord damaged us.

The excess we should never have been forced to pay. This was put to the Court of Appeal but unlike the landlord who got their 100 quid back, our multiple times £100 that we paid in the excesses was simply ignored by Court of Appeal, like clause 5(22) as if it played no part in the hearing. On balance this breaches Section 6 of the Human Rights Act, the right to a fair trial. But more importantly this hi-lights as a minor point the way throughout the claimants are being ignored in all the issues. It can be said this minor point proves the bigger picture.

Point 45. Court of Appeal Judgment.


At the point of trespass the landlord owed £39,000 in rent but any rent owed by us was shown to the first Judge, Justice Wilkie and the second Judge Lord Justice Clarke, as proved was paid.

I offered the same receipt of payment to the court of appeal, who said they did not need to see the receipt. So to say absent liability to repair, the landlord broke in peacefully is incorrect in evidence. No rent as proved was owning at re-entry. But as contended if it follows that clause 5(22) was to be implied for the landlord not to void the insurance then not only was rent not owed but £39,000 in rent was paid and unduly enriched the landlord.

Point 46. Court of Appeal Judgment.

The Court of Appeal said that a case for partial unfitness of the premises was never pleaded, which is not true and it is there for all to see in the schedule of loss. The Court of Appeal say’s both experts, meaning surveyors on each side agreed and that is just not true and since they did not even see the reports this is an oddity.

Evidence. Schedule of loss plus the joint surveyors report.

Even the expert forensic accountant, assessed on the partial unfitness element. So this is said now in isolation and is very out of the ordinary by the Court of Appeal and is utterly incorrect. But since we are just dealing here with £39,000 and trespass and interest and further losses to date, in the grounds of appeal which were given permission or at the oral hearing – a lie is just not adequate and can be proved as a lie and this issue of great importance needs to be addressed. Just to add it is strange that this now is the only reference in terms of wording of the insurance policy ever mentioned in judgment yet I handed over 3 copies to each Judge of the policy and it was hi-lighted in yellow for ease of reference to point to all the risks and relevant covers. It has also been put in the relevant papers for the Supreme Court.

Point 47. Court of Appeal Judgment.

Since the original trial Judge makes no reference to why he awarded indemnity costs and in our skeleton argument we say “at least if he said these costs were made from the point of an offer to settle then indemnity costs would make more sense”, it is quite extraordinary here in Judgement at the Court of Appeal, that they now say based on no evidence whatsoever that indemnity costs were based in relation to the £25,000 offer to settle. Incidently that offer was made the day before the 10 days trial hearing two years into the case (so what about the indemnity costs for even the court cases we won at the beginning) and was seen as a cheap trick to save the insurers the cost of the trial. It reflects in no way any of our losses so cannot be used under CPR rules on indemnity costs 44.3-

“indemnity costs are rare and not to be used as a tools with regards to mediation”.

This landlord has never once offered to sit down and mediate. The day before the trial for us to go to that mediation and be really prepared when we were still working on the actual trial preparation, meant we had to urgently pay £8,000 to get a QC to be there as we actually took them seriously and wanted to get it right in law. We represented ourselves at the trial and all the hearings apart from the second oral hearing as ordered.



 And for a little laugh for you tonight here is a picture of my 8th Great Grandfather, he's the one on the left, Chief Justice of Chester, William Noel of the Common Pleas Royal Courts of Justice.

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:O607jO2vEQAJ:www.shakespeares-sonnets.com/Archive/Bench1.htm+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=firefox-a


I was watching a program last night about how the Jews tried to fit in in Paris and it was so sad that they still couldn't be accepted. It resonated with me having been in care and getting two central London art galleries and living a great life but having had all that taken off me I just wonder about stereo-tying people and still treating them badly! When will we all learn? It's just not right or fair!


Hall of Fame

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 1. June 2000 Ms Gavin ( now Ms Flores) took on a commercial lease of 104 Cromer Street, London, WC1 from the landlord Community Housing Association for six years. Ms Gavin and Ms Cracy expand with the same landlord to commercial lease106-108 Cromer Street, London, WC1 from April 2004 for 2 years. Further from March 2005 for 10 years.
2. 29th October 2008 the landlord trespassed to avoid a large liability claim for disrepair. They purported to forfeit the leases, by re-entry by their bailiffs, for late payment of rent, when the rent had actually been paid in advance until Jan 2009.
3. Ms Gavin took an interim injunction on 4th November 2008 to protect her property.
4. On the return date 14th Nov 2008 she succeeded against leading counsel in proof of payment of her rent and of ongoing disrepair at the two premises covered by liability insurance that had thus far not been paid out. An order was made to proceed to the County Court for the outstanding liability claim, against disrepair/business interruption and cessor of rent all risks (amounting to a repairing covenant) that were insured, in her lease/contract.
5. The lead up to the trial was unfair without full disclosure from the respondent. Financial and delay tactic's were used, purporting we did not plead our case right. It took 2 years until trial of 10 days on 13th July 2010. The respondent tried to vary the order with a spurious claim to take back one of the premises under a section 25 which had previously been used for improper inducement and was subject to the trial
6. The trial was unfair. The respondents aired their case for 4 days, the claimant's, 2 hours before being cut off and asked to e-mail the rest to the Judge. Submission's on liability were given by both parties. The Judge later did a second judgement as he did not hear our case nor read it, he admitted. Judgment two, changed nothing.
 7. In Sept 2010 the landlord was judged to have won. Both premises as well as hundreds of thousands in costs were awarded back to the landlord. Permission to appeal was refused unless transcripts were obtained.
8. This took another two years then the court said they couldn't obtain the transcripts. Behind the scenes reports were being written by the Judicial Assistance to Sir Anthony May and later the JA to Lord Neuberger the brother in law of the landlords Chairperson. Why these senior figures were recommending that permission should not be given remains a conflict of interest. Transparency ought to have stopped them being involved. Finally the incomplete and non-approved and later shown to be inaccurate notes of the landlords solicitor were requested and used, in a sudden move from the Civil Appeals Office to refuse permission outright on the 20th Feb 2012.
9. Ms Gavin asked for an Oral hearing due to this unfairness. In May 2012 the Judge, being the first ever hear her case said, there was something in it as all leaks were outside of her premises and ordered her to have legal representation but this again delayed permission and put the case again in the long grass and very much out of her hands. Ms Gavin felt compromised. Although the transcripts were now finally produced when requested for by a leading QC, immediately which assisted.
10. Now with enforced legal assistance permission was given to appeal in Dec 2012 on 10 of 12 reformulated grounds. Ms Gavin asked she be given permission to add further grounds as she still did not know the position of her free legal team, as she had not had the advice, this was agreed.
11. When the free legal advice came much of the claim had been avoided and the case did not do justice to Ms Gavin so she added in two further grounds. Permission for these were refused despite irrefutable evidence to their inclusion.
12. The May 1st/2nd 2013 court date was changed to 2nd/3rd with no notice. Lord Justice Patten misrepresented in full what Ms Gavin had asked for and held instead for a case never pleaded that there was no reason to imply any obligation to repair parts of a building retained by a landlord which had caused damage to the parts demised to the tenant, when Ms Gavin had very clearly asked for an implied insurance covenant 5(22) of her lease. She replied to the draft Judgment which outlines all the issues in the case to date. This copy will be attached as hi-lighting the issues of the appeal and then showing point after point how the issues were not dealt with. All the laws Ms Gavin used are in this reply to the draft. Ms Gavin was put to filling out a N244 form to address the administrative misrepresentation. The application was refused with no grounds given. She even mentioned it at judgement.

Quiz
1. When you get to the Bench Memo you will see at the top that it was written originally by whom? 
2. When you get to the end of the Bench Memo, there are comments by the Judge, which one is that?





Quiz
3. What person in the office is suggesting a £100,000 mediation scheme in a two and a half million pounds court case?
4. Can an order legally be changed?
5. Who is the Judge's preferred QC?







Quiz
6. What legally was wrong with my original argument at the 10th May 2012 hearing in front of Lord Justice Ward?
7. Did my appearance have anything to do with the second chance at being heard as opposed to my look in July 2010 hearing below?

This is exactly what I said;



(I.) I apologize I am not a lawyer I am representing myself and I realise this is as difficult for you as it is for me.

(II) I put in two Skeleton Arguments for permission to appeal.
The first skeleton argument was after receiving an official transcript of ‘7 pages’ of the ‘second Judgment’ in Sept 2011.

I submitted Skeleton II Argument after receiving the defendant’s solicitor’s incomplete ‘notes’ of the ‘first Judgment’ sent to me by the courts in Dec 11’.

I apologies for the length of both skeletons so what I am going to try to do is to reduce the points I’m making to the bare minimum.

(III)

1.     Quick point. ‘THE LANDLORD’S LIABILITY’ 6(5) (a) & (c) also ‘THE LANDLORD’S COVENANTS TO INSURE’ Clause 7(ii) and finally the definition of ‘INSURED RISK’S’ Clause 1(11).


The Judge failed, in his final second Judgment by the ‘expressed’ terms of the lease, by saying:
“After the insurance payment of Jan 2006, previously mentioned in 09/09/10 Judgment, ‘the fact that the insurers took the view that the defendant was at fault’ (D2/407) does not mean, in my Judgment, that the defendant was in breach of any ‘duties’ to the claimant.
Nor does it follow that the defendant was in breach of a duty to advance an insurance claim on the claimant’s behalf.
I read the letter of the 3rd July 2006 (D2/489 – 490) as a request by the claimants for compensation from the defendants.
It is the insurances response which is described as extremely slow and un-helpful but in the letter the defendant was not asked to do anything about that.
I mentioned near the end of my Judgment on 9thSept 2010 the series of letters mentioned by the Claimant in their letter to me of 25th July 2010, two of which are referred to again in paragraph 39 and many others also feature in paragraph 46 to 48 and the letter at C/181 is also referred to.
It still seems to me that no blame can attach to the defendant for the failure on the claimants part to persuade the insurers to pay them. The claimants by their loss adjuster were in direct communication with the insurer and the defendant did nothing to prevent or hinder it.
The loss adjuster may have experienced some ‘lack of information from time to time from employees of the defendant’ but that is a far cry from the defendant being in breach of ‘duty’ and ‘even if it were’, such lack of information did not result in the refusal of the insurers to pay the claimants what they were asking for. D3 669,672,696 and 710.
Again the fact that ‘the insurers took the view that the defendant was not covered’, even on the basis that the ‘defendant ought to have remedied the defects earlier and so was not covered by the terms of the policy’ does not lead to the conclusion that the defendant acted in breach of ‘duty’ to the claimant.
The defendant’s duty was in my Judgment as ‘neighbouring’ occupier, as I explained in my Judgment of the 9th Sept by reference to ‘Guild’ Case.”

(IV) The Judge gave Judgment 9th Sept 2010 without taking into account of or either reading our submissions on liability.
Proof of this is he gave a second Judgment on the 22ndSept 2010 where he admitted that that was so (appeal bundle) for that reason alone his Judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered.

A detached bystander would be driven to the conclusion that what the Judge was trying to do after having given his Judgment was to defend his earlier Judgment. That I submit is bias.

(V) Unfortunately there are no transcripts of the hearing; Judge Cowell said I could not appeal without transcripts.

I have no money. I therefore asked Master Hendy if transcripts could be made available at public expense. He ordered that they could. Sixteen months later no transcripts had been prepared of the Judgment.

What had happened was the courts never sent the tapes to the transcribers.
We now have to rely on the ‘defendant’s’ incomplete notes, which I do not except are accurate.

And in support of the essential proposition here I’d refer you to Vural, Barrett and Hargrove:

1.     Vural Ltd v Security Archives Ltd (1989) 60 P&CR 258 – Chancery Division
BRIEF SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS, CONTEXT AND DECISION
The landlord’s predecessor let the property to the tenant.  Under the lease the tenant agreed to pay a proportion of the building insurance premiums and the landlord covenanted to insure the building and (in the event of damage by an insured risk) to use the insurance proceeds to make good the damage.  A fire destroyed the parquet floor within the property and this caused the tenant indirect loss as it lost a lucrative manufacturing contract with a customer because the manufacturing contract was conditional on the premises having a floor of a certain quality.  The evidence apparently showed that the landlord had deliberately delayed reinstating the floor in order to persuade the tenant to give up the lease.  The tenant sued for damages to compensate for its loss.
Was there an implied duty on the landlord to pursue the claim with the insurance company in a timely manner?  Held by the court that whether it was an implied term of the lease or whether the insuring covenant whilst limited nevertheless created an enforceable proprietary obligation, either way the landlord was obliged to exercise the rights conferred by the insurance policy in such a way as to preserve the tenant’s interests in what it had paid for.

NOTE: On the face of it the Vural case seems to involve a deliberate attempt to cause loss to the tenant much the same as our case pleaded involving many other issues but significantly for this authority the £5,000 entire replacement of the floor claim due to flooding an ‘insured risk’ and the then subsequently improper inducement of a section 25 notice threat by Oliver Barnett Commercial Director to double the rent if we did not fix it ourselves constituting statutory harassment leading directly to the trespass shortly after was an attempt to end the tenancy.

Judge Cowell states us as being ‘in direct contact with the insurers’ but this was through their complaints process and was a requirement of the Financial Ombudsman Service only happening in 2007 two and three years after the events claimed for. If his honour means the ‘independent loss assessor’ Alan Hines that is not the insurer and we were in touch only with our landlord and the broker. The landlord ‘hid’ for many years from the us the fact that they had breached the terms of their own insurance leading the us to wrongly believe from the landlord and broker who told us they were experiencing delays that it was the insurers who were very slow. This deceit directly ‘stood in the way’ of the POL ‘Property Owners Liability’ an ‘insured risk’ being claimed as a normal process in the disrepair.
The landlord equally breached the terms by never applying for ‘cessor of rent’.
 Judge Cowell in Judgment muddied the waters without contextualising the extent of ‘contact’. We believe this was an attempt to ‘relieve’ the landlord from its own insurance obligations. Our own loss assessor was brought in much later as we were paying rent without a floor on threatening demands and were equally never paid compensation for the thousands we had already lost not trading and in interest on having to take out more and more loans and without Alan Harris we’d have never known that in fact the landlord breached the terms so the insurers would not pay.

2.     Barrett v Lounova (1982) Ltd (1988) 2 EGLR 54 – Court of Appeal
BRIEF SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS, CONTEXT AND DECISION
The tenancy of a house required the tenant to keep the interior in good condition but there was no express obligation on either the landlord or the tenant to keep the exterior in good condition.  The tenant complained that disrepair of the structure and exterior had caused extensive water penetration and damage to internal plaster and timbers. 
The Court of Appeal held that the principle of ‘correlative’ obligation could be applied here; the tenant had an express covenant in respect of the interior and it was reasonable to imply a mirror-image covenant in respect of the exterior on the part of the landlord.  If the outside was not kept in good condition then sooner or later the tenant would be unable to comply with its covenant in respect of the interior.  An obligation to repair the outside had to fall on someone and that someone could only be the landlord.
NOTE: this decision was made in the context of a residential house but as a small commercial business the ‘correlative’ obligation point seems to be central to the Court of Appeal’s thought process, and therefore it would seem that the tenant succeeded in this case because the court concluded that the tenant could not comply with its ownobligations in the absence of the landlord having an implied obligation to maintain the exterior and structure.
There are obviously separate issues as to the nature and extent of the landlord’s obligations.  Barrett was seemingly a case where the landlord had no express repairing obligations, and it is a different matter to imply further obligations in circumstances where the lease does set out some repairing obligations, especially if those more limited obligations do seem workable in principle and are not in conflict with what a reasonable landlord and tenant might be assumed to have intended such as being insured for the ‘risks’ of ‘water ingress’ from the stack pipes and from the pavement which required ‘maintenance’, which was correctly proved by the claimant’s to be demised and the Judge judged was demised to the landlord.

1.     Hargroves Aronson & Co v Hartopp and another (1905) 1 KB 472 – Divisional Court
BRIEF SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS, CONTEXT AND DECISION
A rainwater gutter in the roof, which was controlled by the landlord, became stopped up.  The tenant informed the landlord but the landlord failed to clear the gutter until 4 or 5 days later by which time rainwater had seeped into the tenant’s premises causing damage.
The Divisional Court held that as the gutter was under the landlord’s control it had a duty to take care that it was not in such a condition as would cause damage to the tenant’s premises.  The landlord had ‘notice’ of the gutter being stopped up and failed to clear it within a reasonable time and was therefore responsible for the damage done.  The court took the view that despite the absence of a covenant to maintain the roof and gutters in good condition the landlord was nevertheless under a duty to take reasonable care to prevent a gutter under its control from being blocked up so as to cause damage to the premises of the occupier below.  The fact that the landlord never inspected the gutters and then delayed carrying out repairs even after receipt of notice of the problem was evidence of a failure to discharge that duty.  The court felt that this was particularly the case in relation to something like a gutter which was an artificial construct used for the purpose of carrying off rainwater and which it therefore had a duty to ensure was actually performing the function for which it had been constructed.
NOTE: this is helpful to the claimant’s position, although it is only a Divisional Court case (less authoritative than the Court of Appeal) and it is also quite an old case. The pavement was an artificial construct put in by the landlord in 2000. In court ‘notice’, was proven to be given as soon as problem’s occurred. Further damage was caused as stated by not only the claimant’s but by the insurance by the landlord’s delays to remedy defects for the stack pipes, the pavement, the fire exit, the electricity cupboard and all other issues that were brought forward in this case.


The Judgment has many aspects that can be criticized. In short the Judge overlooked that the essential points was that the entire mess was because the landlord failed to claim on the insurance on time.

Quiz
8. I'm looking forward to my next argument at the Supreme Court and have followed all the Civil Procedure Rules but as predicted when I asked them on the phone and by email, 'Liberty' the organization said that they may just NOT answer (I've had that before for two years after my 2010 hearing.. but so many other cases are just jumping my queue of 5 years publicly innit and the PR is amazing but not a drop on my case all very quiet I think no one has the balls just like all the legal people) and that I have made very serious accusations they said. Well what am I supposed to do about that, I didn't do anything to cause that except fight for my full rights to get all my money back, did I?



                                                                                 
                                                                                    Appeal No: B5/2010/2396
                                                                                    Claim No: CHY09015


COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) ON APPEAL FROM THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT BEFORE HHJ COWELL.

B E T W E E N

(1)  JO GAVIN (now JO FLORES)
(2)  CHANTAL CRACY
Claimants/Appellants


                                                                     -and-

                                                    COMMUNITY HOUSING
    ASSOCIATION LIMITED
(now ONE HOUSING GROUP)

                                                                                                Defendant/Respondent

                                                                                                                                   

Claimants Skeleton Argument for Appeal
                                                                                                                                   

_____________________________________________________________
All page references are to the (replacement) Appeal Bundle
filed on 16 November 2012


Introduction

1. This appeal arises from litigation between landlord and tenant in respect of
 2 leases of two commercial properties situate in adjoining premises in
Cromer Street, London WC1. The Appellants are the tenants (and are referred
to as such in this Statement). The Respondent is the landlord (and is referred
to as such in this Statement).

2. Both leases are of the ground floor and basement areas of multi-storey
buildings. The lease of No.104 was taken in the sole name of Ms Jo Flores
(the first Appellant, formerly known as Ms Jo Gavin) for a term of 6 years
from June 2000 to June 2006.1 When that lease expired, the first Appellant
continued in occupation and held over. The premises were used as an art
gallery (trading name “Scarlet Maguire”).

3. The lease of Nos. 106-108 was taken in the joint names of Ms Flores and Ms
Cracy, the second Appellant, for the term from 17 March 20052 to 7 April
2014. 3 The term has yet to expire. The premises were used as a contemporary
multifunctional space available to hire, for product launches, events, serviced offices etc (trading name “Spaceshift”).

4. Both leases were subject to the provisions of Part II of the Landlord & Tenant
Act 1954.

5. Put very shortly, problems arose with the condition of the two leased
properties in terms of disrepair and flooding, arising from defects in parts of
the building which had not been demised but which remained in the landlord’s
ownership and control.

6. These problems adversely affected the tenants’ businesses and in consequence
their cash flow. Claims made by them on the buildings insurance policies
(held by the landlord but paid for by the tenants pursuant to the terms of the
leases4) did not result in swift or sufficient recompense. The tenants believed
that their inability to trade from the premises (as they had become unfit for
trade) relieved them of liability for some or all of the rent, given the terms of
the leases relating to cesser of rent when the whole or part was rendered unfit.5

7. On 29 October 2008 the landlord purported to forfeit the leases, by re-entry by
their bailiffs, for late payment of rent.6

1 That lease is at p79
2 There had been an earlier lease from 2004-2005.
3 That lease is at p113
4 Clauses 5(3)(a) and 7(2) of the leases
5 Clause 6(3) of the leases
6 The Notices of re-entry are at pp145-146
3
The history of the litigation (in short summary only)

8. On 4 November 2008 the tenants obtained a without-notice injunction7 in the
High Court (Wilkie J) restoring them to occupation.

9. On the return day of the injunction, 14 November 2008, the Judge
(Christopher Clarke J) gave a short judgment, indicating that the points
relating to the provisions of the lease as to cesser of rent were arguable and
that on the balance of convenience the tenants should remain in occupation.8
Cross-undertakings were given which left the tenants in possession pending
the issue and trial of legal proceedings, to be commenced by the tenants.9

10. As required by their undertakings, in December 2008 the tenants began a
claim for damages in the High Court arising out of the condition of the
premises and for the losses they claimed they had suffered.10 They also made a
claim for damages for unlawful eviction in relation to the re-entry.11 The claim
was transferred to the Central London County Court.12

11. By its Defence, the landlord disputed any liability for the adverse conditions in
the premises and claimed that the leases had both been forfeit by re-entry. By
a counterclaim, it sought damages for wrongful occupation since termination
of the leases.13 There was a Reply and Defence to Counterclaim.14

12. The landlord applied to be released from its undertaking to leave the tenants in
occupation of No.104.15 It did so because the lease had expired, it had given
notice pursuant to section 25 of the 1954 Act16 and it contended there had
been no application for a new lease.17 That application was adjourned (with
liberty to restore) and HHJ Cowell fixed a case management conference
(CMC) in the main proceedings.18 The application was restored and heard at
7 See pp147-150
8 The Transcript of Judgment is at pp26-33
9 The Order and Undertakings are at pp151-153 (Terms of Lease; Quiet Enjoyment & Cessor of Rent)
10 Claim Form at p154
11 Particulars of Claim at p156
12 Transfer Order at p170
13 Defence & Counterclaim at pp171-192
14 Reply to Defence and Defence to Counterclaim at pp193-204
15 Application Notice pp205-207
16 Notice at p464
17 The correspondence relating to that issue is (in part) at pp471-476
18 Order at pp208-210

the CMC but did not succeed. The judge gave a short judgment addressing it19
and also gave directions for trial.20 He gave reasons for refusing the landlord’s
application for permission to appeal.21

13. At a pre-trial review in February 2010, the tenants gave notice of their
intention to apply to amend the Particulars of Claim and an application notice
was filed to that effect.22 At a subsequent hearing, the application was only
allowed23 to the extent of permitting three short paragraphs to be added24 but
the Schedules25 which had been annexed to the draft Amended Particulars
were later utilised in the proceedings. A trial was fixed for July 2010 with a
time estimate of 10 days.

14. In June 2010 the landlord issued a claim for possession of No.10426 on the
basis that, even if the lease had not been forfeit, the term had expired without
service of a claim for a new lease.27 The landlord applied for the possession
claim to be considered at the trial of the tenants’ claim.28

15. The claim and counterclaim were tried together over two weeks in July 2010.
Both parties had put in Skeleton Arguments for trial. 29 The tenants were selfrepresenting. The landlord was represented by Leading Counsel. 5 separate
witnesses for the defendant were called and examined by Ms Flores. Leading counsel for the defendant asked Ms Flores to the witness box taking 4 days in total with no re-course to cross examination or access to any documents to clarify exact dates and times etc. Only 3 witnesses were called for the claimants to save time and the documents adduced for trial prepared by the defendant’s counsel extended over 20 volumes of lever arch files. Over the 10 days trial there was only sufficient time for the evidence of the parties to heard, with the unusual exception of Ms Flores presenting the claimant’s case. Ms Flores was asked to send an email within days putting to the Courts the case if any she wished to plead as litigant in person for the Claimant’s.29a Both sides were then ordered to put written closing submissions on liability to the Courts in August (landlord) 30 and September 2010 (tenants) 31 respectively.

16. The judge gave judgment (in a series of separate judgments and rulings) in
September 2010.

17. First, on 9 September 2009 he delivered a judgment on liability, relating to the
19 The Transcript of Judgment is at pp34-38
20 Order at pp216-218
21 Reasons at pp219-220
22 Application Notice at pp223-224
23 Order at pp225-227
24 Reproduced at pp228-229
25 Schedules at pp230-243
26 Claim form for possession at pp246-247
27 Particulars of Claim at pp248-253
28 Application Notice at pp254-256
29 Tenants’ Skeleton Argument at p257, Landlord’s Skeleton Argument at p266
29a Email dated July 2010
30 Defendant’s Submissions at p301
31 Claimants’ Submissions at p348
5
condition of the premises.32 Under that judgment, the tenants had succeeded
on only one small aspect of their claims. They invited the judge to defer
submissions and judgment on quantum, possession and costs (scheduled to be
considered on 20-23 September 2010) until the outcome of an appeal on
liability. Both parties made written submissions33 on that invitation which, in
the event, the judge declined.

18. At the resumed hearing on 20 September 2010 the judge gave a judgment on
quantum on the respective money claims i.e. the tenants’ claim for damages
(£100 awarded) and the landlord’s claim for mesne profits (over £225,000
awarded).34

19. The judge had, after a protracted enquiry from the claimant’s starting as soon as Judgment was given, Ms Flores asking had his honor read the claimant’s 92 pages, 245 paragraphs submission’s on liability as the claimant’s had not orally stated their case at the 10 days trial, however, he realised by 20 September 2010 cost’s hearing that in preparing his judgment on liability he had not read or considered the tenants’ extensive post-trial written submissions.35 He made a statement in open court to that effect on 20 September 2010 and adjourned, after the costs hearing, to read the submissions and prepare a supplementary judgment, to consider, if anything, needed to be changed. That supplementary judgment, now addressing the claimant’s earlier written submissions on liability, was then delivered on 22 September 2010.36

20. Finally, on 22 September 2010 the judge gave a composite judgment as to
forfeiture (which he found established), relief from forfeiture (which he
refused), possession (which he granted), an extension of time to appeal (which
he granted), a stay (which he refused) and costs (which he awarded against the
tenants on an indemnity basis in respect of the whole proceedings).37

21. The judge’s Order, concluding the litigation, reflected the several judgments
given and provided for the tenants to pay substantial interest on the award of
mesne profits and for an interim payment on account of costs in the sum of
£225,000 against a Schedule of Costs of over £330,000.38 The judge refused
permission to appeal.39

22. The outcome was calamitous for the tenants. In the absence of any stay, the
forthwith possession order was executed immediately (at dawn the following
morning) and they were put out of the premises. Their total liability for
32 Transcript of Judgment at pp39-63
33 Landlord’s submissions at p440, Tenant’s Submissions at p441
34 Transcript of that Judgment at pp64-68
34a Claimant’s conteporanious notes on costs hearing
35 His explanation as to how that arose is at pp7-8
36 Transcript of that Judgment at pp70-74
37 Transcript of Judgment at pp75-78
38 Order at pp2-4
39 Reasons at pp5-6
6
damages and costs runs into tens of thousands of pounds, if not hundreds of
thousands of pounds. The tenants have lost their business premises and face
financial ruin.

The Appeal

23. The tenants lodged their Appellant’s Notice on 13 October 2010. 40 They
sought the setting aside of the Judge’s order and a stay of execution.

24. Thereafter the progress of the appeal became bogged-down for more than 24
months. That happened because of communication difficulties between Ms
Flores and the Civil Appeals Office because of problems in securing
transcripts of the judgments and of the trial proceedings in the County Court
(which this Court had ordered early on to be provided at public expense and without which permission to appeal could not commence as ordered by the trial judge).

25. Acting on such material as was only made available by February 2012, which primarily consisted of the landlord’s solicitors notes of the judgment which had already been requested by the claimant’s in Sept 2010 in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules, Lord Justice Jacob refused permission to appeal on the papers.41

26. The First Appellant exercised her right to renew the permission application
and it came before Lord Justice Ward on 10 May 2012. He was addressed by
Ms Flores. The papers were, by then, were still in a wholly unsatisfactory state.

27. Lord Justice Ward ordered that the hearing of the renewed application for
permission and a stay be adjourned on notice and that the papers be brought
into order. His Order directed the Appellant to the Bar Pro Bono Unit (‘the
Unit’) who might assist.42

28. Correspondence conducted between the Unit’s volunteer adviser Jan Luba QC and the Civil Appeals Office during September 2012 and October 2012 unblocked the logjam of 24 months and produced the transcripts which had been long awaited. The last of them was provided in October 2012.

29. The Unit subsequently authorised its volunteer to assemble a fresh Appeal
Bundle, prepare an Advocate’s Statement42a, and appear for the First Appellant
at the resumed hearing of the renewed application for permission and a stay.
40 N161 at p9
41 Order at p21
42 Order at p22
42a Advocates statement 13thDec 2012
7

30. No doubt in the hope that the involvement of the Respondent in the appeal
might trigger the production of manageable documentation and the assistance
of a legal representative, Lord Justice Ward had directed that the resumed
hearing be on notice to the Respondent. However, the Respondent
indicated to this Court that, while intending no disrespect, it does not intend to
be present or represented at the resumed hearing.43 Nevertheless it was
provided with a copy of this Statement, a copy of the proposed Amended
Grounds (see below) and a copy of the index to the new Appeal Bundle.

31. Although the Second Appellant has been content to leave the conduct of the
appeal to the First Appellant, she has also been provided with a copy of this
Statement and a copy of the proposed Amended Grounds (see below).

The Grounds of Appeal

32. There are presently three Grounds of Appeal, settled by the tenants as selfrepresented litigants.44

33. The first is that (in summary) there had been a breach of natural justice and/or
Article 6, in that: the county court had failed to ensure an ‘equality of arms’;
the case management leading to the trial was unfair; and the trial itself was
unfair. Particular emphasis was placed on the judge’s oversight of the tenants’
written submissions (see above at [19]). This ground was addressed in robust
terms by Lord Justice Jacob in paragraph 4 of his Order and is not pursued
further. Although in the light of material made available to Ms Flores on 19th March 2013 where she has now viewed and has in her possession all the civil appeal courts inter-party correspondence over the past few years permission may be sought to keep these grounds and further advance them if needs be at the next level but that is only if the case is further seen by Ms Flores not to be conducted fairly and her amended grounds for permission to appeal not reasonably advanced and therefore cut out of the appeal. She may only then have with respect and certainly not wanting to cause any further trouble, unheard of publically or as yet put forward in any way, evidence to suggest judicial influence by a public body, leading to a very lengthy and unfair trial.

34. The second ground is directed to the correctness (or otherwise) of the judge’s
approach to the landlord’s legal liability in respect of the damage to the
premises. It is respectfully suggested that permission be given for it to be
recast in the alternative language of Grounds 1 – 3 of the Amended Grounds
of Appeal (see below).

35. The third ground asserts that the judge misrepresented and misunderstood the
events which had taken place since the grant of the injunction (and the
undertakings) restoring the tenants to the premises and thereafter up to the
date of judgment. This ground was addressed by Lord Justice Jacob in
paragraph 5 of his Order and is not pursued further. Again in the light of comments made in para 33 about the inter-party correspondence namely for this ground the solicitors notes leading to Jacob LJ’s decisions, permission may be sought to advance this ground and all of the others, if we are unfairly put to taking the case to any next level (or to a judicial review or to the European Courts and/or to the public domain). With respect to the courts and in the interest of natural justice to the case at hand and its own independent merit solely that we wish to advance and conclude, (so as to get on with the more important work of current national interest the child abuse scandals of the day for which Mary Moss AKA: Ms Flores is in the centre of and is on National news about we have going on see www.legalaidcuts.blogspot.comwhere we currently have 15,775 followers including much of the mainstream press), the furthering of this ground is not of any interest whatsoever, to do at any time. We just want a fair and fast resolve at the appeal in this strange case that seems to hi-light much of the current landlord and tenants laws of some importance too, that was inadvertent to us as we just suffered the losses, we did not go about trying to add to or make legal landlords and tenants history. Nor with respect, did we set about being the fighters against injustice we are being set up to be, with no choices in those matters but to fight, uncouth as that is for us, for what we once had. We do not wish for any of this, we do not wish to do this sort of old hat 1980’s fighting. But we have no more social standing and are prisoners of poverty and social derision to this case and are being put to fighting like dogs by any means necessary to be listened to. Two girls who owned two posh premises doing privately good social change work in an up to date and very stylish fashion have been brought down, treated like animals and had their whole lives changes irreparably, it is so sad. The fact we are up against another charity of high standing should not justify anyone thinking that they are not wrong.
43 Letter at p23
44 Grounds at pp17-20
8

Application to rely on the Amended Grounds of Appeal

36. The First Appellant (acting for herself and the Second Appellant) sought the
permission of this Court to amend the Grounds of Appeal. She did not make a
formal application but filed an Application Notice and received exemption
from payment of the fee .

37. The application was made very late and represented a very significant re-casting
of the basis and scope of the appeal. Nevertheless, the Court was invited to
allow the amendment because: (1) it enables the Court and the parties to focus
on the real issues in the appeal; (2) the Appellants have only recently been
provided with the transcripts of the judgments which explain the Order under
appeal and enable them to address the judge’s reasoning; and (3) they have
only recently been able to secure some further services of the Unit.

The Amended Grounds of Appeal

38. The Amended Grounds of Appeal 45 are here dealt with briefly, given the
already unusual length of this draft amended skeleton. It was respectfully
suggested that there might be a direction, now the application for permission has been granted, for preparation and service of a full Skeleton Argument by both parties, well ahead of the appeal hearing. The Claimant’s skeleton can only be completed when the Civil Appeal Courts have decided upon whether to allow the amendments which will be served on the 2nd April on the N244 application notice (the N244 has already been filed on the 21st March 2013 but the Deputy Master of the Civil Appeals wrote back on the 26th March 13’ (received on 27th) and asked that the grounds for any permission to amend be put more formally, with a copy of the grounds of appeal as currently drafted, marked up to show amendments (and with the Easter break and 7 days in which to file it, this will be done by the 2nd April 2013 for the N244 application to amend). Further it has been suggested by Jan Luba QC in the light of Ward LJ’s order for the Claimants to seek pro-bono advice following the May 10th2012 oral hearing where Ms Flores represented herself in person, that if pro-bono cannot assist (although they did in part hence the delay with the skeleton and bundles but now they cannot as of 15th March 2013 due to needing a senior junior for 21 days to assist Jan Luba QC and they do not have those 21 days to ask of any of their volunteers to prepare bundles and do the skeleton as it is rather a lot of work for a volunteer) that a court Amicus can be provided to Ms Flores as she does know her case having represented it for 4 years but with respect does not know all of the laws. As soon as Ms Flores got the news that a volunteer could not be provided from pro-bono she remembered Jan Luba’s QC’s suggestion and has asked repeatedly by email on the 18th March, 20th March and the 26th March 2013, the Civil Appeals Office about such a provision as an amicus but to date there has been no reply on the matter. Therefore we suggest that when a court amicus is provided that any laws which are not as yet covered in this draft (draft as it will/may be used at the appeal, if there is no provision or no reply regarding a court amicus, a person who knows the laws and can assist the claimant in the court hearing when it comes to advocating the laws) skeleton can be added up to the time of the 1st May and 2nd May hearing or sooner as hopefully will be the case. This should not affect the defendant’s skeleton, which has not yet been received (but they were waiting for the pro-bono too) as we will still here lay out the facts we will rely on. However the amendments need to be approved before each party can put forward their skeleton so perhaps the Civil Appeals office can set a new date for those to be filed albeit in the light of the above with or without all of the laws, in the claimant’s case, which we may later rely on. The laws relied on do not have to be in until the 24th April 2013.

39. The current Amended Grounds are dealt with under the following headings.

Liability

40. The tenants cannot, and do not, seek to go behind the judge’s relevant findings
of fact as to the extent of the damage done to their premises or as to the cause
of that damage (except for the cistern). The judge found that, at a minimum, the tenants “had suffered
from at least four instances of ingress of water, including on two occasions
foul water and sewage, between April 2004 and June 2005”46 and that “I
cannot believe that many basements have quite the degree of damp problems
that this one has”.47
45 Amended Grounds of Appeal at p24
46 Transcript of Judgment p40 para [1]
47 Transcript of Judgment p67 para [8]
9

41. Grounds 1, 2 and 3 address the judge’s self-directions on law in relation to the
liability of the landlord for the damage that was caused to the tenants’
premises.

42. The judge was not helped as to the relevant law by the facts that (1) the
tenants were unrepresented, (1) the Particulars of Claim, albeit settled by
counsel, made it “extraordinarily difficult to ascertain from those particulars
what the causes of action were”48 and the judge was “concerned about the
failure to allocate particular sets of facts to allegations of negligence or other
breaches of duty which has bedevilled this case and made it difficult to try”49
and (3) the judge had himself earlier refused the tenants’ application for
permission to amend the Particulars of Claim to bring them into good order. There were two attempts at this to show good conduct to the courts and towards the defendants, in a demandingly short period of time (a few weeks or they contended the case could be struck out). Firstly by Marc Beaumont whom did not seem to be quite with the case as he had another appearance at the same time to attend to (direct access £10,000 for one weeks work) so the hearing was dismissed with costs and the claimants were given one more chance not to have their case thrown out so next by Vikram Sachdeva (of £12,000 as had to employ solicitors too as no direct access) both at considerable and we contend unnecessary cost to the claimants. The claimants were scared and unknowledgeable at the time as they were acting as litigants in person (to save this type of costs and had thus far asked for the help of a friend barrister in drafting the particulars within the given 3 weeks from the High Courts Order to produce the particulars) and on the advice/order of the judge because of complaints by the defendant that the particulars needed to be amended to be made clearer for the parties, they acted as they believed at the time was necessary. They now see this as utter bullying of them.  Neither exercise came to anything as the judge said he now understood that all the leaks came from outside the demise and that the original particulars could now be used. Although facts were said to not be exactly next to particular allegations, this was semantics as the allegations and breaches of duty are made clear in the original particulars and the witness statement and then further made clear by the claimants in their submissions on liability, legally. The defendant’s cannot reasonably be said to not know the case they had to answer but can be said to have tried to cost the claimants out of court and/or caused delays and/or played a tactical game throughout.

43. Against that background, the judge had to determine and apply the relevant
law for himself. He correctly found that the leases imposed no express
repairing obligations on the landlord in respect of the demised premises but
did require the tenants to keep them clean, in repair and decorated.50

44. But he also found as fact that, in relation to each of the most significant
incidents of damage to the demised premises, the source was a defect in the
parts of the buildings retained in the ownership and control of the landlord (i.e.
the pipes to the toilet which leaked, the soil stack pipes which leaked51 and the pavement lights which leaked52).

Grounds that Succeeded Permission to Appeal are 1-7 & 11-12.

45. Ground 1 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
The judge misdirected himself in law as to the extent of a landlord’s
liability for damage caused to demised premises by a defect in another
part of same building which is retained under the ownership and
control of the landlord. He ought to have directed himself that the
landlord was liable to the tenant for all loss caused by the defect and
not simply for such loss as is suffered after the landlord has had
knowledge of the defect and a reasonable opportunity to remedy the
defect.

46. The judge’s error was to hold that the landlord’s only duty was to repair the
48 Transcript of Judgment p40 para [3]
49 Transcript of Judgment pp47-48 para [18]
50 Lease, clause 5((6) at p93 and p126
51 Transcript of Judgment p43 para [8]
52 Transcript of Judgment pp42-43 para [7] and [8]
10
defect in the retained premises “as soon as reasonably practicable after he
knows it is causing damage to [the demised premises]”.53 With respect that
cannot be the law. If it were, a landlord could let premises encapsulated within
a building, of which he otherwise retained ownership and control, and let
those parts fall to ruin. Even if the defects in the other parts frequently caused
damage to the demised premises, his only duty would be to attend to the
specific item of repair and prevent it causing further damage. If it re-occurred,
or another defect caused damage in the demised premises, the landlord would
again not be liable in damages provided the defect was rectified reasonably
quickly after his having notice of it.

47. It is not impossible to imagine cases (and this case may be a paradigm) in
which a series of defects, each in turn repaired reasonably promptly by the
landlord, successively causes such damage to the demised premises that they
are rendered worthless but in respect of which loss of use or value the landlord
(by prompt after-the-event repairs in each case) escapes liability.

48. The judge ought to have used the ‘duty’ he identified in Duke of Westminster v
Guild [1985] QB 688 as a basis for holding that the liability of such a landlord
arises as soon as the defect in the part retained by him causes damage to the
demised premises.

The Learned Judge placed substantial weight on the case of Duke of Westminster v Guild [1985] Q.B. 688. In that case, at page 701, Slade L.J. said as follows:
“There is a general principle established by such cases as Hargroves, Aronson & Co. v. Hartopp [1905] 1 K.B. 472 and Cockburn v. Smith [1924] 2 K.B. 119 which is summarised, in our opinion accurately, in Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant, 28th ed. (1978), vol. 1, para. 1-1469, p. 621:
"Where the lessor retains in his possession and control something ancillary to the premises demised, such as a roof or staircase, the maintenance of which in proper repair is necessary for the protection of the demised premises or the safe enjoyment of them by the tenant, the lessor is under an obligation to take reasonable care that the premises retained in his occupation are not in such a condition as to cause damage to the tenant or to the premises demised."
In Hargroves, Aronson & Co. v. Hartopp [1905] 1 K.B. 472 the plaintiffs were tenants of a floor in a building of which the defendants were the landlords. A rainwater gutter in the roof became stopped up and the defendants failed to clear it out for a few days after receiving notice of the stoppage. They were held to be in breach of a duty of care to the plaintiffs and liable for the damage done. In Cockburn v. Smith [1924] 2 K.B. 119 the facts were similar and the defendant landlords were held liable to the tenant for damage suffered by her as a result of defects in the guttering of the roof of the building of which the landlord retained control. Scrutton L.J. considered, at p. 133, that the landlord's duty was based on "that modified doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330 which is applicable where he retains in his control an artificial construction which becomes a source of danger to his tenant." Bankes and Sargant L.JJ. preferred not to decide whether the relevant duty arose out of a contract between the parties or whether it was an instance of the duty imposed by law upon an occupier of premises to take reasonable care that the condition of his premises does not cause damage: see [1924] 2 K.B. 119 , 130 and 134. But they expressed no doubt that the relevant duty existed.”

49. The judge seems to have imported requirements that, before any liability can
arise, there must be: (1) knowledge or notice of a need for repair on the part
of the landlord; and (2) a reasonable opportunity for repairs to be carried out.
That puts the tenant of ‘enveloped’ premises in a seriously vulnerable
position.

50. The correct approach would be to hold that the landlord is usually absolutely
liable if a defect in the non-demised premises causes damage to the premises
demised. That would put the landlord subject to the Guild duty in no different
position from any other landlord who owes a duty to keep defects in retained
parts from damaging the demise. As Carnwath LJ (as he then was) said in
Earle v Charalambous [2006] EWCA Civ 1090:54
“In applying a standard lessor's repairing covenant, the law draws a
distinction between disrepair in the demised premises themselves, and
disrepair in other parts of the building within the lessor's control. In
53 Transcript of Judgment p47 para [18]
54 At [8]
11
the latter case the "general rule" applies: that is, the covenant requires
the lessor to keep the premises in repair at all times, and he is in
breach immediately a defect occurs (British Telecommunications plc
v Sun Life plc [1996] Ch 69).”

Although it can be said the landlord has no expressed repairing covenant in the leases they do have an expressed covenant in the leases to insure against ‘all risks’ that could cause damage to the demise which can be said is the same thing under different construction. The Earle v Charalambous case is used to outline the accepted ‘general rule’ that requires the ‘lessor to keep in repair at all times’ and it hi-lights what is meant by the definition of ‘at all times’ in terms of construction and meaning of the words, even if it is as with this case, within the insurance policy, which are in this case attached inextricably to the leases and landlords obligations and specifically require the landlord to keep the retained premises in repair ‘at all times’ (including pipes and anything that causes water ingresses). It can be said as an authority that the construction of words in the policy ‘at all times’ to keep (the pipes) in repair is the ‘general rule’ and therefore ‘absolute liability’ is attached to this case upon failure to do so and is in this case the negligence causing nuisance that voided the policy. It is therefore a Ryland v Fletcher case. In all of the disrepair that affected the premises none of the items of disrepair served the claimants premises or was for the use of the premises what so ever. In Ryland v Fletcher, “the person who for his own purpose brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes, must keep it in at his own peril, and if he does not do so, is prima (fact) facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.

Further in both leases the landlord retained rights to enter the demise to repair and
at the permission to amend hearing HHJ Cowell said, “at any rate the issues arising from the law of nuisance are sufficiently pleaded in terms of FACT in the pleadings.”


The first issue raised under the Amended Grounds of Appeal is the question of whether the Learned Judge erred in law in directing that the landlord’s liability for damage arising from defects in another part of the same building as the demised premises, under the ownership and control of the landlord, arose only after notice and a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect.

The principle that a landlord was only liable for a breach of a repairing covenant when he was given notice of it was established in O'Brien v Robinson [1973] AC 912, [1973] 1 All ER 583, HL. However, this rule is an exception to the general rule and the general rule is that a covenant to keep premises in repair is an obligation to keep in repair at all times, not when notice is given British Telecom plc v Sun Life Assurance Society plc [1995] 2 EGLR 44.

In British Telecom v Sun Life Nourse L.J. reviewed the authorities. He cited with approval Melles & Co v Holme [1918] 2 K.B. 100 as an example if the general rule. In Melles & Co v Holme Salter J said, at p.104:

“It is said that the plaintiffs cannot enforce that covenant because they gave no notice of the breach. In some cases no doubt there must be read into a covenant by a landlord to repair a condition that the tenant must give him notice of the want of repair before he can be entitled to complain of it. The principle of that rule is thus laid down by Bramwell B. in Makin v. Watkinson (1): "When a thing is in the knowledge of the plaintiff, but cannot be in the knowledge of the defendant, but the defendant can only guess or speculate about the matter, then notice is necessary." This was also put very clearly by Collins M.R. in Tredway v. Machin (2): "That rule rests upon the principle that the landlord is not the occupier of the premises, and has no means of knowing what is the condition of the premises unless he is told, because he has no right of access to the demised premises, whereas the occupier has the best means of knowing of any want of repair." To justify the Court in reading into a covenant a condition which is not there, there must be very strong ground for their doing so. Here there are no such grounds. The roof was in the possession and control of the defendants, not of the plaintiffs. Therefore there is no justification for saying that they cannot enforce the covenant in the absence of notice.”

The obligation to carry out repairs pursuant to a repairing covenant is an obligation to carry out those repairs within a reasonable time of notice being given Morris v Liverpool City Council (1987) 20 HLR 498, [1988] 1 EGLR 47, CA and McGreal v Wake (1983) 13 HLR 107, [1984] 1 EGLR 42, CA . In McGreal v Wake Sir John Donaldson noted that the Court considered that it was unfortunate that the House of Lords had felt obliged to conclude that notice was required in O’Brien v Robinson. The principle that repairs are only required within a reasonable period of time of notice being given, can have no application to a case in which there is no obligation to give notice.

Accordingly, the Claimant’s take the view that the Learned Judge did err in law in concluding, at Paragraphs 18 to 21of his Judgment [AB47-49], that liability was dependent upon notice and a reasonable opportunity to repair it; the decision on this point of law was the basis of most of the subsequent findings of the Learned Judge. In reaching that conclusion he cited a paragraph from the highly respected Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 19th edition, which refers to an obligation arising only on proof of negligence. However, the Learned Judge did not appear to appreciate that that paragraph was not considering contractual obligations, nor was it the chapter on nuisance. In my view, the Learned Judge took that paragraph out of context and clearly did not consider the relevant authorities on point.

The damage arising from leaks from the waste stack pipes which were retained by the Respondent [AB42 at Paragraph 8 Judgment] and those from the electricity room which was not within the demise, Paragraph 54 Judgment [AB61] as well as the flooding of 104 premises para 41 [AB57] should succeed in absolute liability from the moment of damage and further consequential damages para 45 [AB57] to the demised premises.

51. Ground 2 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
The judge misdirected himself in law as to the landlord’s liability for
disrepair under the leases held by the tenants in this case. He ought to
have held that the tenants’ obligations to repair, in respect of the
demised premises, were matched by a correlative implied obligation
on the landlord to keep in repair, at all times: (1) the parts of the
building retained in its ownership and control, defects in which may
affect the demised premises; and/or (2) such parts of the building as
might, if defective, lead to the occurrence of damage covered by an
insured risk.

52. The judge was taken to the leading authority on correlative implied
obligations, Barratt v Lounova (1982) Ltd [1990] 1 QB 348, and referred to it
in his judgment.55 The instant case was an a fortiori case for the application of
a correlative and absolute obligation on the landlord to keep in repair the
controlled and retained parts of the building containing the demised premises.
That is because: (1) the retained parts enveloped the demised premises or (in
the case of the pipework) passed through them; and (2) in addition to being
obliged by the leases to repair the demised premises the tenants were required
to meet the cost of insuring the premises against such damage as might arise if
defects in the retained premises caused damage in the demised premises.

53. Although the judge was plainly alerted to these propositions, he failed to apply
them, without any cogent explanation as to why he did not do so.56

He appears to have held that the tenants were in some way put in difficulty by
the principle of caveat lessee (which we have asked permission to appeal in our amended grounds). But that principle could not avail the landlord
when the relevant defect was in the retained, rather than in the demised, parts
of the building.57


The Learned Judge also concluded that the pavement lights with the glass bricks were not demised to the Appellants, and were retained by the Respondent, [AB58 Paragraph 46]. This point was fought by the tenants and succeeded. However, in considering the pavement lights the Learned Judge concluded that the Defendant’s case on caveat lessee was correct [AB59 Paragraph 49] and so that is why we are asking for permission to appeal in the amended grounds against the finding of caveat lessee.

To turn to the question of whether the Learned Judge was wrong in relation to caveat lessee, it is necessary to consider the nature of the principle. In Southwark v Mills, at page 11, Lord Hoffman set out the principle in some detail:
There is however another feature of the covenant which presents the appellants with a much greater difficulty. It is prospective in its nature: see Norton on Deeds , 2nd ed (1928), pp 612-613. It is a covenant that the tenant's lawful possession will not be interfered with by the landlord or anyone claiming under him. The covenant does not apply to things done before the grant of the tenancy, even though they may have continuing consequences for the tenant. Thus in Anderson v Oppenheimer (1880) 5 QBD 602 a pipe in an office building in the City of London burst and water from a cistern installed by the landlord in the roof flooded the premises of the tenant of the ground floor. The Court of Appeal held that although the escape of water was a consequence of the maintenance of the cistern and water supply by the landlord, it was not a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. It did not constitute an act or omission by the landlord or anyone lawfully claiming through him after the lease had been granted. The water system was there when the tenant took his lease and he had to take the building as he found it. Similarly in Spoor v Green (1874) LR 9 Ex 99 the

plaintiff bought land and built houses upon it. The houses were damaged by subsidence caused by underground mining which had taken place before the sale. The Court of Exchequer held that there was no breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment which had been given by the vendor. Cleasby B said, at p 108:
"it seems to me impossible to say that there is a breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment by reason of the subsidence of the house in consequence of the previous removal of the coal. This subsidence of the house was a necessary consequence of the condition of the property bought by the plaintiff ..."
The tenant takes the property not only in the physical condition in which he finds it but also subject to the uses which the parties must have contemplated would be made of the parts retained by the landlord. Anderson v Oppenheimer 5 QBD 602 , in which it was contemplated that the cistern would be used to contain water, demonstrates this proposition. An even more pertinent case is Lyttelton Times Co Ltd v Warners Ltd [1907] AC 476 . The plaintiffs owned a hotel in Christchurch, New Zealand, next to the premises in which the defendants operated a printing press. They made an agreement under which the defendants would rebuild their premises and grant a lease of the upper floors to the plaintiffs for use as additional hotel *12 bedrooms. Unfortunately the noise and vibrations of the press beneath caused substantial inconvenience to the occupants of the bedrooms. The plaintiffs claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants from working their press. They said that the defendants knew that they intended to use the premises as bedrooms and were under an implied obligation not to interfere with their convenient use. But Lord Loreburn LC, giving the advice of the Privy Council, said that the plaintiffs also knew that the defendants intended to use their premises for printing. He went on, at p 481:
"When it is a question of what shall be implied from the contract, it is proper to ascertain what in fact was the purpose, or what were the purposes, to which both intended the land to be put, and having found that, both should be held to all that was implied in this common intention ... if it be true that neither has done or asks to do anything which was not contemplated by both, neither can have any right against the other."

In the present case in dealing with this issue all the Learned Judge said was that he agreed with the submissions of the Respondent. Those submissions are in the Skeleton Argument [AB266-300] in which the submissions on caveat lessee were set out at [AB279-284 and 289] and Closing Submissions [AB301-331] at [AB310-312 and 325-327]. The argument was that any defect in the pavement lights (or glass bricks) existed prior to the grant of the lease and so “there was no liability in nuisance for any damage caused by water ingress from the pavement lights” [AB325-326].


It is the claimants view that the Learned Judge erred in his conclusions on this issue. It must be noted that the passage cited above from Lord Hoffman’s speech was considering an argument that the covenant of quiet enjoyment gave rise to an obligation to improve premises by installing sound insulation to prevent noise nuisance arising from ordinary use of premises. Lord Hoffman considered the principle in Duke of Westminster v Guild and did not perceive any difficult with it. The proper comparison with the present case would be if the Appellants had contended that the very existence of the pavement lights was wrong, but that was not their case. The Appellants case was that glass bricks had not been sealed properly and was causing leaks.

The Claimants are reinforced in this view by consideration of the authority cited by Lord Hoffman, Anderson v Oppenheimer (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 602 in which the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of Field J rejecting the claim on the basis that the covenant of quiet enjoyment was prospective and so could not assist that tenant in respect of a burst water tank provided for the benefit of those in the building. However, it was noted that the jury had found there was no negligence in that case and it appears implicit that a cause of action could have arisen in tort if the tank had been negligently installed or had there been negligence in maintaining it. In the present case the argument was that the failure to seal was negligence in delaying carrying out repairs.

Barrett and Lounova seeks to imply an obligation, that decision has not been followed by the CA in subsequent cases but treated as decided on its own special facts (Adami v Lincoln Grange Management [1998] EGLR 58, Lee v Leeds CC [2002] 1 WLR 1488) and is doubted in Woodfall at para 13.007. Its facts it could be suggested perhaps a good deal stronger than the present. Barratt is not the leading authority on correlative obligations and so for this reason, when the court comes back to the claimants and appoints a court amicus we shall add further argument as to why Barrett and Lounova should apply perhaps too as to the special facts in the circumstances to this case, as we were enveloped as the eminent QC Jan Luba said and further that we did ask for the structure, in the case of ventilation, to be repaired or as in Sir John Vinelott in Adami v Lincoln Grange Management LTD and we offered to pay for it to be repaired. The issue of the ventilation more poignantly hangs on the fact that the lease was unworkable without this repair and that the repair was an insured risk, albeit with an implied obligation. Further HHJ Cowell said that there would be a case of damages if we had asked for the structure to be repaired which we did on several occasions para 223 [AB 430-431-431a-431b-431c-431d-431e-431f-431g-431h-431i-432-433-434-435-436-437-438-439].

Although not appropriate to our caseQuick v Taff-Ely Borough Council [1985] has been cited in the cases of ventilation causing condensation etc. We have never pleaded anything other than that we required the structure to be fixed. However it is noted that in this case damages were not sought for the fact that the residential premises were not fit for human habitation and because they did not ask for those damages they did not get them. We ask for the damages to reflect that the lease was unworkable from day 1, as not fit for purpose causing a total constructive loss of all our business venture and causing distress in proving this in a court of law as the landlord put us to doing so. Please note that the landlord had full knowledge of the defect on the onset of the leases and knew the nature of the social good Ms Flores was establishing.



If this part succeeded then the claimants would move for a ‘total constructive loss’ in line with the insurance policy for which the defendants can argue with their insured about. This would be from April 2004 until the lease ends in April 2014, with all other issues subsumed at the 106 premises and that part of the case closed. It is respectfully asked that this be dealt with at the beginning of the May 1st, 2nd hearing so as not to waste further courts time and for damages to be assessed in the time left over. It has to be noted that until 19th March 2013 Ms Flores had not seen the note from the defendants counsel that the Claimants premises have been let on long leases. Therefore the damages should reflect the Claimants being able to set up both premises again in the WC1 area. Please note that a joint forensic accountants report is available to the courts to assess damages and in particular Ms Flores can give evidence as to how Youth Parliament Economy has been adversely affected then as part of the claim.

To turn back to Ground 2 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal, it is said that there was a correlative implied obligation on the landlord to keep in repair those parts of the building which the landlord retained in its ownership and control. That principle is set out in ‘Dilapidations: The Modern Law and Practice’ by Nicholas Dowding Q.C. and others, Sweet & Maxwell 4th edition. As noted in Paragraph 19-16 of ‘Dilapidations’ this obligation should only be implied where performance of the express obligation is impossible without it. In Barrett v Lounova (1982) Ltd [1990] 1 Q.B. 348 the Court of Appeal implied an obligation to repair the exterior in circumstances where the tenant had covenanted to repair the interior.

However, as the authors of ‘Dilapidations’ note it is difficult to see that the covenant to repair the interior could not be performed without the implied obligation and so the tenancy did not appear to be unworkable without the term. Further, those cases where correlative obligations have been implied are cases in which the tenant had agreed to pay for the work as noted by Sir John Vinelott in Adami v Lincoln Grange Management Ltd [1998]1 E.G.L.R. 58 at 60M.


The claimants have to say that, in common with the authors of ‘Dilapidations’ there is some considerable doubt about whether Barrett v Lounova was correctly decided. It is certainly a case which is strongly in favour of the Appellants, but we are concerned that proper scrutiny of this decision in the light of the applicable principles would be such that the Court of Appeal would be anxious to distinguish it. However, it is a ground on which there is existing authority in favour of the Appellants and Ward L.J. has granted permission to proceed with it. We consider the prospects of success to be on balance in favor of the Claimants in light of the existing authorities, but, do sound a note of real of caution about being overly optimistic about this ground. It is for the courts to decide and give good reason why it can or cannot apply in the light that HHJ Cowell stated as fact that it could and LJ Ward has backed this in already giving permission to proceed.





55. Ground 3 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
55 Transcript of Judgment p45 para [14]
56 Transcript of Judgment pp44-45 para [14]
57 Transcript of Judgment pp58-59 para [48] –[49]
12
The judge erred in holding that, notwithstanding the facts as found by
him, conditions in the demised premises did not give rise to the
operation of the ‘cesser of rent’ provisions in the leases in this case.

56. The central thrust of the tenants’ case had been that the recurrence of episodes
of damage to the premises had caused them to become in whole or part unfit
for use (the relevant uses being as galleries and exhibition spaces) and that the
cesser of rent clauses in the leases58 had accordingly been triggered.

57. It will be recalled that Christopher Clarke J had found this point well arguable.
The trial judge himself found that, inter alia, that there had been at least four
leaks into the demised premises in a 14 month period, some of foul water and
sewage. At one point the “smell was really bad in 106-108”59 and the judge
found that the recurrence of repeated ingress of water must have been “quite
enough to daunt the bravest of spirits”.60

58. Yet, on those findings, he held that the cesser of rent provisions were never
triggered. The relevant passage of his judgment does not provide reasons but
appears to proceed on the basis that the provisions only apply when the
premises are “wholly unfit”. That statement is made even though the clauses
refer to “…any part…” of the demised premises.61 On the facts he found, the
judge was therefore wrong to hold that the cesser of rent clauses had never
been triggered.

The third of the Amended Grounds of Appeal concern the Learned Judge’s finding that the conditions in the premises did not give rise to the ‘cesser of rent’ clause, see Paragraph 13 Judgment [AB44]. The clause came into effect if the demised premises was destroyed or damaged “so as to be unfit for use”. In the claimants view, there is a strong case for this Ground of Appeal succeeding on the basis of the findings of fact of the Learned Judge throughout his Judgment.


Quantum

59. Grounds 4 and 5 are concerned with the quantum awarded on the tenants’
claims for damages.

60. Ground 4 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
As a consequence of all or any of the errors of law in Grounds 1-3
above, the judge seriously under-assessed the damages recoverable by
the tenants for breach of the landlord’s obligations and over-assessed
58 Clause 6(3) at p107 and p139
59 Transcript of Judgment p55 para [34]
60 Transcript of Judgment p40 para [1]
61 Transcript of Judgment p44 para [13]
13
their liability to pay rent.

61. The Ground is obviously only in play if the judge did err on liability. But if he
did, quantum must necessarily be significantly affected and would be
significantly higher.

62. Ground 5 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
Further, even if the judge had correctly directed himself as to liability,
he was wrong to assess damages at only £100 given the findings of fact
he had made as to the harm caused to the demised premises and the
purposes for which those premises were being used.

63. The assessment of damages at £100 is extraordinary on the judge’s own
findings of fact (not least that at one point the “smell was really bad in 106-
108”62 and the recurrence of repeated ingress of water must have been “quite
enough to daunt the bravest of spirits”63). In his judgment on quantum,64 the
judge approached the assessment at a simple matter of looking at the lost
income for bookings during the exact three week period when he found that
the premises could not be used for display/hire. Such approach takes no
sensible account of the impact on the tenants’ ability to attract customers, to
display their art or hire the exhibition area, of the fact that the premises
recurrently had a foul or damp smell and/or were damp as a result of ingress of
water, foul water or sewage.

64. Further, on the judge’s own findings, the tenants had had to make repeated
claims on the insurance policy.65 In relation to each claim there had been a
£100 excess. That excess was a loss which they suffered by reason of the
landlord’s default and for which they were awarded no damages.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal address the question of quantum and the fact that the Learned Judge seriously underestimated quantum. In the claimants view this is plainly correct and stands a very good prospect of success.

However, it is one thing to consider that the £100 award was plainly too low, (even without the further periods of time in respect of which a claim could be made were some of the other grounds to succeed) and quite another to achieve the schedule of loss expectations of the Claimants. Ms Flores accepts that the Schedule of Loss [AB166-169] is unrealistic if it were to be perused at 100%, but let us be clear so as to not cause any further misunderstanding the claimant has indicated this very precisely in the schedule of loss that she would accept 1% (or 2% or higher if the courts see fit) of the claim for loss of opportunity for the Youth Parliament if that part of the claim is not seen as remote given that the defendants knew at all times the special circumstances of the project and further so as not to cause any confusion that any other damages in liability have already been correctly assessed at great cost £8,000 to each party notwithstanding that this was by the order of HHJ Cowell to incur such costs, for the assessment of damages in liability, by the joint forensic accountant in great and full detail as to the realistic potential of the businesses had the issues of disrepair not occurred. The claimants do not intend to have the same job done twice.

The Schedule of loss made hastily within three weeks of the order of LJ Clarke to put together the particulars of claim and a schedule of loss includes, for example, a claim for “£1.5 Billion” in respect of loss of potential membership from Sept 2004-Dec 2008 based on 15 million UK under 18’s at £100 per head
and “£40 Million” from spaceshift from Sept 2007-2008 from a UK Franchise with 10% of £200,000 income per 2000 businesses nationally going to spaceshift to expand with more youth businesses, with a loss £200,000 income for 4000 young entrepreneurs from care who could have profited from the setting up and duplication of the spaceshift business on the Founders 007 course Ms Flores wanted to set up at the premises and had a full business plan to do so, as well as the space to do it,and therefore “£1.9 Billion total potential opportunity” loss.It is often taken out of context and Ms Flores readily admits that when quantifying initially (and as stated in haste) to meet the three weeks deadline, that 1% of potential of membership lost, if Ms Flores did get a total membership for the Youth Parliament Economy for Youth Parliament as a statutory right lobbied and voted for in parliament at a mere £100 per head per annum of 15 million children and young people in the country, that she would never claim that in this court case at 100% as that would be seen as too remote of course she knows that. Notwithstanding that with the general state of benefits in the country and the universal benefit of say the winter fuel tax, amounting to a few Billion handed out universally to pensioners whether they be rich or poor, it was not unrealistic to aspire to those figures at £100 per head for the rights of young people not to be abused anymore by the country and this was very much in line with the convention of human rights and the convention of the rights of the chid (which she had previously been involved with in getting ratified in her work with NAYPIC when she was Mary Moss) most especially the clause that young people ‘have freedom of expression’ which cannot with respect be done with grants or funding as that is only ‘empowerment’ it is not a right, like gay rights, women’s rights, civil rights and in the light of the work she was undertaking to advance those benefits for young people in the country plus a very detailed plan on how to achieve that, on her website www.youthparliament.co.ukand with ten staff which was an entirely possible aim, even if the modest potential growth levels had been achieved, then this was important to put into the schedule of loss as loss of opportunity.She at the time of estimating the schedule was just trying to hi-light the importance of her lifetimes work and needed the figures even if some would say optimistic to show that potential. She did not mean to cause alarm merely to show the losses that stopping her did potentially cause. It was simply an indication of her work. If anything it should have been seen as something that should not have been stopped for the potential social good it could have achieved. The abuse of children was a social time bomb ticking and Ms Flores through these businesses wanted to be ready to advocate the solution with sound businesses so the message could be received loud and clear from the survivors of those abuses.

The measure of damages for disrepair by a landlord is that which would have put the lessee in the position he would have been in had there been no breach of the repairing covenant Hill & Redman Law of Landlord & Tenant Chapter 10 Paragraph [3728]. Wallace v Manchester City Council (1998) 30 H.L.R. 1111, albeit the claimants add with some caution a case concerning residential accommodation and so not appropriate for a commercial venture whose losses depend on being able to trade in the accommodation demised and not live in them, but I add it here to hi-light being put back in a position as if the damage had not occurred and also because no doubt the defendant may try to cite it as a relevant authority but it is an authority for the proposition that damages will be assessed by reference to the rent paid and the cessor of rent clause as part of the contract of the leases adequately deals with the loss of rent as a very separate head of claim.

In Woodfall: Landlord & Tenant it is noted:
“11.34 An action for damages for breach of covenant is a contractual claim. The fundamental principle governing the award of damages for breach of contract is that the injured party must be placed, so far as money can do it, in the position in which he would have been if the contract had been performed. However, an award of damages is also governed by the rules relating to remoteness of damage. A contract-breaker is not liable to compensate the injured party for all damage which he suffers as a result of the breach. He is liable to compensate the injured party for (1) such damage as may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from the breach of contract itself and (2) where at the date of the contract both parties know of special circumstances, such additional damage as may naturally flow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch.341

In the claimants view, the loss of business has been calculated by a leading expert, who is also the auditors of the defendants solicitors and in terms of legal compliance should not have ever been the independent joint expert as the claimants saw in hindsight as he was very minimal in his approach as can be seen by the report. However that being so, he still assessed the claimants as having at 106 premises lost in the region of £40,000 per annum at 40% trading, £80,000 at 50% trading and £125,000 at 100% trading that is without any assessment for loss of opportunity that is simply on the basis of the tread of booking that were achieved (with insistence from the loss assessors and some considerable discounts to achieve that in the circumstances) in the beleaguered building. For example one month the claimants had a block booking for a training school at £5,000 for the month. Ms Flores has contended throughout that she has had potential bookings of a year or two years at £10,000 per month and can give this evidence over as to losses accumulated since the leases were trespassed. It may seem that that is a large amount of money for what seems to first glance to be a small enterprise but it is fact. The underestimation of what this claim has been about has bedeviled this case except of course to the defendants who know very well how much money the claimants put into these spaces to make them achieve such outstanding incomes. It further adds insult to injury to accept any mediation where the defendant seem to just want to save the measly costs of a few days at court something that they are not even paying for as it is too an insured risk. A message needs to be sent out to the big boys that just because someone is a small business that does not mean they can be costed out of their lives as they know them. Damages should be assessed correctly and not in a patronizing and judgmental fashion using cheap tricks to show some kind of bad conduct to gain mense profit. The claimants as can be seen throughout the case have always attempted to mitigate losses and have with the need to sell one of their houses to pay off the debts been able to albeit not wanting to, initially fund the trial to stay in the game. Both litigants are now largely due to the length of the trial of 5 years now living below the breadline, yet continue to conduct themselves well.

Accordingly, we think that it is imperative that the £400,000 cost order which LJ Ward rightly set aside should be dismissed for what it is, a scare tactic and the award of damages should be correctly assessed using at the very least the costly forensic accountants assessment for the commercial premises, as with respect anything else is not law.


Forfeiture & Possession

65. For the tenants, the retention of the leases was a critical issue at trial. They had
paid the rent due throughout the difficulties experienced right up to 2009.
Although significant rent arrears had accrued by the date of trial (due to His Honor Judge Clarke suggesting no rent to be paid whilst leading to trial), it had been
their intention to set-off part of the damages awarded on their claims in
62 Transcript of Judgment p55 para [34]
63 Transcript of Judgment p40 para [1]
64 Transcript of Judgment p65 para [1] – [3]
65 A sample policy is at p442.
14
satisfaction of that and any past rent liability of which their were no arrears on the day of trespass.

66. Ground 6 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
The judge was wrong to hold that the leases had been lawfully forfeit
by re-entry in October 2008. Had he not made all or any of the errors
identified in Grounds 1-5 above, he would have found that the tenants
did not, at the date or re-entry, owe the landlord any rent.

67. In essence, the tenants’ case was that even if the rent due in October 2008 had
strictly been paid some days late, the level of the rent arrears on the basis of
which the landlord took possession were modest and would have been easily
met by a set-off of the unliquidated damages which had by then accrued in the
tenants’ favour.

68. The judge dealt with the issue of forfeiture very shortly.66 He did not identify
the sum owing at re-entry (none). He acknowledged that the arrears might have been
extinguished by the set-off of the damages he awarded. However, due to his
own rulings on liability and quantum (addressed in Grounds 1 to 5 above) the
figure available to set-off was wrongly fixed too low.

Equally, in relation to the matters raised under Grounds 6 and 7 the Claimants are of the view that there is a good prospect of the Learned Judge finding that the leases were not lawfully forfeit and that there was no liability to the Respondent for mesne profits. As it seems that these matters obviously arise from my other conclusions there is little purpose in considering this in more detail


69. Ground 7 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
The judge was wrong, in those circumstances, to hold that the tenants
were liable to the landlord for mesne profits. He ought to have held
that, subject to abatement in respect of the period during which they
were unlawfully evicted, the tenants were only subject to an obligation
to pay the actual rent reserved by the leases.

70. It must follow that, if the damages had been correctly assessed at a sum
greater than the notional arrear of rent, a set-off would have extinguished
those rent arrears. In that eventuality the leases would not have been forfeit
and the re-entry would have been (as the tenants contended it had been) an
unlawful trespass and eviction. That would have had the consequence that (1)
the tenants were entitled to recompense for the fact of their exclusion and the
loss flowing from it and (2) were not liable for mesne profits but only for rent
from the date of reinstatement.
66 Transcript of Judgment p76 para [1]
15

Relief from Forfeiture (Grounds not given Permission to Appeal are 8,9 & 10)

71. The judge directed himself that he had no jurisdiction to grant relief from
forfeiture but also that, assuming he had jurisdiction, it would not be right that
it be exercised.67 He was wrong on both accounts.


72. Ground 8 of the Amended Grounds of appeal is that:
The judge was wrong to hold that he had no jurisdiction to consider
whether relief from forfeiture should be granted. Although no formal
application for relief had been pleaded, the judge had previously given
a judgment in the same proceedings treating his court as seized of such
an application and it was unfair of him to resile from that and to deny
jurisdiction.

73. The question of relief from forfeiture had arisen during the Case Management
Conference in these proceedings in August 2009. In his judgment arising from
that CMC, the judge said that although no formal application had been made
he “ought to treat as pending” an application for relief from forfeiture.68 He
indicated that he would consider at the conclusion of that hearing whether he
needed to give directions about it. In the event, notwithstanding that 25
directions were given in the Order from that hearing, none required a formal
application for relief. It was therefore wrong for the judge to reverse his stance
after the trial and to hold that in the absence of a formal application he had no
jurisdiction.

74. Ground 9 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
The judge was wrong not to grant relief from forfeiture of either or
both leases. On the unusual facts of the case before him, the judge
ought to have granted such relief, even if the tenants could not
immediately pay the accrued rent in compliance with the usual terms.

75. The judge plainly had a wide discretion but treated himself as required to
apply an approach that it was for the tenants to show that they could, and
would, immediately pay the rent up-to-date in order to obtain relief.

76. There is no such fetter on the discretion. As was said in Shiloh Spinner v
67 Transcript of Judgment p76 paras [1]-[2]
68 Transcript of Judgment p35 para [3]
16
Harding [1973] AC 691 at 723G -724A
"It remains true today that equity expects men to carry out their bargains and will
not let them buy their way out by uncovenanted payment. But it is consistent with
these principles that we should reaffirm the right of courts of equity in appropriate
and limited cases to relieve against forfeiture for breach of covenant or condition
where the primary object of the bargain is to secure a stated result which can
effectively be attained when the matter comes before the court, and where the
forfeiture provision is added by way of security for the production of that result. The
word "appropriate" involves consideration of the conduct of the applicant for relief,
in particular whether his default was wilful, of the gravity of the breaches, and of the
disparity between the value of the property of which forfeiture is claimed as
compared with the damage caused by the breach."

77. Earl Loreburn in Hyman v Rose [1912] AC 623 had said (page 631):
"I desire in the first instance to point out that the discretion given by the section is
very wide. The court is to consider all the circumstances and the conduct of the
parties. Now it seems to me that when the Act is so express to provide a wide
discretion, meaning, no doubt, to prevent one man from forfeiting what in fair
dealing belongs to someone else, by taking advantage of a breach from which he is
not commensurately and irreparably damaged, it is not advisable to lay down any
rigid rules for guiding that discretion. I do not doubt that the rules enunciated by the
Master of the Rolls in the present case are useful maxims in general, and that in
general they reflect the point of view from which judges would regard an application
for relief. But I think it ought to be distinctly understood that there may be cases in
which any or all of them may be disregarded. If it were otherwise the free discretion
given by the statute would be fettered by limitations which have nowhere been
enacted. It is one thing to decide what is the true meaning of the language contained
in an Act of Parliament. It is quite a different thing to place conditions upon a free
discretion entrusted by statute to the Court where the conditions are not based upon
statutory enactment at all. It is not safe, I think, to say that the Court must and will
always insist upon certain things when the Act does not require them, and the facts of
some unforeseen case may make the Court wish it had kept a free hand."

78. Had he not misdirected himself, that it was an absolute requirement for relief
that the tenants must immediately be able to bring the rent up to date, the
judge would and should have found this a fit case for the exercise of discretion
because:
(1) this was not a wilful default case;
17
(2) despite all the difficulties that the judge found with the
state of the premises, the tenants had paid the rent
throughout the ‘problem periods’ up to 2009;
(3) the October 2008 rent had (on the tenants’ account)
been tendered by cheque before re-entry;
(4) that rent had in any event been paid in full by money
transfer the day after re-entry;
(5) despite the modest award on damages, the tenants had
succeeded on their claims; and
(6) they had an extant application for permission to appeal
in respect of the judge’s judgment.

The Stay

79. Ground 10 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
“Having extended the tenants’ time to appeal from his orders, the
judge was wrong not to have stayed his order for possession until the
appeal court could be seized of such an appeal. He ought to have
directed himself that a refusal of a stay would lead to the landlord
immediately recovering possession (as it did) and would thereby
disable the tenants from trading and thus effectively financing and
pursuing an appeal (as it did).

80. This Ground speaks for itself. The judge appears to have directed himself that
a stay should only be granted if the tenants could satisfy the terms of the very
order in respect of which they were seeking a stay pending appeal.69 That
approach is entirely circular. The refusal of a stay has, as the tenants suggested
that it would, prevented them from continuing to trade and thus deprived them
of the ability to pay future rent while at the same time disabling them from
having a base from which, or resources with which, to expediently progress
their appeal.
69 Transcript of Judgment p77 para [5]
18

Costs

81. The remaining Amended Grounds of Appeal deal with costs. They are,
unusually, not contingent on success with the other Grounds of Appeal. They
are freestanding.

The usual principle in forfeiture cases is that costs are awarded on an indemnity basis, although the authors of some of the major texts, see Hill & Redman have queried the extent to which that practice is consistent with the modern approach to costs. Obviously, if the appeal succeeds to the extent that the lease was not forfeit then the costs order will fall. If the appeal fails and the argument regarding costs is freestanding then there are prospects of the argument succeeding. This is a very important point of principle which will have a widespread impact on forfeiture cases. The Claimants consider that the prospects of success are on balance in our favor and that it is worth pursuing this Amended Ground of Appeal.

82. Ground 11 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
Even if the judge did not err in any other aspect of this case, he was
wrong to use the exceptional power to order the tenants to pay the
costs of the proceedings assessed on an indemnity basis when, inter
alia, (1) the tenants’ claim had succeeded in part and (2) the tenants
has been self-represented during the bulk of the proceedings and had
only conducted themselves in a manner common to many reasonable
self-represented litigants.

83. At this stage no great elaboration of this Ground is developed. It is well
recognised that the making of an indemnity costs order is exceptional. The
judge found this an “extraordinarily difficult case70 because it had not been
well pleaded at a time when the tenants had had professional legal
representation (not their fault) and had thereafter been conducted in a fashion
that is sadly not uncommon when litigants try to handle complex litigation
themselves. The judge might have been on firmer ground in applying an
indemnity basis to the period after various offers had been made by the
landlord. But without giving sufficient reasons for doing so, he applied the
indemnity basis to the entirety of the proceedings.

84. Ground 12 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
The judge was wrong to order the tenants to pay the reserved costs of
all the interlocutory applications, most particularly where (1) the
tenants had succeeded in their application to be restored to possession
pending trial and (2) the landlord had later failed in an application to
secure possession of one of the demised premises prior to trial.

85. It is respectfully suggested that this Ground also speaks for itself. The judge
required the tenants to pay all the reserved costs of all the interlocutory
hearings, even those at which it might be said they had ‘succeeded’, without
70 Transcript of Judgment p76 para [1]
19
giving any explanation for doing so.71

The Stay

86. The Appellant’s Notice seeks a stay of execution of the Order under appeal.
Notwithstanding that more than two years have passed since the making of
that Order, a stay is still pressed as explained in the following paragraphs.

87. The tenants’ primary concern is to be restored to possession of the premises at
the outcome of the Appeal (now permission has been granted for an Appeal).

88. In respect of Nos.106-108, the most recent lease was granted in 2005 for a
term expiring in April 2014. 72 That term has more than a year left to run and
this appeal should have been fallen for determination well before it does.

89. In respect of the lease of No. 104, that lease was granted in 2000 and the term
expired in June 2006.73 Although it does not appear that Ms Flores (the sole
tenant under that lease) gave any notice under Part II of the Landlord &
Tenant Act 1954 seeking a new or extended lease (the landlord did not renew the lease in June 2006 due to the liability claim and the leaseholders were legally advised that they could hold over so did so), the judge had previously
held that there was a triable issue as to whether the landlord would be
estopped from taking a point on the failure to give such notice until this
litigation was finally concluded.74 Indeed, the landlord had not been unwilling
to have Ms Flores as tenant and had offered a fresh five year lease, at the same
rent, as one of the terms of a proposed settlement of the litigation.75

90. In those circumstances, the tenants will invite this Court at the conclusion of
the appeal to make an order with the effect that the tenants be restored to
possession. As neither property has been let on a fresh long lease, this is far
from impractical. If permission to appeal be given (now given), the tenants will seek
undertakings from the landlord not to let on long leases pending the hearing of
the appeal (since we now know both shops have long leases a total constructive loss is sought, an insured risk).
71 Transcript of Judgment p78 para [4]
72 The lease is at p113
73 The lease is at p79
74 Transcript of Judgment at p38 para [16]
75 Transcript of Judgment at p78 para [2]
20

Conclusion

91. For all or any of the above reasons, this Court was invited to Order that:

a. The Appellants have permission to amend the Grounds of Appeal by
substitution with the Amended Grounds of Appeal;

b. Permission to appeal is granted on those Amended Grounds;

c. There be a stay on terms of the execution of the Order under appeal
pending the hearing of the appeal; and

d. The costs of the application for permission be costs in the Appeal.

92. The Pro Bono Unit cannot, with respect, commit at this stage to being able to
represent the Appellants in the substantive appeal.

93. If the Court feels that the Amended Grounds of Appeal can only be properly
canvassed with legal representation it may wish to consider the appointment of
an amicus.

Representation on the oral hearing dated Dec 4th was by Jan Luba QC in Person.

94. I need not repeat here the Grounds of Appeal76 that succeeded with the fantastic support of the eminent Mr Jan Luba QC most especially in retaining the transcripts of judgment that held up the permission to appeal for so long, suffice to say they were 1-7 & 11-12. I might add that any costs order if successful be donated to the Pro-bono unit for that hearing.

95. There are a few issues outstanding since the Oral hearing that have been subsequently raised by Ms Flores with counsel. Ms Flores put to LJ Ward in person at the Oral hearing, she was satisfied with the amended grounds as stated generally by Mr Jan Luba QC and she was happy to go along with those Grounds as they stood in suspension until such times as to have further legal opinion on merits but at that stage she made it very clear that she, the courts and the defendant still did not know what Mr Jan Luba’s QC’s (or others at the unit) legal opinion of the case was, on each of the multiple of issues, as she had not as yet been given a legal opinion as to the merits on any of the issues. It was thus very important for her to state this in court at the permission to appeal hearing to LJ Ward and say that she so wished to reserve some scope to further amend based on the outcome of the awaited legal opinion by volunteers at the pro bono unit (that she had been ordered to approach by LJ Ward to try to put the unwieldy case into some good order for the appeal, for which Ms Flores was grateful as she had had no legal help) or finding of fact that may have irrefutable evidence to further ask for permission to appeal to amend and put forward for the grounds of the Appeal. LJ Ward agreed to this at the end of the hearing. This now after receiving advice and deciphering it will further help the Claimant’s to advance their case where some facts may it would seem have still been missed out and could if allowed to continue on that basis disallow substantial parts of the case because they were not yet pleaded at the Oral hearing. An N244 application for permission to amend crucial grounds and finds of fact has now been lodged with the evidence and amended (Advocates Statement) skeleton argument herein to back the amendments.

96. The laws are so arguable as to require further amendments and the finding of fact have irrefutable grounds of evidence to so have permission to amend. They are set out separately in the copy of the Grounds of Appeal and have been marked up to show the amendments as well as further stated herein;

Grounds 2a. The judge misdirected himself in his finding of fact that the claimants did not ask for the structure to be repaired and/or did not offer to repair the structure themselves.

Grounds 2b. The judge misdirected himself in law as to his finding of Caveat Lessee. The claimant’s have never complained that the pavement lights should not be there. They complained that the seal was worn (it required bi-annual maintenance) down causing water to leak in, a risk covered by the insurance, with a landlord’s obligation under the terms of the lease to insure and keep in repair at all times against water ingresses.

Grounds 2c The judge misdirected himself that the landlord had in place insurances to cover risks. He found as a finding of fact that the landlord had ‘breached the terms of the insurance’ and therefore no insurance was in place (he later said “fortunately insurances were in place to cover such risks”) which breached the landlords contractual obligations held in the leases. He ought to have directed himself that no cover has been in place to cover the property owner’s liability (POL an insured risk) due to a breach in the terms of the policy by the landlord invalidating cover.

The principle about the insurance is adequately covered by Vural Ltd v Security ArchivesLtd15 and is a leading authority in the landlord’s proprietary obligations to make insurance claims as well as covers the harassment of the Claimants leading to eviction.

Grounds 3a. The judge erred in holding that the cistern at Flat 3, situated above 104 premises had simply overflowed. There are no facts from either party that suggest that a minor overflow from a cistern brought down two triple layer ceilings at premises 104 and premises 102 next door. Further the facts brought to trial point to disrepair of the pipes (which are to be kept in repair at all times condition of the policy) leading to the cistern. Notwithstanding the facts as found by him that the insurance terms (as in POL) had been breached leading to no POL payment (an additional cover besides the more simple material damage) whatsoever to date has been paid and further that no material damage claim was ever made for the damaged floor. The lack of any claim for the replacement of the floor escalated over many months to improper inducement and harassment for the claimant to cover the material damage or risk having their rent doubled. Further this incident cumulated in eviction of the claimant’s by the landlord.

Grounds 3b. The judge erred in holding in law that Caveat Lessee could be used for the lack of a fire exit. In part once the landlord had opened the fire exit (albeit still not up to regulation standards) Caveat Lessee could be used but not before it was unlocked. In 104 Lease the Exit which serves both premises, there is a contractual obligation to have a means of escape from fire. The means, as the judge said, do not have to have a particular quality but the escape has to be in place.

Grounds 3c. The judge erred that the landlord had assisted the claimants in making insurance claims and muddied the waters that the claimant’s were in direct contact with the insurers, without specifying the nature of the ‘contact’, in that the claimant’s were simply using the FSA official complaints process to find out the delays as they did not know the landlord had breached the terms of the policy and that was causing delays. The judge did not make it clear that the landlord as set out in the terms of the leases had a proprietary obligation to instigate and make the claims which they did not do so. This breached the contractual obligations in the leases and voided the insurances, meaning no insurances were in place notwithstanding that the judge did make that clear. However the judge did say in a contradictory way on more than one occasion that the landlord had not stood in the way of making claims and/or that the landlord had assisted the claimants and/or repairs could have been made and insurances claimed on later. This does not accurately reflect the fact that there was at no time insurance in place as it was voided and that the landlord directly stood in the way of the claimants being paid and further, any contact with the insurers (the landlords agent) was futile, as the insurers were from the beginning backing the landlord to defend a claim as they too did not want to pay and neither party would say why, keeping the claimants in the dark as to the landlords breach of the policy and putting the claimant’s to strict legal proof, time and cost, to defend their claim unarmed legally against the landlord and their agent the insurers who were using fierce means and the best legal team money could buy them, in a thus far 5 year court case, to make us legally prove (POL) liability, an insured risk for us too as we pay for the insurance.


97. The Pro-bono unit gave substantial assistance to Ms Flores since the Oral hearing and provided subsequently another leading counsel to advise on the merit and the laws applicable. It was here that the two issues that may/may not have been seemingly missed out as to disallow them completely, were a cause of concern for Ms Flores. Ms Flores acting as litigant in person for the bulk of the trial has found it difficult to play a game with this litigation. She knows now that that is how lawyers sometimes play, leaving your best points in and did endeavour to leave some points like the fire exits, the security shutters, the unfair trial and the harassment from the landlord out of the appeal to comply with this way of thinking to a large extent initially and until it was discovered that much more of the claim was cut with legal assistance than she could take. Further the suggestion that Ms Flores exaggerated as was pointed out by counsel as some kind of finding of fact has infuriated the claimant and just to address this for any future reference the point is raised is raised here to put an end to it.
3. Paragraph 9-11 of the second Judgement HHJ Cowell “I am well aware that when giving evidence witnesses are not there to simply undergo a memory test and that any lapse of memory is not an indication of deceitful testimony” – “I need add nothing”

The fact that the Judge says that he is well aware (eg: in this case that time, events and dates may have been slightly arie) as stated in this part Judgment after reading our submissions so it is not so one sided, where we say in our defence that ‘because Jo was placed in the witness box for 4 days and not allowed access to her files even though she was representing the claimants in person’ this does not indicate, as was being suggested, deceitful testimony by any memory lapse and that is what this Judgment means above in point 3. Therefore any future reference to ‘exaggerating’ or as the defendants barrister put it, the ‘telling of untruths’ can no longer ‘as statement of fact’ in this Judgment (as was previously suggested by the defendants), as Jo being an ‘unreliable witness’ not be considered as true. That is a now a finding of fact in the second Judgment! It is good the Judge found that after reading our previously unread submissions.

98. The issues of concern for Ms Flores bearing in mind some but now very few of the above points conceded are firstly the ventilation77 and secondly the flooding of 104. Both these issues are crucial to Ms Flores as they were both in play when the trespass took place and were the very issues that without being in the amended grounds could mean that the landlords would have had the right to peaceable re-entry. The set-off (as suggested by counsel and not that we had simply paid the rent so there were no lawful grounds for eviction anyway but ‘set-off’ a legal term was accepted as it is still fact) for disrepair on the other issues may have been too far back as not to hold as much direct relevance on the current issues of the day being named here, that lead to unlawful eviction. The issue of primary fact being irrefutably wrong could be inadvertently left out with those issues side-stepped being more appropriate as to that eviction. Not to amend on just one or two findings of fact voluntarily cuts out substantial parts of the claim without even being judged by a Court which can with respect makes no sense.

99. On the first issue Ms Flores quotes the trial Judge and his finding of fact in his 22ndSept 2010 Judgment.77

I mentioned in my Judgment of 9th Sept the case of Barrett v. Lounova [1989] 1AER 351 and the remarks in it about correlative obligations, thereby anticipating this argument, the effect of which I accept, so far as it is consistent with the law contained in Barrett v. Lounova. But it seems to me that none of the complaints made by the claimants involved asking the defendant to repair the structure

There is irrefutable evidence to suggest that the primary fact of the judge was wrong on this issue, in that the Claimants by there own submissions78 and further evidence in the files79 did in fact ask for the structure to be repaired. In some differing emails80 and even at trial they either asked to do the work themselves, with the required expressed permissionas quoted below, to follow the undertakings given by LJ Clarke for Quiet Enjoyment under the terms of the lease for which injunctions were granted;

Ms Flores addressing the judge at the close of the costs hearing before the forfeiture;
“We would like expressed permission from you which has to date been withheld, ignored to put in ventilation…” 

‘As we can’t do it without permission from them, which they won’t give and we can’t get planning permission they have to, to go through the structure or they’d sue us, catch 22, which is nicely convenient for them while the trial was going on..’

“Expressed permission to honour the high court Judgement to allow ‘Quiet Enjoyment’ of the claimant in both businesses to be able to short/long term hire as set out in request letter for the lease as a place for hire”.. 

I was someone who was in care, I had a good project going, I did not take any public money unlike the defendant yet this so called social landlord has done everything in its power never to mediate but to go all out to wreck me and this court has just knowingly assisted them in doing so in this pro-landlord judgment.

so as the Claimant’s could bore holes into the defendants structure (as without this permission they were forbidden to do so) and/or that they asked the defendant to carry out the work themselves as two different insurances covered this repair81, Ms Flores pointing out that for without the repair to the structure under an implied obligation, Barrett and Lounova, the 106-108 shop was unfit for purpose and/or human habitation and left the claimants open to third part litigation, (although only completely realising this in May 2008 hence the complete ceasing of trading from then until eviction in Oct 2008) rendering them completely unable to trade from day 1 and very worryingly even with the undertakings during the nearly two years lead up to the 10 days trial.

100. There was not just one insurer who covered this structural repair, (that would require diamond core drilling into the structure for which the leaseholders could not touch as it did not form part of the demise but for which without repair, the claimants could not forfil their own repairing obligations) there were two so at all times the landlord had the means to repair by a propreitory obligation to effect an insurance claim. There was also a HAPM82 insurance in place for any snags, alterations and structural repair that may have occurred for up to 20 years of the full public funding refurbishment and at the time of disrepair was in year 5. Evidence suggests that a form of basis ventilation as in holes in the structure was a requirement before A3 use could be legally put in place and the claimant’s lease of A3 would require those holes at the very least within the structure before they could add any other ventilation.82

101. When the judge finishes his passage on the 22nd Sept 2010 hearing he adds that

“without which repair the claimant’s duty to repair the demise becomes futile, for the defendant is not complaining of want of repair by the claimants to the demised premises. So that one notices in relation to the leaking pipes, the leaks when identified have been repaired and the extent of liability is in Guilds’ case, essentially that of a neighbouring occupier. Such leaks require special measures.

In this repair special measures require diamond core drilling through (in some places) 4 foot walls and can cost £15,000 as the claimant’s found when they did get quotes to try and mitigate their losses. They also contacted the building control at the council but were told they were not the freeholder so could not access any data with regards to the lack of holes (air-bricks as they are called).

77‘The pavement lights have to be repaired and are more simply repaired and have been repaired and so this is not, therefore, a case of the claimants seeking to require the defendants to repair the structure.’

102. I think with the above quote and the acceptance of the learned judge as finding of fact that this was an implied obligation covered by the authority Barrett and Lounova to repair the structure by the landlord the defendants, alongside the evidence in part (without wasting more of the courts time with all of Evidence file C2, where there is copious amounts of evidence on this request) referenced here as part of the Appeal bundle, there is a real need here for an amendment challenging the Judges finding of fact which would as the judge said confer a cause of action.

103. Having said that since the eloquent QC did leave scope in Ground 2 for the facts raised here to fit in nicely with the ventilation issues;

Grounds 2. The judge misdirected himself in law as to the landlord’s liability for disrepair under the leases held by the tenants in this case.

He ought to have held that the tenants’ obligations to repair, in respect of the demised premises, were matched by a correlative implied obligation on the landlord to keep in repair, at all times:

(1) the parts of the building retained in its ownership and control,
defects in which may affect the demised premises; and/or

(2) such parts of the building as might, if defective, lead to the occurrence of damage covered by an insured risk.

An amendment is necessary bearing in mind the judge did not hear the claimant’s case in court and the defendant did not direct him to the claimant asking for repair in claimant file 2 in her cross examination of Ms Flores.

104. If the court finds that there is an acceptance of the fact the claimant did ask for repair of the structure, then we would respectfully ask that this be dealt with as an accepted small amendment adjusting a finding of fact backed by irrefutable evidence at the start of the appeal.

105. Further we on the second issue ask that the flood be accepted as a disrepair issue and not an accident. The Judge said ‘even if the claimant’s account of events are right, I cannot see that the flood was anything more than an accident’.
The claimant’s submission very much point to a state of ongoing disrepair.83

106. In short, There are two job cards that relate to this flooding they are -1168820- 04.04.05 and -116853- for 05.06.05 both in reference to Flat 3 bathroom (and show timely dates with the incident of flooding in 24.06.05) and not Flat 2 and they show that the flood was foreseeable due to outstanding and ongoing repairs as was typical with this landlord taking months to repair and complaining of lack of access. They therefore failed to keep the neighbouring flats and their pipes in a good state of repair. Since evidence showed this clearly at the time the loss adjuster was investigating POL liability they concocted a story about the leak coming from Flat 2 (no where near the flooded area) and blamed it on the neighbouring occupier leaving the taps on when in fact he was in hospital. Further the Mr UK said in evidence the loss adjuster wrote his statement and he had not signed it. This raises a serious issue as to his independence.

106. Page 184 C’s submissions on liability show repairs job cards: Reported 24.01.05 invoice accepted 06.06.05 Flat 3, showing 5 months delay. Whereas the repair in Flat 2 119853 was on the 29.03.05 – 31.03.05 with invoice accepted 20.05.05. If we are put to proving in evidence that the pipes were in disrepair we have. If the Judge said as fact it was a leaking cistern then that would suggest it did not overflow, which only then would be an accident.

107. Further this claim relating to the flooding was that insurances were not triggered. The first time the insurance knew of the flooding was in August 2005. The only reason the insurers were alerted was that the claimant’s were put to mitigating their losses by full replacement of the ceiling in October 2005 after months of waiting for the insurers to act. What we had not been told was that the insurers had rejected POL because the landlord breached section 2a and 2b of the policy by failing to alert the insurers. Therefore any valid claim for POL by the claimants was challenged to date with fierce mean’s, as UKU/RSA did not want to accept liability and pay. Instead they choose to defend the claim, which would not have happened if the policy was valid. The landlord believed that they should be covered even if they were at fault. The judge did not challenge the finding of fact that the landlord voided the insurance. He said nothing however about the fact that no one told us that it was that causing delays in us being put out of pocket by the whole incident and never compensated.
Further some consequential damage was added to the material damage claim involving the floor as seen in the damp surveyors report Mike Parrett84. This material damage claim should have been simply claimed for but instead resulted in eviction.

108. If the Appeal succeeds and damages are awarded then the Claimant’s ask that the courts observe that a Joint Forensic Accountant Expert Report by Doug Hall has already been commissioned at £8,000 cost to each party on the instruction of the trial Judge. It is respectfully suggested that this report could be used at the 1st/2ndMay hearing to save costs and further use of court time in an already 5 year long ongoing trial.

76 Grounds of Appeal p24-25 Para [1-7] & [11-12]
77 22nd Sept Judgment p74 Para [17-18]
78 Claimant’s Submissions on Liability p430 Para [223-224]
79 Evidence File C2 Email regarding the claimant’s asking for the structure to be repaired p431A-C
80 Evidence File C2 Email regarding a claim on one of the insurances for theft of ventilation p431E
81 Summary of Cover Building Insurance Policy CLAIMS SETTLEMENT p457 para1
82 Evidence File C2 148-153. HAPM Insurance. Ventilation requirement A3 Planning use p457A-F
83 Claimants Submissions on Liability p386-395 para106-108
84 Evidence File E1 p348-403
85 Evidence File E1 p200-279 & Evidence File E2 p1-176 Scarlet Maguire & p1-127 spaceshift…

Prepared by Ms Flores
Litigant in Person/ First Claimant.
17th March 2013.

Appeal No: B5/2010/2396
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
ON APPEAL FROM THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT
(HHJ Cowell)
For hearing on 4 December 2013
Claim No: CHY09015
B E T W E E N:
JO GAVIN (now JO FLORES)
and
CHANTAL CRACY
Claimants/Appellants
-v-
COMMUNITY HOUSING
ASSOCIATION LIMITED
(now One Housing Group)
Defendant/Respondent









9. Can you spot the contrasting difference. Should it make any difference? What do you suggest I wear next?


My lease on my trespassed premises runs out on April 4th 2014

$
0
0
Can anyone find me a lawyer - I need assistance to speed up the system before it's too late.

This is the spaceshift... lease

PARTICULARS
A.        The Landlord
COMMUNITY HOUSING ASSOCIATION LIMITED of 100 Chalk Farm Road London NW1 8EH

B.        The Tenant
JO   GAVIN   and   CHANTAL   CRACY   both   of  32 Tonbridge House Tonbridge Street London WC1 9PB

C.        The Sureties
None

I).
The Demised Premises
ALL THAT shop on the ground floor and basement of 106/108 Cromer Street London WC1 and being more particularly described in clause 2 hereof.
E.         Contractual Term        :    From the date hereof until        7th  April 2014
F.         Rent
Nine Thousand Pounds (£9000) per annum

G.        Review Date
7th April 2009

H.        Review Period
Every fifth year from the Review Date

I.         Permitted User
Cafe (and tea bar) falling within Class A3 of the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987
THIS LEASE dated                       8th April    2004        2004
is made BETWEEN The Landlord whose name and address appears in A of the Particulars of
one part and The Tenant whose name and address appears in B of the Particulars of the other
part
1. DEFINITIONS
1(1)     The expressions "the Landlord" and "the Tenant" shall wherever the context so admits
include the reversioner  for the time  being and  the Tenant's  successors  in title
respectively and if the Tenant is more than one person their respective covenants and
obligations hereunder shall be deemed to be joint and several 1(2)     The expression "the Demised Premises" shall include inter alia where the context so
admits for the purposes of obligation as well as grant:-
the internal plaster covering the exterior and interior loadbearing walls
all non-loadbearing walls
the coverings of the ceilings
the coverings of the floors and the boards and screed of such floors
all shop fronts and display cases all fascias all windows and window frames all
doors and door frames
all conduits within and exclusively serving the Demised Premises up to the point
of connection with the common or public system
all fixtures and fittings and plant equipment and machinery in the nature of the
Landlords'   fixtures   including   if applicable   all   escalators  all   heating  air
conditioning  and  ventilating  equipment  and  all  electrical   and  mechanical
installations ana other plant equipment and machinery within and exclusively serving the Demised Premises (h)       all sprinkler systems and fire detection and prevention equipment fire fighting
equipment and hoses within the Demised Premises (i)        the toilet accommodation within the Demised Premises including all sanitary
equipment and other apparatus therein (j)        all additions alterations and improvements to the Demised Premises made at any
time
1(3) The expression "the Landlords Surveyor" shall mean any person or a firm of surveyors appointed by or acting for the Landlord including an employee of the Landlord to perform the function of a Surveyor for any purpose of this Lease
1(4) The expression "Interest" shall mean interest at the rate of five per centum per annum above the base rate of Barclays Bank PLC from time to time during the period from the date on which the expenditure is incurred or from such other date may be specified or from which the interest is to run to the date of payment as well before as after any judgment 1(5) Reference to any right exercisable by the Landlord shall where the context so admits
include the exercise of such rights by all persons authorised by the Landlord 1(6)     Any reference to a statute shall include any statutory extension or modification or re-enactment of such statute and any regulations or orders made thereunder 1(7)     Any covenant by the Tenant not to do an act or thing shall be deemed to include an obligation not to suffer such act or thing to be done
1(8) The expression "the term" shall mean the term of years hereby granted and any statutory or other continuation or extension thereof
1(9) The expression "the Town and Country Planning Acts" shall mean the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the Town and Country Planning (Listed Building and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 and the Town and Country Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 and all statutes referred to therein and all statutes regulations and orders included by the application of clause 1(6) hereof and the expression 'Development' shall have the meaning given to it by the Town and Country Planning Acts
1(10) Any reference to parting with possession shall be deemed to include sharing possession and any occupation by a licence
1(11) The expression "the insured risks" mean loss or damage by or in consequence of fire and such other risks as the Landlord may deem desirable or expedient including three years loss of rent and architects and surveyors fees and demolition clearance and similar expenses
1(12)   The expression "the Particulars" means the foregoing particulars hereof
2. DEMISE AND PREMISES
In consideration of the Tenant's covenants herein contained the Landlord demises unto
the Tenant ALL THOSE premises details of which appear in D of the Particulars (hereinafter
called "the Demised Premises") which premises are for identification purposes only shown
edged red on the plan annexed
SUBJECT TO all easements and similar rights and privileges which the Demised Premises are
or may be subject to and in particular to rights of the Landlord and its tenants of neighbouring
premises the free and uninterrupted passage of water gas and electricity through the pipes and
wires which are now or may hereafter be on the Demised Premises and the right for the
Landlord at all reasonable times on notice to the Tenant to enter upon the Demised Premises
with or without workmen and others to inspect repair maintain or renew such wires pipes and
other services TOGETHER WITH the following rights:-
2(1) the right of free passage and running of water and soil in and through the sewers drains and channels upon through or under adjacent premises of the Landlord and uninterrupted use of all gas electric telephone and other pipes wires and cables upon through or under adjacent premises of the Landlord
2(2) Subject to such regulations as may be made by or on behalf of the Landlord from time to time
2(3) The right of subjacent and lateral support and shelter and protection from the elements for the Demised Premises
2(4) The right (but only if and so far as the Landlord is able to grant the same) to place table and chairs on the pavement area in front or the Demised Premises for use during business hours by customers of the Tenant's business carried on at the Demised Premises Provided that public rights of way are not obstructed or affected
3. TERM
The term for which the premises are demised is as shown in E of the Particulars subject
to the right of the Landlord to determine the term as hereinafter appearing
4.RENT
The rent payable throughout the term will be at the rate per annum set out in F of the Particulars
5.    TENANTS COVENANTS
The Tenant hereby covenants with the Landlord as follows : 5(1)     RENT
To pay the rent as before mentioned by bankers standing order by equal quarterly payments in advance on the usual quarter days without any deduction the first payment to be made on the date hereof to be a due proportion of the rent for the period from the date hereof up the quarter day next following the date hereof provided that if and so long as the amount of the rent which the Tenant is liable to pay shall be restricted by law the Tenant shall in lieu of the rent hereby reserved pay the maximum amount of rent which such restrictions may from time to time allow and to pay as rent the service charge payments as provided for in clause 6 below 5(2) OUTGOINGS
To pay and indemnify the Landlord against all existing and future rates taxes and similar outgoings payable in respect of the Demised Premises whether parliamentary local or otherwise and whether or not of a capital or non-recurring nature or of a wholly novel character which are now or may hereafter be payable (excluding any tax levy or imposition payable upon the Landlord's interest in reversion) and to repay to the Landlord on demand a fair proportion (to be determined by the Landlord's Surveyor) of any rates and other charges as aforesaid which may be assessed in respect of the Demised Premises together with other land or property 5(3)     INSURANCE (a)       To repay forthwith upon demand by the Landlord or its agents a due proportion (to be
assessed by the Landlords Surveyor) of the premium and amounts paid by the Landlord
in respect of its carrying out its obligations relating to insurance contained in Clause 7(2)
To insure and keep insured in a reputable insurance office approved by the Landlord the
plate glass windows of the Demised Premises and all other parts of the Demised
Premises which the Tenant is obliged to repair against damage and destruction to the full
replacement value thereof in some insurance office of repute for breakage and third
party risks and for such other risks as the Landlord may reasonably require and to
produce the policy and the last premium receipt to the Landlord on demand but save as
aforesaid not to effect or maintain any insurance in respect of the Demised Premises
(except as to the Tenants' trade fittings or stock)
To insure and at all times keep insured in a reputable insurance office approved by the
Landlord the Demised Premises against all third party public and occupiers liability risks
for such sum as may be reasonably required by the Landlord from time to time
5(4)     USE
Not to use or permit (whether on assignment or otherwise) the Demised Premises for
any purpose other than as defined in I of the Particulars
Not to do on the Demised Premises anything which may be a nuisance or cause danger
injury damage or unreasonable noise to the Landlord or its tenants or any neighbouring
owner or occupier
Not to use or permit or suffer to be used the Demised Premises as a betting shop or as
offices in connection with the business of turf commission agents or pools promoters
nor as a job centre or as taxi or mini cab offices nor for any noxious noisy or offensive
trade or business nor for any illegal or immoral act or purpose and not to allow on the
Demised Premises anything which is combustible inflammable radio active or explosive
Not to place material at the Demised Premises or the Service Area in such manner as to
overload the floor or any other part of the Demised Premises or overload the supplies
thereto
Not to discharge anything into the drains or sewers serving the Demised Premises which
will be corrosive or harmful or which may cause any obstruction or deposit
Not to place store exhibit or hang any goods or things for sale or otherwise outside the
Demised Premises nor to leave any rubbish or waste in any open part of or outside the
Demised Premises except for trade refuse in a suitable dustbin or other covered
receptacle or storage rooms as have been designated by the Landlord and to ensure that
all such rubbish or waste is collected or otherwise regularly removed from the Demised
Premises not less frequently than once a day
Not to carry on upon the Demised Premises any trade or occupation or to do any other
thing which may make void or voidable the insurance of the Demised Premises against
the insured Risks nor without the prior written consent of the Landlord (which consent
may be subject to conditions) to do anything on the Demised Premises which may
render any increased or extra premium payable for such insurance
(h) Not to reside or sleep at the Demised Premises
(i) Not to open the Demised Premises for trading before 7.30 in the morning or after 11.00
at night and to keep the Demised Premises fully stocked and to maintain a window
display which is attractive to the general public (j) Not to store or bring or suffer to be stored or brought into the Demised Premises any
articles of a specially combustible inflammable or dangerous nature nor to store or bring
or suffer to be stored or brought into the Demised Premises any machinery engines or
motors except such as are usual in connection with the purpose tor which the Demised
Premises are authorised to be used pursuant to this lease (k)       Not to use any loudspeakers television sets radios or other devices so has to cause
nuisance or annoyance or so as to be audible outside the Demised Premises (1)        To keep the Demised Premises sufficiently heated at all times to prevent freezing of
water in pipes and fixtures therein. (m)      Not to cover any windows of the Demised Premises by posting or fixing of notices or
advertisements thereto or painting thereon to a greater extent than ten per cent of the
area of each such window, (n)       Not to allow any trolleys provided by the Tenant for the use of customers to be left or
stored outside the Demised Premises and to take all necessary steps to ensure that such
trolleys are at all times immediately collected and returned to the Demised Premises if
left outside the Demised Premises by any party.
5(5)     WASTE AND ALTERATIONS
Not to commit any waste to the Demised Premises nor erect any new buildings or
structures thereon nor make any structural alterations or additions thereto
Not without the previous consent in writing of the Landlord to make any alteration in or
addition to the Demised Premises or in the layout or arrangement of the Demised
Premises nor any alteration or addition to the Demised Premises which shall alter the
external appearance thereof nor to add to or alter any new additions or alterations
effected or made in pursuance of the consent of the Landlord nor to annex the Demised
Premises to other premises and the Tenant shall obtain and comply with all necessary
consents of any competent authority and making an application supported by drawings
and where appropriate a specification in duplicate and paying the reasonable fees of the
Landlord and any mortgagee and their respective professional advisors and to the Tenant
entering into such reasonable covenants as the Landlord may require as to the execution
of the alterations
To remove any erection or alteration made in breach of the foregoing or in respect of
which the permission of the relevant planning authority is withdrawn or lapses and to
comply with every order of such authority requiring the removal or demolition of or
other work in connection with such erections or alterations and in all such cases to make
good all damage caused by such removal demolition or other work and to restore all
parts of the Demised Premises affected thereby to a condition consistent with the
covenants in these Presents as to repair and decoration
Provided that if pursuant to sub-paragraph 5(6)(b) hereof the Tenant applies for the Landlord's consent to the making of any substantial alteration or addition to the Demised
10
Premises the Landlord shall be entitled as a condition of giving such consent to require
the Tenant to provide security to the satisfaction of the Landlord for the carrying out and
completion of the works proposed by the Tenant (d)       Not to puncture or pierce the walls plaster or wall coverings of the Demised Premises or
do anything which may injure pierce penetrate or bridge any damp proofing membrane
within the walls of the Demised Premises 5(6)     REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE AND DECORATION
To be responsible for any damage caused to the Landlord or the owners and/or occupiers
of adjoining premises by the bursting overflowing or obstruction of any part of the water
sanitary or heating installations on the Demised Premises by the act omission neglect of
the Tenant its servants or agents
To cleanse and keep clean and to put and keep in good and substantial repair decoration
and condition and renew as necessary the Demised Premises and every part (including
cleaning repointing and treating of all outside brickwork plasterwork and stonework of
the shop front of the Demised Premises) with all necessary reparations and cleansing
and rebuilding works and amendments whatsoever (regardless of the age or state of
dilapidation of the Demised Premises for the time being) and to replace from time to
time all Landlords fixtures and fittings and appurtenances in the Demised Premises
which may be or become beyond repair at any time during the term or at the
determination of the term
At least once in every consecutive period of three years during the term and the last year
of the term to decorate all the interior surfaces of or within the Demised Premises
requiring the same for their proper maintenance which are painted or otherwise treated
ll
with a suitable paint or preservative appropriate to the finish thereof and in such colours as shall be approved by the Landlord)
To replace by rebuilding or reinstating the whole or any part of the Demised Premises
notwithstanding that such works may be necessary by reason of a patent or latent defect
or otherwise and notwithstanding that the necessary remedial work amounts to an
improvement
Forthwith to enter into and thereafter to maintain comprehensive maintenance contracts
in forms approved by and with reputable contractors approved by the Landlord for the
maintenance and repair of all plant within the Demised Premises and to produce upon
demand to the Landlord the receipt for the current year's premium and a copy of the
relevant contract and of any reports made by the contractors and to comply with the
recommendations of such contractors
At least once in every week and as and when necessary to keep all windows and glass of
the Demised Premises clean both inside and outside and unobstructed and to keep in
good and safe repair all electricity cables conducting media and meters exclusively
serving the Demised premises and to indemnify the Landlord against all liability
howsoever arising from any failure to repair of the misuse or over-loading of the said
cables
Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing to procure that all electrical and
mechanical installations and equipment within the Demised Premises be properly and
regularly serviced and maintained by qualified persons approved by the manufacturers of
such installations and equipment and by the insurers of the Demised Premises
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5(7)     REGULATIONS
To observe and procure that all occupiers of the Demised Premises and persons doing business thereat observe the reasonable regulations from time to time made by the Landlord with regard to the occupation management and security of the Demised Premises and neighbouring property 5(8)     YIELDING UP
At the end or sooner termination of the term to deliver up the Demised Premises with vacant possession clean and in repair and decorated as aforesaid (damage by an insured risk excepted unless payment of the insurance money is wholly or partially withheld wholly or partially through any act or default of the Tenant its servants or agents or any other person under its control) having first replaced any Landlords' fixtures and fittings which may be missing or damaged with others of a similar kind and quality and having made good any damage resulting from the removal of any tenants fixtures or fittings 5(9) ADVERTISEMENTS AND AERIALS ETC.
Not to exhibit any advertisement notice or sign outside the Demised Premises or inside the Demised Premises so as to be seen from the outside nor to install any flag pole outside television or radio aerial on the Demised Premises Provided That the Tenant may display its name and/or details of its business on the area of the Demised Premises immediately above the shop window thereof subject to such sign being of a size type and location to be approved by the Landlord in its absolute discretion 5(10) ASSIGNMENTS ETC. (a)       Not to assign underlet part with or share possession nor charge part only (as distinct
from the whole) of the Demised Premises
13
Not to underlet the whole of the Demised Premises
Not to assign the whole of the Demised Premises without the consent of the Landlord
which shall not be unreasonably withheld and to procure that any assignee of the
whole of the Demised Premises shall covenant by deed with the Landlord to pay the
Reserved Rent and other sums made payable hereunder and to observe and perform all
the covenants on the part of the Tenant and the conditions herein contained and that if
such assignee is a corporate body and the Landlord shall so require to procure that at
lease two directors or other persons or a company acceptable to the Landlord join in
such deed to guarantee the covenants of such assignee in such form as shall be
required by the Landlord
PROVIDED
(i)        that the Landlord shall be entitled to require the Tenant to enter into an authorised guarantee agreement as described in Section (16) Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 and (ii)       that the intended assignee shall (if the Landlord reasonably so requires)
provide a 12 month rent deposit or similar security and
(iii) in any event that the Landlord may withhold its consent where (in the reasonable opinion of the Landlord) the proposed assignment will cause a decrease in the value of the Landlord's reversion
PROVIDED that the Tenant shall if so required by the Landlord enter into an authorised guarantee agreement as described in Section (16) of the said Act PROVIDED FURTHER that on assignment shall be entitled:
14
in the case of an assignment to an individual or individuals to require that the assignee
be at least two individuals each having an income (at the date consent is requested for
the assignment) independent of the business permitted to be carried on at the Demised
Premises in excess of three times the rent passing under this Lease (at the date consent
is required for the assignment) or
in the case of a company either:
(i) that two directors having an income (at the date consent is requested for the assignment) independent of the business permitted to be carried on at the Demised Premises in excess of three times the rent passing under this Lease (at the date consent is requested for the assignment) shall stand as sureties for the intended assignee and shall covenant to accept a new Lease of the Demised Premises upon disclaimer of this Lease if so required by notice to the sureties within three months after such disclaimer such new Lease to be for the residue of the Term unexpired at the date of such disclaimer and at the rents then payable and subject to the terms of this Lease in every respect and to be granted at the cost of the sureties in exchange for a counterpart duly executed by the sureties; and
(ii) to require that the intended assignee company produce audited accounts for the three years immediately preceding the date on which consent is requested for the assignment evidencing net profits (before the payment of any dividend) of not less than three times the rent passing under this Lease at the date of such assignment
15
PROVIDED THAT provisos (A) and (B) above shall not apply in the case of either an assignment to an individual or company where either provide a rent deposit equivalent to two year's rental (at the date consent is requested for the assignment) to be held for such time as the individual or company remain the Tenant under this Lease upon terms contained in a deed reasonably acceptable to the Landlord such deed to include (without limitation) a provision that in the event of insolvency the Landlord can immediately forfeit the balance of the deposit monies 5(11) REGISTRATION OF DOCUMENTS
Within one month of every assignment transfer or charge affecting the demised Premises or any devolution of the estate of the tenant therein and every surrender terminating any derivative mediate or immediate estate or interest in the demised Premises or any devolution of such estate or interest to give notice in writing with particulars thereof to the landlord's solicitors and produce such assignment transfer or charge or Probate of the will or letters of Administration or other document or evidence of such devolution or surrender with a certified copy thereof and to pay to the Landlord's solicitors in respect of every such assignment charge devolution or surrender a reasonable registration fee being not less than twenty pounds plus V.A.T. 5(12) RIGHT OF ENTRY FOR INSPECTION ETC.
(a)    To permit the Landlord to enter the Demised Premises for the purpose of inspecting the
state and condition and repair thereof
(b)    Within two months after written notice thereof or forthwith in an emergency to remedy
any breach of covenant for which the Tenant is liable and that in case of default the
Landlord may enter the Demised Premises and remedy the breach and all expenses in
16
connection therewith shall be paid by the Tenant to the Landlord and shall be
recoverable as rent in arrear (c)       To permit the Landlord and Tenants and occupiers of the Development and those
authorised by them at any time upon not less than forty eight hours prior notice (except
in case of emergency) to enter upon the Demised Premises:-
(i)        to comply with covenants contained in other leases of adjoining property
(ii)       to examine decorate repair and rebuild the structure of the Demised Premises or any adjoining or neighbouring property
(iv)      for the purpose of inspecting repairing renewing connecting to cleansing altering or constructing conduits in over upon or under the Demised Premises
(v)       to measure the Demised Premises
(vi)      for any other reasonable purpose Subject to the person or person exercising such
right making good all damage thereby occasioned to the Demised Premises 5(13) ON EXPIRY OR SALE OF REVERSION
To allow the Landlord to enter on the Demised Premises at any time within six months next before the end of the term or at any time when the Landlord wishes to sell the reversion and to fix thereon a noticeboard for re-letting or selling the same which shall not be removed or obscured but which shall not be fixed in such a position as to interfere with the Tenant's business or beneficial occupation 5(14) COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTES ETC.
To comply in all respects with the provisions of all Statutes for the time being in force and any requirements of any competent authority relating to the Demised Premises or any part thereof and the use thereof and anything contained therein and not to do or omit or suffer to be
17
done or omitted on or about the Demised Premises any act or thing by reason of which the Landlord may under any enactment incur or have imposed upon it or become liable to pay any levy penalty damages compensation costs charges or expenses and so far as the law allows to indemnify the Landlord against all liability in respect thereof and in particular against any liability under the Offices Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963 the Factories Act 1961 and the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 relating to the Demised Premises 5(15) EXPENSES
To pay all reasonable and proper expenses incurred by the Landlord or any mortgagee and their respective professional advisors in connection with any notice or proceedings (or any such costs incurred in contemplation thereof) under S.146 and S.147 of the Law of Property Act 1925 or in connection with any breach of covenant by the Tenant (whether or not relief is granted by the Court) or preparation and service of any justifiable schedule of dilapidations and in connection with every consent applied for under this Lease and to repay forthwith upon demand by the Landlord the cost to the Landlord (including but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing the fees of any bailiff solicitor Counsel or other person engaged by the Landlord) of effecting the recovery of any arrears of rent service charge cost of insurance or any other monies due from the Tenant to the Landlord under the provisions of this Lease 5(16) TOWN PLANNING (a) At all times during the term to comply with the provisions and requirements of the
Town and Country Planning Acts (and the conditions thereof) relating to or affecting :
(i)        the Demised Premises or
(ii)       any operations works acts or things carried out executed or done or omitted on the Demised Premises or
18
(iii)      the use of the Demised Premises
During the term as often as occasion requires at the Tenant's expense to obtain and if
appropriate renew all planning permissions and bye-law or other necessary consents and
serve all notices required for the carrying out by the Tenant of any operations permitted
under the terms of this lease or the institution or continuance by the Tenant of any use on
the Demised Premises permitted by this lease
To pay and satisfy any charge imposed under the Town and Country Planning Acts in
respect of the carrying out of maintenance by the Tenant of any such operation or the
institution or continuance by the Tenant of any such use mentioned above
As soon as the same comes to the attention of the Tenant to notify the Landlord of any
order direction proposal or notice under the Town and Country Planning Acts served on
or received by the Tenant or coming to the Tenant's notice which relates to the Demised
Premises and to produce to the Landlord if required any such order direction proposal or
notice in the Tenant's possession
Immediately on receipt from any public authority of any notice order communication or
proposal of any nature affecting the Demised Premises to send a copy of the relevant
document to the Landlord
Not to apply for any Planning permission which will or may render the Landlord liable
to tax or any future tax or levy based upon the realisation of the development value in
land
19
5(20) INDEMNITY
To keep the Landlord indemnified from and against all expenses loss and claims arising directly or indirectly from any breach of covenant on the part of the Tenant herein contained or from the use of the Demised Premises or out of any works carried out at any time during the term to the Demised Premises or out of anything now or during the term attached to or projecting from the Demised Premises which arises from any act neglect or default by the Tenant or by their respective servants or agents 5(21) FIRE FIGHTING
To keep the Demises Premises supplied and equipped with all fire fighting and extinguishing appliances from time to time
required by law or
reasonably required by the Insurers of the Demises Premises such appliances being kept
open to inspection and properly maintained and not to obstruct or permit or suffer to be
obstructed the access to or means of working such appliances or the means of escape
from the Demised Premises in case of fire
5(22) TO PAY COST OF REBUILDING IF INSURANCE AVOIDED
In the event of the Demises Premises or the building in which they are situate or any neighbouring premises or any of them or any part thereof being destroyed or damaged by any of the Insured Risks and the insurance money under any policy of insurance effected thereon by the Landlord being by reason of any act neglect default or omission of the Tenant wholly or partially irrecoverable forthwith in every such case to pay to the Landlord on demand the cost of rebuilding and reinstating the building or buildings so destroyed or damaged such rebuilding works to be carried out by and in accordance with the requirements of the Landlord and the
21
Tenant being allowed towards the expenses of so doing (upon such rebuilding and reinstatement being completed) the amount (if any) actually received by or on behalf of the Landlord (other than in respect of loss of rent) under any such insurance as aforesaid in respect of such destruction or damage 5(23) TO COMPLY WITH NOTICES
To comply at the Tenant's own expense with any statutory notice order or other requirement lawfully served by a competent authority upon either the Landlord or the Tenant concerning the Demised Premises and forthwith to provide the Landlord with a copy of any such notice order or requirement served upon the Tenant and at the request of the Landlord to make or join with the Landlord in making such objections or representations against or in respect of any such notice order or requirement as aforesaid as the Landlord shall deem expedient 5(24) EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH COVENANTS
To produce upon demand reasonable evidence of compliance with the covenants and conditions herein contained 5(25) SUBSTITUTION OF SURETY
To notify the Landlord within twenty one days of any of the following events:-
If any Surety being an individual or individuals shall become bankrupt or make any
arrangement for the benefit of or enter into any arrangement with its creditors either by
composition or otherwise
any Surety being an individual or individuals shall die
If any Surety being a Company or corporate body shall be wound up either voluntarily
(except as a solvent company for the purpose of amalgamation or reconstruction) or
22
compulsorily or shall for any reason be removed from the Register of Companies and if the Landlord so requires them at the Tenant's expense within twenty eight days to procure that some other person or company reasonably acceptable to the Landlord shall execute a guarantee in the form of the covenants in clause 8 below 6.        PROVISOS 6(1)     PROVISO FOR RE-ENTRY
If the whole or any part of the rent shall be unpaid for 21 days after becoming payable whether formally demanded or not or if the Tenant Being a company) shall enter into liquidation whether compulsory or voluntary (except as a solvent company for the purpose of amalgamation with any other company or for the purpose of reconstruction) or an administration order shall be made in respect of the Tenant or if any person shall become entitled to exercise the powers of an administrative receiver or (not being a company) shall become bankrupt or if the Tenant shall make any arrangement with its creditors or shall permit any execution to be levied on the Demised Premises or if there shall be any breach of any of the Tenant's covenants the Landlord may at any time thereafter re-enter upon the Demised Premises or any part thereof and this demise shall thereupon terminate but without prejudice to any right of action or remedy of the Landlord in respect of any breach of covenant by the Tenant 6(2) SERVICE OF NOTICES
Any notice shall be properly served if it complies with the provisions of the Law of Property Act 1925 S. 196 as amended by the Recorded Delivery Service Act 1962 or the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 S.23
23
f ae Demised PKmixs or any pan thcreof sm ^ dearoyed or ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
other risk for which th<
^ises so as to be unfit for occupation or use then unless the insurance of the Demised
hereby reserved or a fair and just proportion thereof according to the nature and extent of the
damage sustained shall be suspended and cease to be payable until the Demised Premises or
damaged portion thereof shall have been reinstated or made fit for occupation or until the third
anniversary of such destruction or damage whichever shall be the sooner
6(4)     DAMAGE FROM SERVICES
The Landlord shall not be liable to the Tenant or any other person claiming through the
Tenant for any damage which may be caused by stoppage or defect of any plant or machinery in
or service to the Demised Premises or any neighbouring premises where the same is beyond the
control of the Landlord
6(5)     LANDLORD'S LIABILITY
(a) In any case where the facts are or should reasonably be known to the Tenant and not reasonably known by the Landlord the Landlord shall not be liable to the Tenant in respect of any failure of the Landlord to perform any of its obligations to the Tenant hereunder whether express or implied unless and until the Tenant has notified the Landlord of the facts giving rise to the failure and the Landlord has failed within a reasonable time to remedy the same
(b)       The Landlord shall not be responsible to the Tenant or to its servants agents licensees invitees customers or visitors for any accident injury damage or loss caused to them or
24
their chattels property or goods sustained at or in the vicinity of the Demised Premises
and in particular will not be liable for any damage to motor vehicles within the Service
Area howsoever arising (c)       The Landlord shall not be liable to the Tenant or any other person claiming through the
Tenant on account of any diminution of light or air enjoyed at the Demised Premises or
otherwise in consequence of the erection or alteration of any adjoining or neighbouring
property or any other works carried out thereto 6(6)     GENERAL
Nothing in this Lease shall render the Landlord or the Tenant liable in respect of any of the covenants conditions or provisions contained in these presents if their performance and observance becomes impossible or illegal under the Town and Country Planning Acts or any other enactment but subject as above the term granted by this Lease and the rent payable by virtue of it shall not determine only because of a change modification or restriction of use of the Demised Premises or obligations or requirements made or imposed after the date of this Lease under or by virtue of any enactment 6(7) PARAGRAPH HEADINGS ETC.
Paragraph headings and any marginal notes or index do not form part of this Lease and shall not be taken into account in the construction or interpretation thereof 7.         LANDLORD'S COVENANTS
The Landlord hereby covenants with the Tenant:
7(1)     That the Tenant shall have quiet enjoyment of the Demised Premises against the Landlord and all persons claiming title through the Landlord
25
7(2) To insure the Demised Premises and the Development in an insurance office of good repute or at Lloyds against the Insured risks and in the event of the Demised Premises being destroyed or damaged by any of the Insured Risks the Landlord shall with all convenient speed (subject to the availability of all necessary labour and materials and the obtaining of all necessary permissions) lay out and apply in rebuilding repairing or otherwise reinstating the Demised premises all monies received by virtue of such insurance other than monies received in respect of loss of rent Provided that the Landlord shall be under no liability to the Tenant hereunder if the insurance money under any policy of insurance effected by the Landlord shall be wholly or partially irrecoverable in the circumstances set out in 5(22) above Provided always that the Landlord shall not be under any obligation to insure any fixtures or fittings installed by the Tenant which have become part of the Demised Premises unless the Tenant shall have notified the Landlord in writing of such installation and the Landlord has agreed with the Tenant at the cost of the Tenant to effect the insurance thereof and provided further that the covenant by the Landlord as to reinstatement shall be satisfied if the Landlord provides in the premises so reinstated accommodation as convenient and commodious as is practicable but not necessarily identical to the Demised Premises as the same existed prior to such damage or destruction and provided further that if any competent authority shall lawfully refuse permission for or otherwise lawfully prevent any rebuilding or reinstatement of the Demised Premises or any rebuilding or reinstatement shall be otherwise impossible impractical or frustrated all relevant insurance monies (so far as not laid out aforesaid) shall be receivable by the Landlord for its own use and benefit absolutely
26
8.         SURETIES COVENANTS
8(1) The Sureties HEREBY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY GUARANTEE in favour of the Landlord the payment by the Tenant and its successors in title of the rent and additional rent reserved by these presents and as from time to time revised and increased (if such be the case) and due performance and observance by the Tenant of the covenants and conditions contained in this Lease at all times and HEREBY COVENANTS that in case of default or delay on the part of the Tenant the Sureties will pay and make good to the Landlord on demand anything whatsoever which ought to be paid performed or observed as aforesaid including all losses damages and expenses thereby arising or incurred by the Landlord Provided that any neglect or forbearance on the part of the Landlord or its agents in endeavouring to obtain payment of the rent (or other payments due under the Lease) or enforcing the performance and observance of the said covenants and conditions and any time which may be given to the Sureties and/or the Tenant by the Landlord shall not release exonerate or in any way affect the liability of the Sureties hereunder
8(2) The Sureties HEREBY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY COVENANT with the Landlord that should any liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy of the Tenant disclaim this Lease or this Lease becomes Bona Vacantia and be as such disclaimed the Sureties will with effect from the date of such disclaimer duly accept from the Landlord on demand a Lease of the premises demised by this Lease (but without the Landlord being under any obligation to grant the same) for the residue of the Term which would have remained had there been no disclaimer and containing the like covenants on the part of the Tenant and the Landlord respectively and the like provisos and conditions in all respects with the exception of this clause including the proviso for re-entry as are contained in this Lease unless the Landlord shall within three months
27
after the date of receipt of such notice of disclaimer give notice to the Sureties that the Sureties are not required to accept such Lease as aforesaid and that the Sureties will not do or omit to do anything in the way of registration of land charges or otherwise howsoever which may prejudice the enforceability of the Sureties covenants by the Landlords 8(3)     It is hereby and agreed as follows :-
that the obligations of the Sureties shall continue notwithstanding that the Tenant may
assign the Lease or may cease to exist in any way and so that the covenants shall be
deemed to impose on the Sureties the same obligations (but not confer upon him any
benefit or rights as tenant) as if this Lease had been granted direct to them as tenant
any variation in the terms of this Lease the transfer of the reversion expectant upon the
term granted by the Lease or any part thereof or any other act permission matter or thing
whatsoever whereby (but for this provision) the Sureties would be exonerated either
wholly or in part from their obligations hereunder other than by a release given under
seal by the Landlord shall not release or in any way lessen or affect the liability of the
Sureties hereunder.
that the Sureties covenants hereunder are irrevocable
9. It is hereby certified that there is no agreement for lease to which this lease gives effect
IN WITNESS whereof the Landlord and the Tenant have executed this lease as a deed the day
and year first before written.

The Common Seal of COMMUNITY HOUSING ) ASSOCIATION LIMITED was hereunto affixed ) in the presence of-r




And this is the Scarlet Maguire Lease (which was held over)

PARTICULARS
A.        The Landlord  :
COMMUNITY HOUSING ASSOCIATION LIMITED whose registered office is at 100 Chalk Farm Road London NW1 8EH

B.        The Tenant      :
JO GAVIN of 32 Tonbridge House   Tonbridge Street London WC1 9PB

C.        The Sureties    :
None

D.        The Demised Premises
ALL THOSE shop and basement premises at 104 Cromer Street London WC1 (and being more particularly described in clause 2 hereof).

Contractual Term:
6 years from theft day of jv»w*.2000

Initial Rent
Five Thousand Five Hundred Pounds (£5,500 per annum)

Review Date   :
25th March 2004.

Permitted User:
Retail Shop falling within Class Al of
the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order
1987
THIS LEASE dated    8th June    2000 is
made BETWEEN The Landlord whose name and address appears in A of the Particulars of first part The Tenant whose name and address appears in B of the Particulars of the second part and the Surety whose name or names and addresses(es) appear in Part C of the Particulars of the third part 1. DEFINITIONS
1(1)     The expressions "the Landlord" and "the Tenant" shall wherever the context so admits
include the reversioner for the time being and the Tenant's successors  in title
respectively and if the Tenant is more than one person their respective covenants and
    obligations hereunder shall be deemed to be joint and several
1(2)     The expression "the Demised Premises" shall include inter alia where the context so admits for the purposes of obligation as well as grant:-
the internal plaster covering the exterior and interior loadbearing walls
all non-loadbearing walls
the coverings of the ceilings
the coverings of the floors and the boards and screed of such floors
all shop fronts and display cases all fascias all windows and window frames all
doors and door frames
all conduits within and exclusively serving the Demised Premises up to the point
of connection with the common or public system
all fixtures and fittings and plant equipment and machinery in the nature of the
Landlords'   fixtures   including   if applicable   all   escalators   all   heating   air
conditioning  and  ventilating  equipment  and  all  electrical  and  mechanical
installations and other plant equipment and machinery within and exclusively serving the Demised Premises (h)       all sprinkler systems and fire detection and prevention equipment fire fighting
equipment and hoses within the Demised Premises (i)        the toilet accommodation within the Demised Premises including all sanitary
equipment and other apparatus therein (j)        all additions alterations and improvements to the Demised Premises made at any
time
1(3) The expression "the Landlords Surveyor" shall mean any person or a firm of surveyors appointed by or acting for the Landlord including an employee of the Landlord to perform the function of a Surveyor for any purpose of this Lease
1(4) The expression "Interest" shall mean interest at the rate of five per centum per annum above the base rate of Barclays Bank PLC from time to time during the period from the date on which the expenditure is incurred or from such other date may be specified or from which the interest is to run to the date of payment as well before as after any judgment 1(5) Reference to any right exercisable by the Landlord shall where the context so admits
include the exercise of such rights by all persons authorised by the Landlord 1(6)     Any reference to a statute shall include any statutory extension or modification or re-enactment of such statute and any regulations or orders made thereunder 1(7)     Any covenant by the Tenant not to do an act or thing shall be deemed to include an obligation not to suffer such act or thing to be done
1(8) The expression "the term" shall mean the term of years hereby granted and any statutory or other continuation or extension thereof
1(9) The expression "the Town and Country Planning Acts" shall mean the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the Town and Country Planning (Listed Building and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 and the Town and Country Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 and all statutes referred to therein and all statutes regulations and orders included by the application of clause 1(6) hereof and the expression 'Development' shall have the meaning given to it by the Town and Country Planning Acts
1(10) Any reference to parting with possession shall be deemed to include sharing possession and any occupation by a licence
1(11)   The expression "the insured risks" mean loss or damage by or in consequence of fire and
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such other risks as the Landlord may deem desirable or expedient including three years
loss of rent and architects and surveyors fees and demolition clearance and similar
expenses
1(12)   The expression "the Particulars" means the foregoing particulars hereof 2. DEMISE AND PREMISES
In consideration of the Tenant's and Surety's covenants herein contained the Landlord demises unto the Tenant ALL THOSE premises details of which appear in D of the Particulars (hereinafter called "the Demised Premises") which premises are for identification purposes only
shown edged red on the plan annexed «
SUBJECT TO all easements and similar rights and privileges which the Demised Premises are or may be subject to and in particular to rights of the Landlord and its tenants of neighbouring
premises the free and uninterrupted passage of water gas and electricity through the pipes and
wires which are now or may hereafter be on the Demised Premises and the right for the
Landlord at all reasonable times on notice to the Tenant to enter upon the Demised Premises
with or without workmen and others to inspect repair maintain or renew such wires pipes and
other services TOGETHER WITH the following rights:-
2(1) the right of free passage and running of water and soil in and through the sewers drains and channels upon through or under adjacent premises of the Landlord and uninterrupted use of all gas electric telephone and other pipes wires and cables upon through or under adjacent premises of the Landlord
2(2) the right (but only so far as the Landlord is able to grant the same) to use an area of the surface of the pavement immediately adjoining the shop front of the Demised Premises and extending the full width of the Demised Premises and being one and a half metres in depth (measured from the said shopfront) for the display of flowers Subject to such regulations as may be made by or on behalf of the Landlord from time to time
2(3) the right of subjacent and lateral support and shelter and protection from the elements for the Demised Premises
2(4) a right of exit in case of fire (or other emergency) only over the fire escape passages/courtyard ("the Fire Escape Areas") leading from the Demised Premises Subject to such regulations as may be made by or on behalf of the Landlord from time to time
3. TERM
The term for which the premises are demised is as shown in E of the Particulars subject
to the right of the Landlord to determine the term as hereinafter appearing

pushbar     j emergency opening bar
to fire door
I Store: no flammable i substances
Livingstone Design Group
tichltieti       UUn
Cramer House Hiliview Estate


job no.    9818 L(0)36
January 2000
Livingstone Design Group
4.RENT
4(1)     DEFINITIONS
In this Clause the following expression shall have the following meanings :-
"the Initial Rent" : the amount shown in F of the Particulars per annum payable in
respect of the period expiring on the Review Date first occurring during the term
"the Reserved Rent" : the yearly rent from time to time payable in accordance with the
terms hereof
"Review Date" : the date shown in G of the Particulars and the date of expiration of each
successive period of four years thereafter during the term but subject to the provisions of
Clause 4(5) below and the expression Review Date shall be construed accordingly
"Review Period" : the period between a Review Date and the next succeeding Review
Date of the term and the expression "Relevant Review Period" shall be construed
accordingly
"Open Market Rent" : the yearly rent at which the Demised Premises might reasonably
be expected to be let at the Review Date by a willing Landlord to a willing Tenant in the
open market with vacant possession and without fine or premium for a term equal to the
term hereby granted and having regard to open market rental values current at the
Review Date including in that limitation open market rental values of comparable retail
premises throughout the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
assuming if not the fact that:
(i)        the Demised Premises remain in existence
(ii)       that the covenants and conditions on the part of the Tenant contained in these presents have been duly observed and performed
whether in time or amount on the review of the Reserved Rent and/or the collection of
any increase in the Reserved Rent or any part thereof
4(2) From the date hereof until the Review Date first occurring during the term the Tenant shall pay the Initial Rent and from that Review Date the Tenant shall pay the Reserved Rent which shall be the Open Market Rent as hereinbefore defined
4(3) The Landlord may at any time (without being under obligation so to do) within the period of six months before or any time after the Review Date serve on the Tenant a notice in writing (hereinafter called "a Rent Notice") specifying the amount of rent payable hereunder from the Review Date and thereupon the following provisions shall have effect:-
the Tenant within twenty one days after the receipt of a Rent Notice may serve on the
Landlord a Counter-notice (time to be of the essence hereof) stating that the Tenant is
unwilling to pay the rent specified in the Rent Notice from the Review Date and calling
upon the Landlord to negotiate with the Tenant the amount of rent to be paid hereunder
as from the Review Date
if the Tenant shall fail to serve a Counter-notice within the said twenty one days it shall
be deemed to have agreed to pay the rent specified in the Rent Notice as from the
Review Date
if the Tenant shall serve a Counter-notice then the Landlord and the Tenant shall
forthwith consult together and use their best endeavours to reach agreement as to the
amount of rent to be paid hereunder as from the Review Date but failing agreement
within twenty-eight days after the service of such Counter-notice (or within such
extended period as the Landlord and the Tenant shall mutually agree) the question of the
amount of rent to be payable hereunder shall be referred to a Surveyor in the manner hereinafter mentioned
(d) the said Surveyor (whose costs shall be borne by the Tenant) who shall be nominated on the joint application of the Landlord and the Tenant (such Surveyor to be skilled in the valuation of real property and having a knowledge of the locality) or if either of them shall neglect forthwith to concur in such application on the sole application of the other of them by the President for the time being of the Royal Institution of Chartered surveyors and the Landlord and the Tenant shall forthwith submit such valuation statement of reasons or other information as shall be required by such surveyor and such surveyor shall determine the Open Market Rent of the Demised Premises at the Relevant Review Date as an expert and not as an arbitrator and his determination shall be final and binding on the Landlord and the Tenant
4(4) Whether the Reserved Rent shall be agreed or determined as aforesaid before or after the Relevant Review Date such Reserved Rent shall be paid with effect from the Relevant Review Date (and Interest shall be payable by the Tenant in respect of any increase in rent not paid on the Relevant Review Date in accordance with Clause 5(19) hereof) and no demand for or acceptance of any lesser sum by the Landlord or receipt therefor given shall operate in any way to diminish the Landlord's rights under this clause
4(5) On each on every occasion during the term that the Rent Restrictions shall prevent or prohibit either wholly or partially:-
the operation of the above provisions for review of the Reserved Rent and/or
the collection of the Reserved Rent or any installment or part thereof by the Landlord or
the retention thereof at any time after collection
then and in any such case :-
the Review Date shall be postponed to take effect on the first date or dates thereafter
upon which such review may occur and if there shall be a partial relaxation of the Rent
Restrictions there shall be a further review of the Reserved Rent on the first date
thereafter as aforesaid
the collection of any increase in the Reserved Rent shall be postponed to take effect on
the first date thereafter that such increase may be collected and/or retained in whole or in
part and on as many occasions as shall be required to ensure the collection of the whole
increase
AND until the Rent Restrictions shall be relaxed either partially or wholly the Reserved Rent
shall be the maximum sum from time to time permitted by the Rent Restrictions
4(6)     Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions the Reserved Rent payable for the Review
Period shall not be less than the amount of the Reserved Rent payable for the period
immediately preceding the commencement of such Review Period
5.    TENANTS COVENANTS
The Tenant hereby covenants with the Landlord as follows :
5(1)     RENT
To pay the rent as before mentioned by bankers standing order by equal quarterly payments in advance on the usual quarter days without any deduction the first payment to be made on the date hereof to be a due proportion of the rent for the period from the date hereof up the second quarter day next following the date hereof provided that if and so long as the amount of the rent which the Tenant is liable to pay shall be restricted by law the Tenant shall in lieu of
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the rent hereby reserved pay the maximum amount of rent which such restrictions may from time to time allow 5(2)     OUTGOINGS
To pay and indemnify the Landlord against all existing and future rates taxes and similar outgoings payable in respect of the Demised Premises whether parliamentary local or otherwise and whether or not of a capital or non-recurring nature or of a wholly novel character which are now or may hereafter be payable (excluding any tax levy or imposition payable upon the Landlord's interest in reversion) and to repay to the Landlord on demand a fair proportion (to be determined by the Landlord's Surveyor) of any rates and other charges as aforesaid which may be assessed in respect of the Demised Premises together with other land or property 5(3) INSURANCE
To repay forthwith upon demand by the Landlord or its agents a due proportion (to be
assessed by the Landlords Surveyor) of the premium and amounts paid by the Landlord
in respect of its carrying out its obligations relating to insurance contained in Clause
7(2) hereof
To insure and keep insured in a reputable insurance office approved by the Landlord the
plate glass windows of the Demised Premises and all other parts of the Demised
Premises which the Tenant is obliged to repair against damage and destruction to the
full replacement value thereof in some insurance office of repute for breakage and third
party risks and for such other risks as the Landlord may reasonably require and to
produce the policy and the last premium receipt to the Landlord on demand but save as
aforesaid not to effect or maintain any insurance in respect of the Demised Premises
(except as to the Tenants' trade fittings or stock)
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(c) To insure and at all times keep insured in a reputable insurance office approved by the Landlord the Demised Premises against all third party public and occupiers liability risks for such sum as may be reasonably required by the Landlord from time to time
5(4)     USE
Not to use or permit (whether on assignment or otherwise) the Demised Premises for
any purpose other than as defined in H of the Particulars
Not to do on the Demised Premises anything which may be a nuisance or cause danger
injury damage or unreasonable noise to the Landlord or its tenants or any neighbouring
owner or occupier
Not to use or permit or suffer to be used the Demised Premises as a betting shop or as
offices in connection with the business of turf commission agents or pools promoters
nor as a job centre or as taxi or mini cab offices nor for any noxious noisy or offensive
trade or business nor for any illegal or immoral act or purpose and not to allow on the
Demised Premises anything which is combustible inflammable radio active or explosive
Not to place material at the Demised Premises or the Service Area in such manner as to
overload the floor or any other part of the Demised Premises or overload the supplies
thereto
Not to discharge anything into the drains or sewers serving the Demised Premises which
will be corrosive or harmful or which may cause any obstruction or deposit
Not to place store exhibit or hang any goods or things for sale or otherwise outside the
Demised Premises nor to leave any rubbish or waste in any open part of or outside the
Demised Premises except for trade refuse in a suitable dustbin or other covered
receptacle or storage rooms as have been designated by the Landlord and to ensure that
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all such rubbish or waste is collected or otherwise regularly removed from the Demised
Premises not less frequently than once a day (g)       Not to carry on upon the Demised Premises any trade or occupation or to do any other
thing which may make void or voidable the insurance of the Demised Premises against
the insured Risks nor without the prior written consent of the Landlord (which consent
may be subject to conditions) to do anything on the Demised Premises which may
render any increased or extra premium payable for such insurance (h)       Not to reside or sleep at the Demised Premises (i)        Not to open the Demised Premises for trading before 7.30 in the morning or after 9.30 at
night and to keep the Demised Premises fully stocked and to maintain a window display
which is attractive to the general public (j)        Not to store or bring or suffer to be stored or brought into the Demised Premises any
articles of a specially combustible inflammable or dangerous nature nor to store or bring
or suffer to be stored or brought into the Demised Premises any machinery engines or
motors except such as are usual in connection with the purpose for which the Demised
Premises are authorised to be used pursuant to this lease (k)       Not to use any loudspeakers television sets radios or other devices so has to cause
nuisance or annoyance or so as to be audible outside the Demised Premises (1)        To keep the Demised Premises sufficiently heated at all times to prevent freezing of
water in pipes and fixtures therein, (m)      Not to cover any windows of the Demised Premises by posting or fixing of notices or
advertisements thereto or painting thereon to a greater extent than ten per cent of the
area of each such window.
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(n) Not to allow any trolleys provided by the Tenant for the use of customers to be left or stored outside the Demised Premises and to take all necessary steps to ensure that such trolleys are at all times immediately collected and returned to the Demised Premises if left outside the Demised Premises by any party.
5(5)     WASTE AND ALTERATIONS
Not to commit any waste to the Demised Premises nor erect any new buildings or
structures thereon nor make any structural alterations or additions thereto
Not without the previous consent in writing of the Landlord to make any alteration in or
addition to the Demised Premises or in the layout or arrangement of the Demised
Premises nor any alteration or addition to the Demised Premises which shall alter the
external appearance thereof nor to add to or alter any new additions or alterations
effected or made in pursuance of the consent of the Landlord nor to annex the Demised
Premises to other premises and the Tenant shall obtain and comply with all necessary
consents of any competent authority and making an application supported by drawings
and where appropriate a specification in duplicate and paying the reasonable fees of the
Landlord and any mortgagee and their respective professional advisors and to the Tenant
entering into such reasonable covenants as the Landlord may require as to the execution
of the alterations
(c)    To remove any erection or alteration made in breach of the foregoing or in respect of
which the permission of the relevant planning authority is withdrawn or lapses and to
comply with every order of such authority requiring the removal or demolition of or
other work in connection with such erections or alterations and in all such cases to make
good all damage caused by such removal demolition or other work and to restore all
14
parts of the Demised Premises affected thereby to a condition consistent with the covenants in these Presents as to repair and decoration
Provided that if pursuant to sub-paragraph 5(6)(b) hereof the Tenant applies for the Landlord's consent to the making of any substantial alteration or addition to the Demised Premises the Landlord shall be entitled as a condition of giving such consent to require the Tenant to provide security to the satisfaction of the Landlord for the carrying out and completion of the works proposed by the Tenant
(d) Not to puncture or pierce the walls plaster or wall coverings of the Demised Premises or do anything which may injure pierce penetrate or bridge any damp proofing membrane within the walls of the Demised Premises
5(6)     REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE AND DECORATION
To be responsible for any damage caused to the Landlord or the owners and/or occupiers
of adjoining premises by the bursting overflowing or obstruction of any part of the water
sanitary or heating installations on the Demised Premises by the act omission neglect of
the Tenant its servants or agents
To cleanse and keep clean and to put and keep in good and substantial repair decoration
and condition and renew as necessary the Demised Premises and every part (including
cleaning repointing and treating of all outside brickwork plasterwork and stonework of
the shop front of the Demised Premises) with all necessary reparations and cleansing
and rebuilding works and amendments whatsoever (regardless of the age or state of
dilapidation of the Demised Premises for the time being) and to replace from time to
time all Landlords fixtures and fittings and appurtenances in the Demised Premises
15
which may be or become beyond repair at any time during the term or at the determination of the term
At least once in every consecutive period of three years during the term and the last year
of the term to decorate all the interior surfaces of or within the Demised Premises
requiring the same for their proper maintenance which are painted or otherwise treated
with a suitable paint or preservative appropriate to the finish thereof and in such colours
as shall be approved by the Landlord)
To replace by rebuilding or reinstating the whole or any part of the Demised Premises
notwithstanding that such works may be necessary by reason of a patent or latent defect
or otherwise and notwithstanding that the necessary remedial work amounts to an
improvement
Forthwith to enter into and thereafter to maintain comprehensive maintenance contracts
in forms approved by and with reputable contractors approved by the Landlord for the
maintenance and repair of all plant within the Demised Premises and to produce upon
demand to the Landlord the receipt for the current year's premium and a copy of the
relevant contract and of any reports made by the contractors and to comply with the
recommendations of such contractors
(f)    At least once in every week and as and when necessary to keep all windows and glass of
the Demised Premises clean both inside and outside and unobstructed and to keep in
good and safe repair all electricity cables conducting media and meters exclusively
serving the Demised premises and to indemnify the Landlord against all liability
howsoever arising from any failure to repair of the misuse or over-loading of the said
cables
16
(g) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing to procure that all electrical and mechanical installations and equipment within the Demised Premises be properly and regularly serviced and maintained by qualified persons approved by the manufacturers of such installations and equipment and by the insurers of the Demised Premises
5(7)     PECULATIONS
To observe and procure that all occupiers of the Demised Premises and persons doing
.
business thereat observe the reasonable regulations from time to time made by the Landlord with regard to the occupation management and security of the Demised Premises and neighbouring property 5(8)     YIELDING UP
At the end or sooner termination of the term to deliver up the Demised Premises with vacant possession clean and in repair and decorated as aforesaid (damage by an insured risk excepted unless payment of the insurance money is wholly or partially withheld wholly or partially through any act or default of the Tenant its servants or agents or any other person under its control) having first replaced any Landlords' fixtures and fittings which may be missing or damaged with others of a similar kind and quality and having made good any damage resulting from the removal of any tenants fixtures or fittings 5(9) ADVERTISEMENTS AND AERIALS ETC.
Not to exhibit any advertisement notice or sign outside the Demised Premises or inside the Demised Premises so as to be seen from the outside nor to install any flag pole outside television or radio aerial on the Demised Premises Provided That the Tenant may display its name and/or details of its business on the area of the Demised Premises immediately above the
17
shop window thereof subject to such sign being of a size type and location to be approved by the Landlord in its absolute discretion 5(10) ASSIGNMENTS ETC.
Not to assign underlet part with or share possession nor charge part only (as distinct
from the whole) of the Demised Premises
Not to underlet the whole of the Demised Premises unless such underletting is outside
the protection of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 and the appropriate Court order is
obtained (so as to exclude the provisions of that act) prior to the grant of any such
underlease and also not to underlet without the consent of the Landlord (which shall not
be unreasonably withheld) and to procure that any undertenant of the whole of the
Demised Premises shall covenant by deed with the Landlord to observe and perform all
the covenants on the part of the Tenant and the conditions herein contained so far as
they relate to the premises so underlet and that if such undertenant is a corporate body
and the Landlord shall so require to procure that a surety or sureties acceptable to the
Landlord join in such deed to guarantee the covenants of such undertenant in such form
as shall be required by the Landlord Provided that each and every permitted underlease
shall be granted without any fine or premium at a rent not less than the then open market
rental value of the Demised Premises such rent being payable in advance on the days on
which rent is payable under this Lease and shall contain provisions approved by the
Landlord:-
(i)    prohibiting the undertenant from doing or allowing any act or thing in
relation to the Demised Premises inconsistent with or in breach of the provisions of this Lease
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(n)    for re-entry by the underlandlord on beach of any covenant by the
undertenant
(iii)    imposing an absolute prohibtion against all dispositions of or other
dealings whatever with the Demised Premises other than assignment or
underletting of the whole
(iv)    prohibiting any assignment or underlease of the whole without prior
consent of the Landlord under this Lease (such consent not to be
unreasonably withheld)
(v)    prohibiting the undertenant from permitting another to occupy the whole
or any part of the Demised Premises
(vi)    imposing in relation to any permitted assignment underletting or charge
the same obligations for registration with the Landlord as are contained
in this Lease in relation to dispositions by the Tenant and;
(vii)    imposing in relation to any permitted underletting the same obligations
as contained in Clause 5 hereof
(c) Not to assign the whole of the Demised Premises without the consent of the Landlord which shall not be unreasonably withheld and to procure that any assignee of the whole of the Demised Premises shall covenant by deed with the Landlord to pay the Reserved Rent and other sums made payable hereunder and to observe and perform all the covenants on the part of the Tenant and the conditions herein contained and that if such assignee is a corporate body and the Landlord shall so require to procure that at lease two directors or other persons or a company acceptable to the Landlord join in
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such deed to guarantee the covenants of such assignee in such form as shall be required by the Landlord PROVIDED
(i)        that the Landlord shall be entitled to require the Tenant to enter into an authorised guarantee agreement as described in Section (16) Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 and (ii)       that the intended assignee shall (if the Landlord reasonably so requires)
provide a 12 month rent deposit or similar security and
(iii) in any event that the Landlord may withhold its consent where (in the reasonable opinion of the Landlord) the proposed assignment will cause a decrease in the value of the Landlord's reversion
PROVIDED that the Tenant shall if so required by the Landlord enter into an authorised guarantee agreement as described in Section (16) of the said Act PROVIDED FURTHER that on assignment shall be entitled:
in the case of an assignment to an individual or individuals to require that the assignee
be at least two individuals each having an income (at the date consent is requested for
the assignment) independent of the business permitted to be carried on at the Demised
Premises in excess of three times the rent passing under this Lease (at the date consent
is required for the assignment) or
in the case of a company either:
(i) that two directors having an income (at the date consent is requested for the assignment) independent of the business permitted to be carried on at the Demised Premises in excess of three times the rent passing under this Lease (at
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the date consent is requested for the assignment) shall stand as sureties for the intended assignee and shall covenant to accept a new Lease of the Demised Premises upon disclaimer of this Lease if so required by notice to the sureties within three months after such disclaimer such new Lease to be for the residue of the Term unexpired at the date of such disclaimer and at the rents then payable and subject to the terms of this Lease in every respect and to be granted at the cost of the sureties in exchange for a counterpart duly executed by the sureties; and
(ii) to require that the intended assignee company produce audited accounts for the three years immediately preceding the date on which consent is requested for the assignment evidencing net profits (before the payment of any dividend) of not less than three times the rent passing under this Lease at the date of such assignment
PROVIDED THAT provisos (A) and (B) above shall not apply in the case of either an assignment to an individual or company where either provide a rent deposit equivalent to two year's rental (at the date consent is requested for the assignment) to be held for such time as the individual or company remain the Tenant under this Lease upon terms contained in a deed reasonably acceptable to the Landlord such deed to include (without limitation) a provision that in the event of insolvency the Landlord can immediately forfeit the balance of the deposit monies 5(\ 1) REGISTRATION OF DOCUMENTS
Within one month of every assignment transfer or charge affecting the demised Premises or any devolution of the estate of the tenant therein and every surrender terminating
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any derivative mediate or immediate estate or interest in the demised Premises or any devolution of such estate or interest to give notice in writing with particulars thereof to the landlord's solicitors and produce such assignment transfer or charge or Probate of the will or letters of Administration or other document or evidence of such devolution or surrender with a certified copy thereof and to pay to the Landlord's solicitors in respect of every such assignment charge devolution or surrender a reasonable registration fee being not less than twenty pounds plus V.A.T. 5(12) RIGHT OF ENTRY FOR INSPECTION ETC.
(a)    To permit the Landlord to enter the Demised Premises for the purpose of inspecting the
state and condition and repair thereof J
Within two months after written notice thereof or forthwith in an emergency to remedy
any breach of covenant for which the Tenant is liable and that in case of default the
Landlord may enter the Demised Premises and remedy the breach and all expenses in
connection therewith shall be paid by the Tenant to the Landlord and shall be
recoverable as rent in arrear
To permit the Landlord and Tenants and occupiers of the Development and those
authorised by them at any time upon not less than forty eight hours prior notice (except
in case of emergency) to enter upon the Demised Premises:-
(i)        to comply with covenants contained in other leases of adjoining property
(ii)       to examine decorate repair and rebuild the structure of the Demised Premises or
any adjoining or neighbouring property (iv)      for the purpose of inspecting repairing renewing connecting to cleansing altering
or constructing conduits in over upon or under the Demised Premises
22
(v)       to measure the Demised Premises
(vi)      for any other reasonable purpose Subject to the person or person exercising such
right making good all damage thereby occasioned to the Demised Premises 5(13) ON EXPIRY OR SALE OF REVERSION
To allow the Landlord to enter on the Demised Premises at any time within six months next before the end of the term or at any time when the Landlord wishes to sell the reversion and to fix thereon a noticeboard for re-letting or selling the same which shall not be removed or obscured but which shall not be fixed in such a position as to interfere with the Tenant's business or beneficial occupation '5f 14) COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTES ETC.
To comply in all respects with the provisions of all Statutes for the time being in force and any requirements of any competent authority relating to the Demised Premises or any part thereof and the use thereof and anything contained therein and not to do or omit or suffer to be done or omitted on or about the Demised Premises any act or thing by reason of which the Landlord may under any enactment incur or have imposed upon it or become liable to pay any levy penalty damages compensation costs charges or expenses and so far as the law allows to indemnify the Landlord against all liability in respect thereof and in particular against any liability under the Offices Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963 the Factories Act 1961 and the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 relating to the Demised Premises 5(15) EXPENSES
To pay all reasonable and proper expenses incurred by the Landlord or any mortgagee and their respective professional advisors in connection with any notice or proceedings (or any such costs incurred in contemplation thereof) under S.I 46 and S.I 47 of the Law of Property Act
23
1925 or in connection with any breach of covenant by the Tenant (whether or not relief is granted by the Court) or preparation and service of any justifiable schedule of dilapidations and in connection with every consent applied for under this Lease and to repay forthwith upon demand by the Landlord the cost to the Landlord (including but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing the fees of any bailiff solicitor Counsel or other person engaged by the Landlord) of effecting the recovery of any arrears of rent service charge cost of insurance or any other monies due from the Tenant to the Landlord under the provisions of this Lease 5(16) TOWN PLANNING
(a)    At all times during the term to comply with the provisions and requirements of the
Town and Country Planning Acts (and the conditions thereof) relating to or affecting :
(i)        the Demised Premises or
(ii)       any operations works acts or things carried out executed or done or omitted on
the Demised Premises or (iii)      the use of the Demised Premises
During the term as often as occasion requires at the Tenant's expense to obtain and if
appropriate renew all planning permissions and bye-law or other necessary consents and
serve all notices required for the carrying out by the Tenant of any operations permitted
under the terms of this lease or the institution or continuance by the Tenant of any use
on the Demised Premises permitted by this lease
To pay and satisfy any charge imposed under the Town and Country Planning Acts in
respect of the carrying out of maintenance by the Tenant of any such operation or the
institution or continuance by the Tenant of any such use mentioned above
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As soon as the same comes to the attention of the Tenant to notify the Landlord of any
order direction proposal or notice under the Town and Country Planning Acts served on
or received by the Tenant or coming to the Tenant's notice which relates to the Demised
Premises and to produce to the Landlord if required any such order direction proposal or
notice in the Tenant's possession
Immediately on receipt from any public authority of any notice order communication or
proposal of any nature affecting the Demised Premises to send a copy of the relevant
document to the Landlord
Not to apply for any Planning permission which will or may render the Landlord liable
to tax or any future tax or levy based upon the realisation of the development value in
land
5(17) VAT,
(a)       Output Tax
(i) Any obligation of the Tenants hereunder or under any document entered into pursuant hereto to make payment to the Landlord shall include an obligation to pay in addition any VAT payable in respect of the supply to which the payment relates.
(ii) Unless the contrary is specified any sum specified in this Lease is (and any sum to be agreed certified determined or ascertained under the provisions hereof shall be) a sum net of VAT.
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(b)       Input Tax
(i)        Any obligation of the Tenant hereunder to repay to the Landlord any expenditure incurred by the Landlord shall include an obligation to repay any VAT forming part of such expenditure 5(18) EASEMENTS AND ENCROACHMENTS
Not to obstruct any window ventilator light or way belonging to the Demised Premises nor acknowledge that any light is enjoyed by consent of any other person not to permit any new easement right or encroachment to be made into against or on the Demised Premises 5(19) INTEREST ON ARREARS
If and whenever the Tenant shall fail to pay the rent or any other monies due under this Lease within seven days of the due date (whether formally demanded or not) the Tenant shall pay to the Landlord Interest on such rent or other money as the case may be from the date when it was due to the date on which it is actually paid 5(20) INDEMNITY
To keep the Landlord indemnified from and against all expenses loss and claims arising directly or indirectly from any breach of covenant on the part of the Tenant herein contained or from the use of the Demised Premises or out of any works carried out at any time during the term to the Demised Premises or out of anything now or during the term attached to or projecting from the Demised Premises which arises from any act neglect or default by the Tenant or by their respective servants or agents 5(21) FIRE FIGHTING
To keep the Demises Premises supplied and equipped with all fire fighting and extinguishing appliances from time to time
26
required by law or
reasonably required by the Insurers of the Demises Premises such appliances being kept
open to inspection and properly maintained and not to obstruct or permit or suffer to be
obstructed the access to or means of working such appliances or the means of escape
from the Demised Premises in case of fire
5(22) TO PAY COST OF REBUILDING IF INSURANCE AVOIDED
In the event of the Demises Premises or the building in which they are situate or any neighbouring premises or any of them or any part thereof being destroyed or damaged by any of the Insured Risks and the insurance money under any policy of insurance effected thereon by the Landlord being by reason of any act neglect default or omission of the Tenant wholly or partially irrecoverable forthwith in every such case to pay to the Landlord on demand the cost of rebuilding and reinstating the building or buildings so destroyed or damaged such rebuilding
works to be carried out by and in accordance with the requirements of the Landlord and the
i Tenant being allowed towards the expenses of so doing (upon such rebuilding and reinstatement
being completed) the amount (if any) actually received by or on behalf of the Landlord (other than in respect of loss of rent) under any such insurance as aforesaid in respect of such destruction or damage 5(23) TO COMPLY WITH NOTICES
To comply at the Tenant's own expense with any statutory notice order or other requirement lawfully served by a competent authority upon either the Landlord or the Tenant concerning the Demised Premises and forthwith to provide the Landlord with a copy of any such notice order or requirement served upon the Tenant and at the request of the Landlord to make or join with the Landlord in making such objections or representations against or in
27
respect of any such notice order or requirement as aforesaid as the Landlord shall deem
expedient
5(24) EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH COVENANTS
To produce upon demand reasonable evidence of compliance with the covenants and conditions herein contained 5(25) SUBSTITUTION OF SURETY
To notify the landlord within twenty one days of any of the following events:-
If any Surety being an individual or individuals shall become bankrupt or make any
arrangement for the benefit of or enter into any arrangement with its creditors either by
composition or otherwise
any Surety being an individual or individuals shall die
If any Surety being a Company or corporate body shall be wound up either voluntarily
(except as a solvent company for the purpose of amalgamation or reconstruction) or
compulsorily or shall for any reason be removed from the Register of Companies and if
the Landlord so requires them at the Tenant's expense within twenty eight days to
procure that some other person or company reasonably acceptable to the Landlord shall
execute a guarantee in the form of covenant in Clause 8 hereof
5(26)   TO PAY TOWARDS COSTS OF MAINTENANCE OF FIRE ESCAPE AREAS
To pay a fair proportion (to be determined by the Landlord's Surveyor) of the costs incurred (or intended to be incurred) by the Landlord in respect of the lighting cleaning and maintenance of the Fire Escape Areas
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6.        PROVISOS
6(1)     PROVISO FOR RE-ENTRY
If the whole or any part of the rent shall be unpaid for 21 days after becoming payable whether formally demanded or not or if the Tenant Being a company) shall enter into liquidation whether compulsory or voluntary (except as a solvent company for the purpose of amalgamation with any other company or for the purpose of reconstruction) or an administration order shall be made in respect of the Tenant or if any person shall become entitled to exercise the powers of an administrative receiver or (not being a company) shall become bankrupt or if the Tenant shall make any arrangement with its creditors or shall permit any execution to be levied on the Demised Premises or if there shall be any breach of any of the Tenant's covenants the Landlord may at any time thereafter re-enter upon the Demised Premises or any part thereof and this demise shall thereupon terminate but without prejudice to any right of action or remedy of the Landlord in respect of any breach of covenant by the Tenant 6(2) SERVICE OF NOTICES
Any notice shall be properly served if it complies with the provisions of the Law of Property Act 1925 S. 196 as amended by the Recorded Delivery Service Act 1962 or the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 S.23 6(3)     CESSER OF RENT
If the Demised Premises or any part thereof shall be destroyed or so damaged by fire or any other risk for which the Landlord is indemnified under the insurance of the Demises Premises so as to be unfit for occupation or use then unless the insurance of the Demised Premises shall have been vitiated by the act neglect default or omission of the Tenant the rent hereby reserved or a fair and just proportion thereof according to the nature and extent of the
29
damage sustained shall be suspended and cease to be payable until the Demised Premises or damaged portion thereof shall have been reinstated or made fit for occupation or until the third anniversary of such destruction or damage whichever shall be the sooner 6(4)     DAMAGE FROM SERVICES
The Landlord shall not be liable to the Tenant or any other person claiming through the Tenant for any damage which may be caused by stoppage or defect of any plant or machinery in or service to the Demised Premises or any neighbouring premises where the same is beyond the control of the Landlord 6(5)     LANDLORD'S LIABILITY
i
(a)    In any case where the facts are or should reasonably be known to the Tenant and not
reasonably known by the Landlord the Landlord shall not be liable to the Tenant in
• respect of any failure of the Landlord to perform any of its obligations to the Tenant
hereunder whether express or implied unless and until the Tenant has notified the Landlord of the facts giving rise to the failure and the Landlord has failed within a reasonable time to remedy the same
The Landlord shall not be responsible to the Tenant or to its servants agents licensees
invitees customers or visitors for any accident injury damage or loss caused to them or
their chattels property or goods sustained at or in the vicinity of the Demised Premises
and in particular will not be liable for any damage to motor vehicles within the Service
Area howsoever arising
The Landlord shall not be liable to the Tenant or any other person claiming through the
Tenant on account of any diminution of light or air enjoyed at the Demised Premises or
otherwise in consequence of the erection or alteration of any adjoining or neighbouring
property or any other works carried out thereto 6(6)     GENERAL
Nothing in this Lease shall render the Landlord or the Tenant liable in respect of any of the covenants conditions or provisions contained in these presents if their performance and observance becomes impossible or illegal under the Town and Country Planning Acts or any other enactment but subject as above the term granted by this Lease and the rent payable by virtue of it shall not determine only because of a change modification or restriction of use of the Demised Premises or obligations or requirements made or imposed after the date of this Lease under or by virtue of any enactment 6(7) PARAGRAPH HEADINGS ETC.
Paragraph headings and any marginal notes or index do not form part of this Lease and shall not be taken into account in the construction or interpretation thereof 7.         LANDLORD'S COVENANTS
The Landlord hereby covenants with the Tenant:
7(1) That the Tenant shall have quiet enjoyment of the Demised Premises against the Landlord and all persons claiming title through the Landlord
7(2) To insure the Demised Premises and the Development in an insurance office of good repute or at Lloyds against the Insured risks and in the event of the Demised Premises being destroyed or damaged by any of the Insured Risks the Landlord shall with all convenient speed (subject to the availability of all necessary labour and materials and the obtaining of all necessary permissions) lay out and apply in rebuilding repairing or otherwise reinstating the Demised premises all monies received by virtue of such insurance other than monies received in
31
respect of loss of rent Provided that the Landlord shall be under no liability to the Tenant hereunder if the insurance money under any policy of insurance effected by the Landlord shall be wholly or partially irrecoverable in the circumstances set out in 5(22) above Provided always that the Landlord shall not be under any obligation to insure any fixtures or fittings installed by the Tenant which have become part of the Demised Premises unless the Tenant shall have notified the Landlord in writing of such installation and the Landlord has agreed with the Tenant at the cost of the Tenant to effect the insurance thereof and provided further that the covenant by the Landlord as to reinstatement shall be satisfied if the Landlord provides in the premises so reinstated accommodation as convenient and commodious as is practicable but not necessarily identical to the Demised Premises as the same existed prior to such damage or destruction and provided further that if any competent authority shall lawfully refuse permission for or otherwise lawfully prevent any rebuilding or reinstatement of the Demised Premises or any rebuilding or reinstatement shall be otherwise impossible impractical or frustrated all relevant insurance monies (so far as not laid out aforesaid) shall be receivable by the Landlord for its own use and benefit absolutely
IN WITNESS whereof the Landlord and the Tenant have executed this lease as a deed the day and year first before written.


The Common Seal of COMMUNITY HOUSING )
ASSOCIATION LIMITED was hereunto affixed )
in the presence of:-    )



We need to urgently step into the light

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I dream of Diamond shaped glass independent play facilities for the kids, with cinema seats with interactive controls for the big screen in front of them and catwalks for fashion shows, with television and broadcasting suites under the edge of the diamond that all link to each other across the country, that can also be hired out to make money for the kids too and a ten person contemporary serviced office above accessed from the other side that can be hired out to businesses on an annual basis to keep the Diamonds in the kids hands and to pay for itself, to adapt to change, to pay the bills, the surplus to fund head office of spaceshift. I see each one with a beam that can shine into the sky and on occasions we can have them all light up the whole sky and the whole country. Yes what a change children with the power to be heard!

I see National membership of 12 million children.

I see new businesses invented by the kids and invested in by spaceshift.

I see my old landlord Community Housing Association apologising to me and them having the shops they were given by Camden Council to them free confiscated from them and being given back to me who paid for them, done them up and then had them robbed off me in a brutal court case!

I see International Development to establish an independent Youth Economy! This is because I believe the children who you too once were, are Gagged!!

I see a Youth Parliament Building, with high tech pods in a huge circle, representatives elected and being interactive from the circle as well as the country as the National meetings take place. This can also be International. It can also be hired out.

I see voting booths in the street designed for kids that are topical and instant.

I see a ‘Children’s Law Practice’ funded by the Youth Parliament to compensate victims at the sharpest end of abuse and to lobby for changes in law with test cases being used. The numbers are way less than 1% percent of children so it is ridiculously possible.

I see a Youth Parliament SAS style military to combat child abuse.

I see a sentencing review, including witness protection for whistle blowers of the big boys who are making the money out of maintaining this old fashioned sub-culture, which serves to hide the old fashioned money making industry.

I see consumer training given to professionals by victims as to how they have social care so wrong and how it further abuses the majority and is self serving for the mental health institutions and the legal drug companies.

I see the launch of a tracking satellite that ensures instant access to photographic and television evidence of kidnappers of children and can be accessed immediately by the Youth Parliament in emergencies.

I want many more parties, networking, exhibitions, art, design and beauty as I had since the year 2000… because I like to dance and sing, help people meet up with each other that they may never meet in their lives and have fun and be happy and I think this is the light…


I suspect I know what is happening...

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So I phone the European Court yesterday and speak to a lady.

I ask to speak to M Lafferty and she says, "no she won't speak to you, your case is not urgent", so I say slightly taken back, "I have a shop that I could lose next month 4th April and I have not had a reply to my letter of 7th Feb (I meant 17th Feb but nevertheless), so she say's "well a decision was taken on the 7th Feb and you will be informed shortly", I say, "7th Feb a decision was taken but it's the 6th March" - there is a pause - "well, you will get the decision shortly" she seems understanding.

Okay here is a possibility, today would be the last day to go to the Court of Appeal to appeal the Supreme Court decision to refuse me permission to appeal on the grounds of "misrepresentation of my case in full" at the court of appeal in May - In short the Judged me on their own case NOT mine!!! They just made it up - The transcripts will prove it -

Now since they the Supreme Court sent me the reply on the 7th Feb, days after I put I was in Europe on this here blog-

So what if and I am guessing here so bear that in mind -

as it would seem clearly my case is not "important" enough for violation of my human rights in 'right to a fair trial' - but after six years in court that would seem ironic as it does fit the convention of "right to a fair trial with speed" Article 1 & 6 "right to property"

What if the UK are just waiting for me to go to the 'appeal court' even though they took '8 months' to reply instead of the Civil Procedure Rules of '28 days' for a reply - AND they can't reply until I'm fixed - timing wise - or else what is the delay in reply if a DECISION HAS BEEN MADE - Maybe

Firstly that would be futile as I have already been treated illegally by the country hence 8 month v 28days, so I cannot be the one accused of not exhausting domestic remedy - it would be impossible as they UK have already been the one's to break the CPR system - Hence my right to Europe!!!!!
I smell trouble and another ominous envelope -

I mean what does it matter though I am a litigant in person... right!!!! I have no power!!

They all want legal aid cuts but don't want to treat litigant in person with due respect for timing..

They must think we are either powerless or thick!!!!

Maybe I should get a French lawyer I love the French - Maybe the court already does not like me..

Okay what to do now? It is difficult to know! I just hope there is no more games not in Europe please it cannot be, it cannot be, I've done everything right... It's not that difficult - ah maybe it's this blog as something is wrong I feel it - The timing and her words tell me... hmmmmm... There has to be some profile on this case I need some assistance... even though I shouldn't really....

Do you think that it is because I am right that I have not been listened to.. and mainly avoided as so proved... I had chairs, wardrobes and fridges thrown at me for 6 years.. rather than just judged by the facts... no judgement to date..  after 6 years... I just want to know the answer to my case... not all this avoidance...

1. County Court - did not hear or read my case - as proved
2. Court of Appeal - Made up a different case and judged that
3. Supreme Court I was ignored 

When will the facts of my case get JUDGED not avoided!! I need the case judged NOT avoided!!
I would be happy with that.. I would accept it.. but no one to date has done that.. no closure at all!

Legal Futures - It's how the work is done that matters!!

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http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/consumer-panel-chief-how-work-done-not-who-does-it-matters-new-legal-world/comment-page-1#comment-941537


It stands to reason that in cases of an unfair trial where there is potential judicial corruption that someone outside of the profession would have no compromise.

The legal profession have a reputation with the consumers, of being quiet the legal ‘family’ and that is somewhat difficult for us competent litigants in person.

I desperately need a lawyer or a competent person to now deal with Europe.

I have been in the UK courts for 6 years, had my property stolen and face half a million in ridiculous (photocopying) costs from the other sides lawyers.

Now, even Europe is messing me about with delays and lack of importance comments.

I need someone who KNOWS the ‘family’ yet does not care for them!!

Are my cards up... or shall I just keep playing... The question is, should it be a game... Justice... shouldn't be

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Below is my written response to the ‘Court of Appeal’ judgment and it is pretty long winded and detailed. It has a numbered reference to each point of relevant argument. It is placed in the Supreme Court Application as document number 1. I have sent this!!! The judgment and my points are together for ease of reference as seen below. 

These are the merits of my case. I believe I have clearly identified in the application how the convention has been breached.

If I have missed out any conventions that have been breached this is because I am keeping it to the point and also because I am not legally trained to know the conventions that may also apply to the application and have no legal representation.

I have approached organizations but they said they cannot take on the work load. I understand this very well.

Having however changed the law at 19 years old, consulted on the Children Act 1989 and the Residential Care Bill as well as was heavily involved with the consultation and the ratification of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child when I was a development officer for the National Association of Young People In Care, I know only too well to keep things short and to the point.

Those are ‘Right to Property’ & ‘Right to a Fair Trial’

So with this evidence of argument and with the application duly signed and all judgments provided the only trick I can now see happening is that the ECHR’s may and they can do this play the ‘application is manifestly unfounded’ card.

I know that the only way to avoid it according to LIBERTY’s advice given is:

Merits of the case: the Court regularly finds applications are ‘manifestly ill-founded’, which means they will not pursue the case and will often not even require the respondent Government to reply to your application.

There is no hard-and-fast rule to ensure that your application is not manifestly ill-founded. Here are some ways to avoid it:

you should ensure that the application is very clearly set out; you should very clearly identify how your Convention rights have been breached; simply listing off things that were unfair or unreasonable would not be sufficient, those things must be clearly linked with the Convention; it is often better to write a short and succinct application than a long rambling one; you should demonstrate very clearly why the domestic courts in the UK have got something wrong – the Court will often look to the judgments of the domestic courts to understand the case, so you need to ensure that you reply very clearly to the key points made in those judgments.

You normally need to demonstrate that you have suffered ‘significant disadvantage’ from the breach of your rights.

You should be clear, correct and honest throughout your application. If your case is to be successful, the other side will be given an opportunity to respond. If it is shown that your application has deliberately misled the court, it could be struck out.

The response to the judgment was sent to the ECHR’s in Nov 2013 and as you can see I have replied to the key points made in that judgment. I am not going to unnecessarily duplicate as I said in my letter of the 17th Feb.. what is wrong with these administrations?




Neutral Citation Number:


Case No: B5/2010/2396
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT
HH JUDGE COWELL
CHY09015
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 24th May 2013
Before :

LORD JUSTICE MUMMERY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between :


GAVIN & ANOR
Claimants/Appellants

- and -


Community housing association limited
(now one housing group limited)
Defendant
Respondent

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Ms Jo Flores (Gavin)appeared in person for Appellants
Ms Zia Bhaloo QC (instructed by Bircham Dyson Bell LLP) for the Respondent

Hearing dates : 2nd and 3rd May 2013
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1.              This is an appeal by Ms Jo Flores (formerly Ms Jo Gavin) and Ms Chantal Cracy against an order of HH Judge Cowell dated 22nd September 2010 which was made at the conclusion of proceedings in the Central London County Court.
2.              Ms Flores is the tenant of commercial premises at 104, Cromer Street, London, WC1 (“104”) under a lease from the Respondent, Community Housing Association Limited (“CHAL”), dated 8th June 2000.  Together with Ms Cracy she is also the tenant of adjoining premises at 106/108 Cromer Street (“106”) under a lease from CHAL dated 17thMarch 2005.  The lease of 104 was granted for a term of 6 years from 8th June 2000 at an initial rent of £3,500 per annum subject to review.  The lease of 106 was granted for a term of two years from 8thApril 2004 and was then extended on 17th March 2005 for a term until 7th April 2014 at an initial rent of £9,000 per annum again subject to review. 
2. CHA is the acronym for ‘Community Housing Association’ that has been used throughout the trial and adding an L for limited cannot be the new acronym in the judgment, as limited does not form any part of any acronym.
3.              The demise under both leases comprised the ground floor and basement of the premises including internal plaster; ceiling and floor coverings; doors and windows; and all conduits within the demised premises.  It did not extend to any part of the upper floors of 104 and 106 which have been converted into residential flats and have been let as such by CHAL.  Nor did it include the soil pipes on the outside rear wall of the building which serve the upper part of the premises. 
3. The lease for 104 Cromer Street was at an initial rent of £6,500 not £3,500.
One cannot use the term ‘part of the premises’ it can only be said as ‘outside’ of the retained premises. Or it could be construed as ‘part’ if ‘part’ is used, as if the premises were ‘part’ as opposed to ‘above’ with a separate entrance and exit.
 
4.              Under both leases the tenants covenanted to put and keep the demised premises in good and substantial repair, decoration and condition (clause 5(6)(b)) and to decorate them every three years (clause 5(6)(c)) but there is no corresponding covenant by CHAL as landlord to repair those parts of the building which it has retained.  Instead its only express covenants are that the tenant should have quiet enjoyment of the demised premises (clause 7(1)) and an insurance covenant (clause 7(2)) which (so far as material) is in these terms:
“To insure the Demised Premises and the Development in an insurance office of good repute or at Lloyds against the Insured Risks and in the event of the Demised Premises being destroyed or damaged by any of the Insured Risks the Landlord shall with all convenient speed (subject to the availability of all necessary labour and materials and the obtaining of all necessary permissions) lay out and apply in rebuilding repairing or otherwise reinstating the Demised Premises all monies received by virtue of such insurance other than monies received in respect of loss of rent Provided that the Landlord shall be under no liability to the Tenant hereunder if the insurance money under any policy of insurance effected by the Landlords shall be wholly or partially irrecoverable in the circumstances set out in 5(22) above….”.
4. With regard to the comment in brackets (so far as is material); the UKU building policy which forms an integral part of two leases insured repairing obligations, had an express obligation, with regard to ‘Property Owners Liability’ as well as ‘Material Damage’ in the building policy. POL as it is known was very ‘material’ to the case because it covered business interruption caused by any retained premises of the landlord and indeed the claimants qualified for POL under the loss assessors report for UKU so that is not in dispute and must be made clear as it is not at all in this draft and it is primary fact as proved. 
The claimants additionally through another RSA loss assessors report qualified for the RSA excess liability cover too only if the primary policy UKU POL was exceeded, as it was, due to the delays by the landlord in repairing the leaseholders premises. Evidence of the two policies being linked as forming an integral part of the same policy for the leaseholders for which they paid a premium was given to the court of appeal.

Ms Flores handed the document to the court of appeal which clearly said on the front page of the 15 pages she handed up of the RSA excess POL policy and is hi-lighted as such as saying;  ‘Property Insured- (Commercial Property where required) The terms of the policy apply separately to each property as though each had been insured by a separate policy.

On the second page there is further evidence of the excess liability policy being linked to the primary policy and is also hi-lighted as saying;

CROSS LIABILITY CLAUSE
If more than one policyholder is named in the schedule each policyholder so named shall be considered, as a separate and distinct entity and cover shall be construed as applying to each policyholder as though each had been insured separately

Further and highlighted also; ‘page 157 RSA combined liability Insured associated companies lodged with the company (noted interest lodged) & page 158 Section 6 Excess POL Primary Policy is UKU!

Ms Bhaloo tried to say our case was a section 11 and that was a lie and Ms Bhaloo further blatantly gave false information and lied in court saying that the UKU policy was not linked to the RSA policy. She further lied when asked if the UKU building policy covered POL and she said no it is just for material damage. She knew she was lying on both counts as she did with section 11, disputed by the judge correctly. This lie is the undoing of the case and must be re-read in the factual evidence of the RSA policy documents Ms Flores handed the court. Finally on that point Ms Bhaloo gave false information when asked what was the ‘development’? She said this was standard wording, when actually the ‘development’ is the 17 million pounds residential ‘development’ paid for by government grant given to CHA in 1998 and as such is insured! Hence there is an expressed covenant to keep the residential flats which form part of the ‘development’ insured from all risks including escape of water so that is the corresponding express covenant to repair the retained parts. It therefore cannot be said there is no corresponding covenant if one is to take Clause 7(2) of the lease, so far as is material and apply it.
5.              The “insured risks” are defined by clause 1(11) to mean:
“loss or damage by or in consequence of fire and such other risks as the Landlord may deem desirable or expedient including three years loss of rent and architects and surveyors fees and demolition clearance and similar expenses.”
6.              Clause 5(22) provides that:
“In the event of the Demised Premises or the building in which they are situate or any neighbouring premises or any of them or any part thereof being destroyed or damaged by any of the Insured Risks and the insurance money under any policy of insurance effected thereon by the Landlord being by reason of any act neglect default or omission of the Tenant wholly or partially irrecoverable forthwith in every such case to pay to the Landlord on demand the cost of rebuilding and reinstating the building or buildings so destroyed or damaged such rebuilding works to be carried out by and in accordance with the requirements of the Landlord and the Tenant being allowed towards the expenses of so doing (upon such rebuilding and reinstatement being completed) the amount (if any) actually received by or on behalf of the Landlord (other than in respect of loss of rent) under any such insurance as aforesaid in respect of such destruction or damage.”
7.              Under the heading “Landlord’s Liability” clause 6(5)(a) also provides that:
“In any case where the facts are or should reasonably be known to the Tenant and not reasonably known by the Landlord the Landlord shall not be liable to the Tenant in respect of any failure of the Landlord to perform any of its obligations to the Tenant hereunder whether express or implied unless and until the Tenant has notified the Landlord of the facts giving rise to the failure and the Landlord has failed within a reasonable time to remedy the same.”
8.              In addition to these provisions clause 6(3) of each lease contains a cesser of rent clause in the following terms:
“If the Demised Premises or any part thereof shall be destroyed or so damaged by fire or any other risk for which the Landlord is indemnified under the insurance of the Demised Premises so as to be unfit for occupation or use then unless the insurance of the Demised Premises shall have been vitiated by the act neglect default or omission of the Tenant the rent hereby reserved or a fair and just proportion thereof according to the nature and extent of the damage sustained shall be suspended and cease to be payable until the Demised Premises or damaged portion thereof shall have been reinstated or made fit for occupation or until the third anniversary of such destruction or damage whichever shall be the sooner.”
9.              There is also the usual proviso for re-entry in the event of rent being unpaid for 21 days or of any breach of the tenant’s covenants: see clause 6(1).
10.           The appellants fitted out the demised premises at some expense for use as gallery space and, as part of their business, let out part of the area for exhibits and other commercial events.  But on at least four occasions between April 2004 and June 2005 the interior of the demised premises was damaged by the ingress of water and on two occasions sewage from the parts of the building retained by CHAL.  The judge found that in April 2004 gaps between the glass pavement lights above the basement of 106 let water through.  They were repaired in September 2004 and in January 2006 an insurance payment of £150 was made in respect of the damage.  In September 2004 one of the soil pipes carrying sewage from the flats above leaked and sewage permeated the rear wall of 104.  The leak was remedied by the landlord’s contractors on 31st January 2005 and part of the wall was then replaced.  A further insurance payment was made in respect of the damage.
10. When the leak at 106 is mentioned as starting in April and commencing in Sept 2004 that is incorrect. It was repaired as ‘agreed’ by both parties in Nov 2004. Also the damage of £150 was ‘material damage’ (as was all the £3,500 ‘reimbursed’ to the claimants) not damages. The £150 payment was for a small section of ceiling that still had to be repaired and was by the claimants. The rest of the repair of the April-Nov 04 repair was made by the defendants, including fixing the pavement and the internal ceiling. So either miss out the irrelevant £150 re-imbursement or put in all the material damage facts of repair or this continues to be mis-leading as that particular repair amounted to thousands of pounds worth of repair not £150.

Again the Sept 2004 to Jan 2005 date is incorrect it was finished in Feb 2005 as agreed by both parties.

The words ‘a further insurance payment was made in respect of the damage’ is misleading to. Firstly to who as it was not us? Secondly is this again ‘material damage’ or damages it is very unclear?


The 7th Feb-26thApril 2005 soil stack leak says ‘Again this would have resulted in an insurance payment but for the excess on the policy of £100.’ It is very unclear as to whom the draft is referring to. Being paid to whom? For what?

The 24th June – Oct 2005 flooding incident says the, “costs of the works were met by the insurer” but all the costs of ‘material damage’ were met by the insurer, to either the claimant or the landlord whom ever had fixed. The word is re-imbursed for material damage and that would make all this a lot clearer.

On the words ‘associated damages to the exhibition’ no damages were paid or associated costs whatsoever. A small amount of stationary ‘contents’, were paid for those that were flooded. The associated damages or costs are still the subject of a POL investigation and these court proceedings will determine if POL pays out. So again this is very misleading.

To make it clear we were reimbursed as we mitigated our losses by doing the repairs ourselves other costs associated with the exhibition clearly have not been met. It would be like getting run over by a car, paying your own medical bills and then when liability is established being reimbursed for you medical bills but nothing for damages yet. Reimbursed, as a word must therefore be used.
11.           On 7thFebruary 2005 there was then another leak from a stack pipe on the rear wall of 106 which was repaired on 26th April 2005.  Again this would have resulted in an insurance payment but for the excess on the policy of £100.  Finally on 24th June 2005 water from a tap or leaking pipe in one of the flats above 104 inundated the demised premises about a week before an art exhibition was due to be held.  It necessitated the replacement of the ceiling (which was completed in October 2005).  The cost of those works was met by the insurers and the appellants received a cheque direct from the insurers of £3,441.65 to meet these and other costs associated with the exhibition. 
12.           The judge found that all of these leaks (including the defective pavement lights) emanated from the premises retained in the ownership of CHAL.  But, in the absence of any express repairing covenant in respect of its adjoining premises, CHAL contended that it had no liability to the appellants beyond being required to lay out payments received from the buildings insurance it had taken out pursuant to clause 7(2) of the leases in the repair of the damage to the demised premises which had been caused.  It is common ground that this was done.
12. CHA had no express responsibility except to pay out monies received from the insurers. It is common ground this was done. It is not common ground and cannot be contended as such. POL on the insurance policy or cessor of rent whether partially unfit/wholly unfit has not been paid out as contended. Also as proved it will not be paid out as the landlord vitiated the insurance policy by failing to repair on time and/or make claims on the insurance policy on time. If the landlord (hypocritically back by the insured to avoid the claim) believes that the repairs were repaired reasonably after notice then tell that to the insurers not to all else. CHA have an express covenant and a proprietary duty to attain the POL payment owed to the claimants as set out in 7(2) of the leases for business interruption (and for rent owed) as set out in the schedule of loss with the particulars of claim, as part unfit and at times wholly unfit with the said times clearly stated in the schedule as well as multiple occurrences often subsumed to one period of unfitness and therefore claim of damages. It would be a duty of the court to point to this information and it would be difficult to see how the insurer after backing a claim that the landlord repaired on time could then turn around and say the opposite since they have backed this line of thinking. It in turn then does not get them off the hook to honour the landlord in an expressed obligation to be covered for property owner’s liability. CHA could even admit it as Chris Natt did when he said “I thought we were covered even if we did wrong, I think we could end up with a very bad defence in court’. The policy does not allow for people to admit liability, ‘except’ when they say, it is obvious. Well it is obvious. The liability came from outside of the retained parts and Jaqui Greene also admitted it when she said the leaseholders could claim for business interruption, loss of rent and damages. All of which Ms Flores pointed to in court. It is unfortunate that the landlord is now put to a weak defence of lies and avoidance of the issue that they broke the terms of the insurance. They should admit it or the court say that it is true as HHJ Cowell did say and this is ignored in the draft. The landlord and the claimant who were once morally and socially on the same side have been set against each other to save the insurers a claim. This must be addressed. The landlord, who are not now even in the cover of the insurers would do well to admit liability and put a stop to this moral injustice. They would have much to gain by having the courage to do so when they know they are liable by anyone’s reasonable standards of interrupting another’s business and then being held hostage by their insured to defend the ridiculousness of this once simple claim that only got bigger as time moved on and the claim escalated. A chartered accountant could then assess the damages as historically suggested but until then their mighty legal team cannot ruin us indiscriminately. 
13.           Until June 2008 the appellants continued to pay the rent due under both leases but the rent due on the June quarter day was not paid and, as a result, CHAL served notices in respect of both leases that unless payment was received within 7 days it would proceed to re-enter and forfeit the leases.  The rent due on 29thSeptember also went unpaid and the landlord served further notices of its intention to forfeit the leases.  The appellants responded through their solicitors to the effect that they had no liability for rent for those quarters because they had continued to pay rent in 2005 when the demised premises had been unfit for occupation within the meaning of the cesser of rent clause contained in clause 6(3) of the two leases.  As a consequence, they were entitled to recover the rent paid (but not due) during this period and to set off the relevant amount against the rent due in September and October 2008.
13. The rent was paid albeit by bullying us with the treat of eviction but it has never been proven that it was not paid, quite the contrary it was proven that it was and that evidence was too offered to the court of appeal, which said they did not need to see it. It was however accepted by all the judges involved so couldn’t now be said not to have been paid at the date of re-entry making it a trespass.
14.           On 29thOctober 2008 CHAL re-entered 104 and 106 and changed the locks.  On 4th November Wilkie J. granted the appellants an injunction ex parte requiring CHAL to allow them back into possession and this injunction was continued until trial by Christopher Clarke J. on 14th November.  The landlord’s case at the inter partes hearing (and on this appeal) is that the appellants have no claim in restitution or otherwise to recover the rent which they paid in 2005 even if (which is denied) the premises were unfit for occupation in that period.  Judge Cowell found at the trial that the cesser of rent clause had never come into operation because, as he put it, there was never an occasion when the premises were wholly unfit for occupation and use.  That conclusion is challenged in one of the grounds of appeal on the basis that the judge failed to give any consideration to whether “any part” of the demised premises became unfit for use.
14. It should say the challenge ‘as set out in leases with the inseparable insurance documents regarding the cessor of rent ‘if the demise becomes part or wholly unfit’ then the cessor of rent comes into operation. HHJ Cowell addressed that in his second judgment.
15.           The appellants’ claim for damages was issued on 3rd December 2008 and eventually came to trial on 12th July 2010.  It sought to recover damages for financial loss consequent on the disrepair to their premises caused by the leaks I have mentioned.  This was said to have run into many hundreds of thousands of pounds in the form of lost business and at one point the damages claim exceeded £2m.  In order to succeed in a claim for this type of loss the appellants must establish a breach of duty on the part of CHAL whether in contract or in tort arising from the various leaks which occurred.  The basis of such liability is said to be an implied obligation to keep the retained parts in repair or alternatively a common law duty as adjoining occupier to remedy any defect in those premises which was capable of causing damage to the demised premises.
15 The claim was thousands of pounds as the business could command those figures. The figures are not said without expert evidence. The other claim is for the loss of opportunity of Ms Flores social enterprise Youth Parliament and is an additional claim under the CPR rules and should be stated as such and is justified by the defendant’s knowledge of the social enterprise. It is additional damages not business interruption covered under POL in the express clause 7(2) of the leases.

In order to succeed in a claim for this type of loss the claimants need to establish a breach of duty in contract. The breach of duty is the act of omission that has been proved in disclosure and earlier by the eminent loss adjuster Alan Harris that the landlord had vitiated the insurance and POL could therefore not be paid.

The basis of such liability is said to be an implied clause etc etc, no that is not what Ms Flores said in court. She clearly stated at the court of appeal she either wanted absolute liability as covered by an insured risk, which is the purpose of liability insurance of the building and/or an implied covenant to 5 (22) of the leases regarding vitiating the insurance. No case was made in the court of appeal that CHA had any repairing obligations and none can no be said to have been sought that would simply be to now make things up and try something that was never asserted. If it were asserted notice and other issues may have been brought into the equation but Ms Flores steered very clear in her path to establish that the implied clause she sought to establish was 5(22) and no other.

16.           Judge Cowell accepted that there was a duty on the part of CHAL to remedy any defects in the retained premises which would cause damage to the demised premises at 104 and 106.  He based this on the decision in Hargroves, Aronson & Co v Hartopp [1905] 1 KB 472 which was approved by this court in Cockburn v Smith[1924] 2 KB 119.  The scope of that duty was, he held, to take reasonable care to remedy defects in the retained premises which the landlord knew had caused, or were likely to cause, damage to the premises demised to the tenants.  Absent negligence, the duty to repair only arose once the landlord was aware that damage had been caused. 
17.           The judge found that there was no breach of duty in respect of the leak from the soil pipe at the rear of 104 because the landlord had acted reasonably in attempting to trace the source of the leak once the damage it was causing had been notified.  He also found that the flood caused by the leak in the flat above 104 in June 2005 was an unforeseeable accident and that repairs were carried out promptly.  But he did hold CHAL liable for breach of duty in relation to the leak from the soil stack pipe at the back of 106 in 2005 not because it ought to have been aware that the pipe was leaking but because, once alerted to the damage, it could and should have remedied the leak by 8th April 2005 at the latest.  Its failure to carry out the repairs until 26th April was therefore actionable.
18.           In relation to the claim based on the leaking pavement lights at 106, the judge was asked to consider three separate periods.  The occasion of the first leaks at the time of the grant of the first lease in 2004; a second period of leaks between June and October 2006; and a third period between May and June 2008.  The judge accepted that the problems with the pavement lights were covered by the principle of caveat lessee which I will come to later.  But if wrong about that he held that the leak in 2004 could have been easily remedied by the tenant and was within their duty to mitigate.  The cost of repair was later met by insurance.  In relation to the leaks in 2006, the judge held that there was no culpable delay on the part of CHAL and that when it appeared that the repairs would not be covered by insurance then the work was done at the landlord’s expense.  Again the judge held that the tenants should have carried out repairs themselves earlier as part of a duty to mitigate.  The judge also decided that there had been no breach of duty in respect of the leaks in 2008 because at no time did CHAL know or have the means of knowing where the leak was coming from.
18. The pavement was an insured risk as in water ingress. An insured risk. It is neither here nor there how that was caused or if the defendant was covered it mattered not to the claimant. The judge held that the pavement did belong to the defendant and therefore POL would be established which is an insured risk. The claimants had no means to fix a pavement nor should one be suggested as a reason to relief the defendant of a duty to make claims on the insurance for damage was caused to the claimant’s premises. At all times the claimants complied with their own repair obligation they cannot in law be expected to cover repairs outside of the demise. They could not afford the thousands to do so. Not to depart from reality the job involves 5 men and a lorry load of black molten substance to seal the pavement and is expensive. Further the claimants have no right to touch the pavement in law and were expressly forbidden (as proved in email correspondence) by the defendants not to contract the defendant’s contractors to mitigate. This has to be addressed in the draft as the claimant’s hands were simply tied and we had no duty to mitigate even if we tried to. The 2008 leak was caused by rain leaking into the pavement seal the defendants had access to the pavement and had the means of knowledge from two previous repairs there was therefore nothing to trace and/or means of knowing does not enter the equation once they had notice too as proved it was reported.
If you are which is not clear from the draft talking of the electricity cupboard then that was an insured risk and the insurance paid for contractors found the leak in 10 minutes. Bad contactor as in woodfall on the defendant’s behalf in law is not an excuse for a three-year leak.

19.           In summary then the judge found that only one breach of duty sounding in damages had been established and that related only to the three weeks in April 2005 when there was a delay in remedying the leak to the soil stack at 106.  For this he awarded the tenants the sum of £100.  Since this was obviously insufficient to extinguish the arrears of rent he declared in his order that both leases had been forfeited by the landlord’s re-entry on 29thOctober 2008 and ordered the appellants to deliver possession of the premises at 104 and 106 forthwith.  They were ordered to pay mesne profits in a sum which represents the market rent of the premises from the forfeiture of the leases until possession and to pay the costs of the action to be assessed on an indemnity basis.  He also refused permission to appeal.
19. There were no arrears and no set-off, so if insufficient to extinguish the arrears is being used then the fact must be established that there were no arrears.

20.           The tenants’ original grounds of appeal were based on an alleged breach of the rules of natural justice and/or Article 6.  They acted in person at the trial and the judge is said to have failed to ensure that there was a fair trial.  They also challenged the judge’s formulation of the scope of the landlord’s duty.  But in November 2012 they secured the assistance of Mr Jan Luba QC pro bono who re-formulated the grounds of appeal and successfully obtained leave from this court on 4th December 2012 to substitute the amended grounds for those contained in the appellant’s notice.  Although Ms Flores has argued the appeal in person, we have been assisted by the very full Advocate’s Statement first used at the hearing on 4th December as well as by the submissions which Ms Flores has made.  There are now 9 grounds of appeal which can be summarised as follows:
                     (1)   the judge was wrong to hold that the landlord’s liability for damage caused by a defect in the retained premises was limited to a liability in negligence and depended on the landlord having notice of the defect and a reasonable opportunity to remedy it.  He should have held that the landlord was in breach as soon as the defect occurred and caused damage to the demised premises;
                     (2)  the absolute duty contended for arose as an implied obligation under the lease.  The principle of caveat lessee has no application;
                     (3)  the judge misconstrued the rent cesser provisions which were triggered by the damage to part of the premises and the tenants were entitled to recover and set off the rent paid during that period against their liabilities for unpaid rent in 2008;
                     (4)  if the tenants succeed on grounds (1)-(3) they are entitled to substantial damages for loss of profit;
                     (5)  even if the tenants are wrong on grounds (1)-(3) the damages of £100 awarded for the breach which the judge found proved were grossly inadequate;
                     (6) and (7) if the tenants are entitled to substantial damages for loss of profit in excess of the rent due up to 29th October 2008 then the landlord was not entitled to forfeit the leases and the tenants’ continuing liability is to pay rent at the rate reserved and not mesne profits; and
                     (8) and (9) the judge’s order that the tenants should pay the costs of the action including the reserved costs of all interlocutory applications was clearly wrong.

20. Ms Flores was ordered to have pro-bono by LJ Ward. Her grounds have before pro-bono and then after been that the landlord broke the terms of the insurance and had an expressed covenant in the lease to get the insurance to pay as in the case of vural v security archives.
If you are going to summarise the wording for the grounds of appeal then this needs to accurately reflect what was sought in the grounds. I want the original grounds put in here as they leave bits out especially in ground two for example;

What is said is this;

2. The judge misdirected himself in law as to the landlord’s liability for disrepair
under the leases held by the tenants in this case. He ought to have held that the
tenants’ obligations to repair, in respect of the demised premises, were
matched by a correlative implied obligation on the landlord to keep in repair,
at all times: (1) the parts of the building retained in its ownership and control,
defects in which may affect the demised premises; and/or (2) such parts of the
building as might, if defective, lead to the occurrence of damage covered by
an insured risk.

Now if Ms Flores were to take out ‘and/or’ it would say;

He ought to have held that the tenants’ obligations to repair, in respect of the demised premises, were matched by a correlative implied obligation on the landlord to keep in repair, at all times: such parts of the building as might, if defective, lead to the occurrence of damage covered by an insured risk.

So we can all summarise to show what we mean but one cannot simply leave parts out! The insurance here has been omitted and as Ms Flores argued that point 5(22) as the implied covenant in court this cannot be simply left out! It is misleading.
21.           In his Advocate’s Statement and at the hearing on 4th December Mr Luba made it clear that the tenants could not and did not seek to go behind the judge’s findings of fact as to the extent of the damage to their premises or as to the cause of that damage.  But prior to the hearing of the appeal Ms Flores sought permission to challenge the findings by the judge that there was no negligence by asking this court to find (1) that the claimants had previously asked for the structure to be repaired so as to put the landlord on notice of the defects and (2) that the flood from the upstairs flat was not an accident but was due to disrepair.  This application was opposed by Ms Bhaloo QC on behalf of CHAL on the basis that it would necessitate an adjournment of the appeal in order to produce transcripts of the relevant evidence and was in direct contradiction of the basis on which permission to appeal on the amended grounds was granted.  In my judgment we should refuse permission to add these grounds of appeal.  The judge had all the evidence and the material provided in support of the application has not persuaded me that there is any substance in either point.  Moreover permission to appeal was granted on the footing that it was not open to the tenants to seek to go behind the judge’s findings as to the circumstances in which the damage came to be caused.  The tenants obtained permission to appeal on that basis and I can see no justification for allowing them to resile from that position.
21. It was never said in the court of appeal that transcripts on the point of the structure were needed by Ms Bhaloo nor that proceeding would need to be adjourned. However evidence was provided that the claimants did ask for the structure to be repaired and HHJ Cowell had said that there would be a duty to repair on notice if this was the case. The irrefutable evidence does not therefore require transcripts for the finding of fact and the court of appeal should deal with the matter and not simply resile from it due to delay tactics when they have the evidence at hand and it is conclusive of primary fact that ought to be challenged. It does not conflict or have consequences for any other grounds that were sought. It is simply an error of primary fact and no amount of technicality can divert from the issue outstanding that caused such consequences as the claimants business to be utterly unworkable as they were then illegal.
22.           The other introductory matter which I need to mention is the respondent’s notice.  CHAL have served a respondent’s notice by which they cross-appeal against the judge’s award of £100 for breach of duty in respect of the delayed repair of the external soil pipe at 106.  Their case is that the express terms of the lease excluded the duty which the judge found to have been breached so that, regardless of any negligence or breach of duty, the landlord had no liability to the tenants for damage caused to the demised premises by any of the leaks.  They also rely on the fact that in the case of 104 Ms Flores failed to apply to the County Court for a new tenancy under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 by the 6thApril 2009 when the landlord’s s.25 notice expired.  As a consequence, Ms Flores, they say, has lost her right to possession of those premises regardless of whether the lease was forfeited for non-payment of rent in October 2008.
Liability
23.           I turn then to the first two grounds of appeal which relate to the nature of the landlord’s liability (if any) to repair the retained part of the building.  The tenants’ case on this depends upon the duty which the judge found to be established by the decision of this court in Cockburn v Smith and on the more general argument that the court should in this case imply into the lease a covenant by the landlord to keep the retained premises in repair at all times.  It is, of course, critical to the success of this argument that the legal obligation thereby imposed should be strict and absolute in nature and not (as the judge found) a qualified obligation dependent upon the landlord being negligent in the upkeep of his premises and having notice of the damage which the item of disrepair was causing to the tenant.
23. “It s dependant as the judge found on notice”, or “qualified” by that, well it’s all very well to say, dependant on what the judge found, it is actually dependant on law. The appeal considers whether the judge erred in judgment with regard to common law, hence the appeal. It is therefore not dependant on what the judge decided in law as that is legally being disputed and all the correct procedures and grounds have been put forward for the court of appeal to analysis the judges decision in law. Therefore it must be decided independently of what the judge said and correct law applied if necessary. The laws applied are being disputed and not finding of fact as the facts are dependant on common law ‘duty’ and in this case an ‘absolute’ liability only because we were covered by liability insurances as part of the contractual obligation an expressed covenant.

So to look at notice we need to look at the authorities so for example in the case of Hargrove which we had permission to appeal on using that law, notice was given 2 days before a rainwater gutter flooded the claimant’s premises. The court held that two days was enough notice. In the claimants case here notice has not been analysised, although it was put before the court by Ms Flores, at the appeal hearing as written evidence and stated as follows.

NOTICE – us and them means the ‘Claimants and the Defendants’.

104 stack us beginning of Sept 04 them 14th Sept 04
104 Flood us 24/06/05 them agreed
106 stack us 7thFeb 05 them agreed
1st pavement flooding us April 04 them Oct 04
2nd pavement flooding us beginning of June 06 them Aug 06
3rd pavement flooding us 20 June 08 them agreed
1st electricity cupboard water ingress to both shops us June 05 them 1st Sept 05
2nd electricity cupboard water ingress to both shops us June 06 them agreed
3rd electricity cupboard water ingress to both shops us 13th May 08 them agreed
Fire exits locked us early 2005 them 19th Aug 2005

The time scale of leaks being repaired are the very reason that the insurers believed that the CHA vitiated the insurance by not repairing on time.

It would be odd if the insurance company namely an integral part of the contract in the lease, can decide not to allow a claim on the basis of ‘an act of ommission’ by the landlord failing to repair on time and yet the court does not even look at those facts to reasonably analyse if that decision was correct in contract law.

Notice was the subject of the 10 days trial in July-Sept 2010. The length of time to repair each soil stack leak, flood or the structure are as follows and Ms Flores said the following in the court of appeal aloud as well as orally stating thereafter some additional information as regards to the consequences of this dispute even with notice;


106 premises – rainwater leak – 7 months to stop the water ingress

104 premises - stack pipe leak – 4 months to stop the foul waste ingress

106 premises – stack pipe leak – 2.5 months to stop the foul waste ingress

104 premises – Flooding from above – 7 months for full ceiling reinstatement

106 premises – rainwater leak – 4 months to stop the water ingress

106 premises – rainwater leak – 24 months and fixed only after repossession

Electricity Cupboard between premises – pipe leak in ceiling – 3 years to locate

106 premises – Broken fire panel and smoke detectors – claimants replaced

106 premises – Dangerous wiring throughout spurs not ringed– claimants fixed

106 premises – No flooring paid for by public. Claimants had to put one down.

106 premises – No security shutters to date although paid for by public grant.

Between premises leading to fire exit – No emergency lighting 3.2 years to fix

106 premises - No ventilation or airbricks rendering the space illegal - not fixed.

Between premises – Fire exit locked and door swinging inward – 3.2 years to fix

The entire building - Commercial & residential tenants, no fire certificate to date.

Both premises – Breach of duty and of contract on leases regarding building insurance, claims not being made, making the building insurance void, so no payment for claimants when interrupted in business for over 10 years on and off.

Harassment, bribery, fraud, trespass and eviction plus putting the claimants through a to date three years court case (never mind an outstanding 8 year claim on the building insurance) to defend the claims and be reinstated to the premises.

Insurances never paid to date and shops unlawfully taken by force.

Corruption at the trial with this ‘public body’ with many connections to the judiciary not being recognised to date as is now European Law that they have influence so a Judicial review needed.

Still dragging us claimants ‘acting in person’ through the courts without legal representation as the insurances are paying their ‘defence’ (a commercial decision they are allowed to take FOS investigating) ‘legal costs’ and not ours as they have ‘triggered’ the ‘defending a claim’ clause when it is us that is the ‘defendant’ since we were unlawfully evicted.

The building insurance has no cover for ‘landlords and tenants’ disputes (of trespass) but is defending them anyway to save the claim on the liability insurances because it is in their interest to leave us on our knees.


None of the above therefore has been dealt with in the draft judgment with regard to the common law in giving ‘notice’ which could then qualify a ‘duty’ in common law.

In our case that ‘duty’ is simply not necessitated as we are contractually covered from day one as in an ‘absolute’ liability by liability insurance POL on the buildings policy. Therefore the landlord’s only expressed covenant and ‘duty’ was to make an insurance claim to have the repair fixed on time/and or for POL from day one because the liability came from outside of the retained parts for which POL covers and as stated we qualified for under two assessments by two loss assessors for the building liability policy.

To deal briefly with Cockburn v Smith (although Hart v Rogers a supplemental case is no longer an authority that the landlord who retained the roof was under an ‘absolute’ duty to repair), it was held that the landlord was under an obligation to take reasonable care once he had notice but in that case the landlord had some express repair obligations to the common parts. In our case the landlord had no express obligations (except to keep the demised and the common parts the ‘development’ insured against all risks) to repair and that was not argued. Notice was however argued as in a common law ‘duty to take reasonable care’ initially but in the court of appeal no time was wasted on the argument instead Ms Flores contended that in clause 5(22) of the lease their was an implied obligation for the landlord not to break the terms of the insurance so that in the landlords expressed obligation, monies could be laid out once damage was done from premises retained by the landlord and outside of Ms Flores demised premises. All parties were simply insured against the occurrences that took place.

24.           Contract aside, the owner of adjoining premises does, of course, have a liability in nuisance for damage caused by an actionable interference with his neighbours’ enjoyment of their own property.  The nuisance may (and usually does) consist of the lawful use of the defendant’s own land but matters such as a blocked drain which causes water to overflow on to the neighbour’s land have been held to be actionable: see Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan [1940] AC 880.  In principle therefore the blocked soil pipes were capable of amounting to a nuisance to the tenants in this case but a cause of action based on tortious nuisance does not assist them.  It is now accepted that liability in nuisance is fault-based and that the defendant must be shown to have used his land in a way which he knows or ought to have foreseen would cause damage to his neighbour.  This can include the adoption of pre-existing nuisances but in such cases the defendant must be shown to have failed to remedy the problem once he became aware of it: see Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan(supra) at page 905.
24. Again here to deal with Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan again this is notice-based law where a blocked drain was not made safe with a grid over three years and finally caused trespass in foul sewage to the claimant. It was held that the defendant failed to make the drain safe and adopted the nuisance over the three-year period so despite notice damage was eventually caused and held as such.

In our case it is again important in common law to look at the above notice periods and ask that if after notice was given did the defendants repair on time with the assistance of insurance or did they continue a nuisance by their default in making insurance claims an expressed contractual obligation. The insures say they failed to repair in a timely manner and caused an act of omission. Does the court agree or not they had a ‘duty’ to make insurance claims to repair upon notice?

25.           In the course of her oral submissions Ms Flores referred to the rule inRylands v Fletcher(1866) L.R. 1 Exch. 265 as a possible ground for strict liability on the part of CHAL.  The judge was not asked to consider the case on this basis nor does this argument form part of the grounds of appeal.  But there are in any event obvious difficulties about it.  Liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher depends upon the defendant keeping on his land some inherently dangerous thing which poses an exceptionally high risk of damage to neighbouring property should it escape.  In Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1 the House of Lords resisted the call to integrate this principle of liability into the law of negligence on the basis that the strict liability it imposes can be limited to this category of case.  Lord Bingham (at paragraph 10) said that:
It has from the beginning been a necessary condition of liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher that the thing which the defendant has brought on his land should be "something which … will naturally do mischief if it escape out of his land" (LR 1 Ex 265, 279 per Blackburn J), "something dangerous …", "anything likely to do mischief if it escapes", "something … harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's" (p 280), "anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbour" (LR 3 HL 330, 340, per Lord Cranworth). The practical problem is of course to decide whether in any given case the thing which has escaped satisfies this mischief or danger test, a problem exacerbated by the fact that many things not ordinarily regarded as sources of mischief or danger may none the less be capable of proving to be such if they escape. I do not think this condition can be viewed in complete isolation from the non-natural user condition to which I shall shortly turn, but I think the cases decided by the House give a valuable pointer. In Rylands v Fletcheritself the courts were dealing with what Lord Cranworth (LR 3 HL 330, 342) called "a large accumulated mass of water" stored up in a reservoir, and I have touched on the historical context of the decision in paragraph 3(3) above. Rainham Chemical Works [1921] 2 AC 465, 471, involved the storage of chemicals, for the purpose of making munitions, which "exploded with terrific violence". In Attorney General v Cory Bros & Co Ltd [1921] 1 AC 521, 525, 530, 534, 536, the landslide in question was of what counsel described as an "enormous mass of rubbish", some 500,000 tons of mineral waste tipped on a steep hillside. In Cambridge Water [1994] 2 AC 264 the industrial solvents being used by the tannery were bound to cause mischief in the event, unforeseen on the facts, that they percolated down to the water table. These cases are in sharp contrast with those arising out of escape from a domestic water supply (such as Carstairs v Taylor (1871) LR 6 Ex 217, Ross v Fedden (1872) 26 LT 966 or Anderson v Oppenheimer (1880) 5 QBD 602) which, although decided on other grounds, would seem to me to fail the mischief or danger test. Bearing in mind the historical origin of the rule, and also that its effect is to impose liability in the absence of negligence for an isolated occurrence, I do not think the mischief or danger test should be at all easily satisfied. It must be shown that the defendant has done something which he recognised, or judged by the standards appropriate at the relevant place and time, he ought reasonably to have recognised, as giving rise to an exceptionally high risk of danger or mischief if there should be an escape, however unlikely an escape may have been thought to be.”
25. Rylands v Fletcher here in the draft it states that Rylands v Fletcher was not argued except orally by Ms Flores and yet the advocate’s statement and the skeleton makes reference to the case as follows;

45. Ground 1 of the Amended Grounds of Appeal is that:
The judge misdirected himself in law as to the extent of a landlord’s
liability for damage caused to demised premises by a defect in another
part of same building which is retained under the ownership and
control of the landlord. He ought to have directed himself that the
landlord was liable to the tenant for all loss caused by the defect and
not simply for such loss as is suffered after the landlord has had
knowledge of the defect and a reasonable opportunity to remedy the
defect.

46. The judge’s error was to hold that the landlord’s only duty was to repair the
48 Transcript of Judgment p40 para [3]
49 Transcript of Judgment pp47-48 para [18]
50 Lease, clause 5((6) at p93 and p126
51 Transcript of Judgment p43 para [8]
52 Transcript of Judgment pp42-43 para [7] and [8]
10
defect in the retained premises “as soon as reasonably practicable after he
knows it is causing damage to [the demised premises]”.53 With respect that
cannot be the law. If it were, a landlord could let premises encapsulated within
a building, of which he otherwise retained ownership and control, and let
those parts fall to ruin. Even if the defects in the other parts frequently caused
damage to the demised premises, his only duty would be to attend to the
specific item of repair and prevent it causing further damage. If it re-occurred,
or another defect caused damage in the demised premises, the landlord would
again not be liable in damages provided the defect was rectified reasonably
quickly after his having notice of it.

47. It is not impossible to imagine cases (and this case may be a paradigm) in
which a series of defects, each in turn repaired reasonably promptly by the
landlord, successively causes such damage to the demised premises that they
are rendered worthless but in respect of which loss of use or value the landlord
(by prompt after-the-event repairs in each case) escapes liability.

48. The judge ought to have used the ‘duty’ he identified in Duke of Westminster v
Guild[1985] QB 688 as a basis for holding that the liability of such a landlord
arises as soon as the defect in the part retained by him causes damage to the
demised premises.

The Learned Judge placed substantial weight on the case of Duke of Westminster v Guild [1985] Q.B. 688. In that case, at page 701, Slade L.J. said as follows:
“There is a general principle established by such cases as Hargroves, Aronsonv. Hartopp& Co. [1905] 1 K.B. 472 and Cockburn v. Smith [1924] 2 K.B. 119 which is summarised, in our opinion accurately, in Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant, 28th ed. (1978), vol. 1, para. 1-1469, p. 621:
"Where the lessor retains in his possession and control something ancillary to the premises demised, such as a roof or staircase, the maintenance of which in proper repair is necessary for the protection of the demised premises or the safe enjoyment of them by the tenant, the lessor is under an obligation to take reasonable care that the premises retained in his occupation are not in such a condition as to cause damage to the tenant or to the premises demised."
In Hargroves, Aronson & Co. v. Hartopp [1905]1 K.B. 472the plaintiffs were tenants of a floor in a building of which the defendants were the landlords. A rainwater gutter in the roof became stopped up and the defendants failed to clear it out for a few days after receiving notice of the stoppage. They were held to be in breach of a duty of care to the plaintiffs and liable for the damage done. In Cockburn v. Smith[1924] 2 K.B. 119 the facts were similar and the defendant landlords were held liable to the tenant for damage suffered by her as a result of defects in the guttering of the roof of the building of which the landlord retained control. Scrutton L.J. considered, at p. 133, that the landlord's duty was based on "that modified doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330which is applicable where he retains in his control an artificial construction which becomes a source of danger to his tenant." Bankes and Sargant L.JJ. preferred not to decide whether the relevant duty arose out of a contract between the parties or whether it was an instance of the duty imposed by law upon an occupier of premises to take reasonable care that the condition of his premises does not cause damage: see [1924] 2 K.B. 119, 130 and 134. But they expressed no doubt that the relevant duty existed.”

49. The judge seems to have imported requirements that, before any liability can
arise, there must be: (1) knowledge or notice of a need for repair on the part
of the landlord; and (2) a reasonable opportunity for repairs to be carried out.
That puts the tenant of ‘enveloped’ premises in a seriously vulnerable
position.

50. The correct approach would be to hold that the landlord is usually absolutely
liable if a defect in the non-demised premises causes damage to the premises
demised. That would put the landlord subject to the Guild duty in no different
position from any other landlord who owes a duty to keep defects in retained
parts from damaging the demise. As Carnwath LJ (as he then was) said in
Earle v Charalambous [2006] EWCA Civ 1090:54
“In applying a standard lessor's repairing covenant, the law draws a
distinction between disrepair in the demised premises themselves, and
disrepair in other parts of the building within the lessor's control. In
53 Transcript of Judgment p47 para [18]
54 At [8]
11
the latter case the "general rule" applies: that is, the covenant requires
the lessor to keep the premises in repair at all times, and he is in
breach immediately a defect occurs (British Telecommunications plc
v Sun Life plc [1996] Ch 69).”

Although it can be said the landlord has no expressed repairing covenant in the leases they do have an expressed covenant in the leases to insure against ‘all risks’ that could cause damage to the demise which can be said is the same thing under different construction. The Earle v Charalambous case is used to outline the accepted ‘general rule’ that requires the ‘lessor to keep in repair at all times’ and it hi-lights what is meant by the definition of ‘at all times’ in terms of construction and meaning of the words, even if it is as with this case, within the insurance policy, which are in this case attached inextricably to the leases and landlords obligations and specifically require the landlord to keep the retained premises in repair ‘at all times’ (including pipes and anything that causes water ingresses). It can be said as an authority that the construction of words in the policy ‘at all times’ to keep (the pipes) in repair is the ‘general rule’ and therefore ‘absolute liability’ is attached to this case upon failure to do so and is in this case the negligence causing nuisance that voided the policy. It is therefore a Rylands v Fletcher case. In all of the disrepair that affected the premises none of the items of disrepair served the claimants premises or was for the use of the premises what so ever. In Rylands v Fletcher, “the person who for his own purpose brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes, must keep it in at his own peril, and if he does not do so, is prima (fact) facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.

Further in both leases the landlord retained rights to enter the demise to repair and
at the permission to amend hearing HHJ Cowell said, “at any rate the issues arising from the law of nuisance are sufficiently pleaded in terms of FACT in the pleadings.”

It would therefore be hard to say that this argument does not form part of the grounds of appeal as the draft says as one can see above it clearly does.

In dealing with the issue however which the draft then does of Rylands and Fletcher a number of authorities are cited to give reason as to why no stricter liability at common law in terms of an implied obligation to repair after notice should exist other than what is already contractual and has therefore remedy.

In the draft however we then see a lengthy set of quotations of various laws to suit the argument brought about by the claimants to the appeal using Barrett v Lounova. Barrett v Lounova was held that the defendant should have an implied obligation to repair the exterior of the premises despite no expressed obligation to do so where the tenant has an expressed obligation to repair the interior of the demise and it was argued that without such implied obligation on the part of the landlord to repair the exterior, the interior could become a futile exercise of repair.

First the draft mentions the laws relied on by HHJ Cowell. Gordon and Teixeira v Selico Co Ltd but in this case the fraud was committed by a third party.

He mentions Duke of Westminster v Guild but in this case the nuisance came from the claimants own land and caused a trespass to the defendants land.

The draft then goes on and says that HHJ Cowell quoted Bankes LJ in the case of Cockburn v Smith and explains a want of reasonable care after notice where he is given notice and fails to repair.

The draft says that HHJ Cowell mentions Carstairs v Taylor but this was a case where an animal caused the said leak and this was deemed as an act of God not the fault of the landlord.

The draft also says that HHJ Cowell mentions Hargrove v Hartopp but this was a case where it was said that it was too late to say that the defendant should have insured against damage and held that after notice the landlord was liable to the tenant to clear a gutter that caused damage to the tenant.


The writer of the draft in our case in the court of appeal goes on to then quote LJ Scrutton and his concerns over whether the issues brought up arise in tort or in contract and the legal implication left open. He concludes that LJ Scrutton thinks it is tort. A duty to take reasonable care not to cause nuisance.

As for the legal implication left open as to tort or contract the writer of the draft mentions another case that merits a possible answer to that legal implication Gordon v Selico Co Ltd and says that Goulding J expressed the view of whether there was a gap in the instrument (ie the leases) and said it was more natural to fill the gap by implication, ie an implied duty, than by the law of tort. He used a leading authority Liverpool City Council v Irwin in his thinking on the matter. That was a case of large dwellings where cisterns overflowed and vandalism was on the estate but it is a case where the housing act 1961 section 32 came into play and although no express repair obligations fell on the landlord the court decided some could be implied in their absence to make sense of the instrument to keep the common parts in repair and easements in working order. In this case it was seen as an incomplete contract and necessitated an implied obligation rather than many cases of tort. In effect it made the system now workable for good rather than having case after case claiming nuisance in tort so it was a more effective longstanding decision.

26.           It is also necessary as part of this test to show that the use by the defendant of his land for the purpose of accommodating the dangerous operation or installation falls within what Blackburn J in Rylands v Fletcher called the non-natural use of his land.  The use in question must therefore be extraordinary and unusual in contrast to, for example, a domestic water supply or lavatory which are neither.  It is therefore well established that the tenants cannot sue under Rylands v Fletcher for damage caused by defective guttering or leaks in water pipes retained by the landlord in the absence of proving negligence: see Carstairs v Taylor (1871) LR 6 Ex 217; Prosser& Son Ltd v Levy[1955] 1 WLR 1224.  The same principle must apply to the soil pipes in this case. 

27.           Judge Cowell was persuaded that any liability based on the landlord’s retention of the external and upper parts of the building depended upon proof of negligence and notice.  He based his judgment for the tenants in relation to the delay in repairing the soil pipe at 106 on the legal duty described in Cockburn v Smith (supra) and later considered in Duke of Westminster v Guild [1985] 1 QB 688and Gordon and Teixeirav Selico Co Ltd (1986) 18 HLR 219.
28.           In Cockburn v Smith the landlord was sued for damage caused to a tenant’s flat by a leak of rainwater from a defective gutter which was excluded from the demise.  The landlord had been put on notice of the defect but failed to take reasonable steps to repair it.  Bankes LJ (at page 129) said that:
“It cannot now be suggested that there was any agreement express or implied which can accurately be described as an agreement to repair the roof or the guttering; but there is a line of authorities to show that a landlord is under an obligation to take reasonable care that the premises retained in his occupation are not in such a condition as to cause damage to the parts demised to others. In some of these authorities it was not necessary to decide the point expressly, because in the opinion of the Court there was no want of reasonable care; but three of these cases indicate that if it had been necessary to define the duty of the defendant it would have been defined in the terms I have suggested.”
29.           He then referred to Carstairs v. Taylor and Hargroves & Co. v. Hartopp and continued (at page 130):
“Whether this duty arises out of a contract between the parties, or whether it is an instance of the duty imposed by law upon an occupier of premises to take reasonable care that the condition of his premises does not cause damage, I prefer not to decide. Lord Buckmaster speaks of it as a contractual obligation (3), and Greer J. as arising out of contract. There is much to be said for that view, but it is an immaterial question. If the duty is imposed by law, the point on which Greer J. decided in favour of the respondent does not arise, and the appellant's right to damages is clear as soon as it is established that the respondents were guilty of negligence.”
30.           Scrutton LJ (at page 132) thought that liability was tortious and based on a modification of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher to a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that no damage was caused.  This is the principle in operation in cases like Carstairs v. Taylor and in Duke of Westminster v Guild this court confirmed that the landlord’s liability under the principle applied in Cockburn v Smith was based on a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the retained premises were not in such a condition as to cause damage to the tenant.  It left open the question whether the legal basis for the duty lay in contract or in tort but in Gordonv Selico Co Ltd,Goulding J ([1985] 2 EGLR 79) expressed the view (at page 84) that:
“the better characterisation of the alleged duty of the lessor is as an implied term. Where there are gaps in an instrument expressing the reciprocal obligations of landlord and tenant, it is, in my judgment, more natural to fill them by implication, as the House of Lords did in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, than to invoke the law of tort.”
31.           In the Court of Appeal this passage was referred to by Slade LJ without criticism and it seems to me that we should treat this line of authority as establishing that the obligation on the landlord to repair in these cases is based on an implied term.  Ultimately the precise juristic basis of liability may not matter in cases where, as here, the parties have a contractual relationship under the terms of the lease.  Whether the duty imposed on the landlord to take reasonable care of the retained premises arises in tort or contract, the court has still to consider whether the express scheme of repair or insurance imposed by the lease excludes any other form of liability which the law might otherwise impose. The tenants’ appeal on liability in this case depends not only on establishing that a liability on the landlord to keep the retained parts in repair should be implied or imposed over and above the express terms of the two leases but also that the implied obligation to repair should be absolute in nature in the sense that the landlord became liable for the consequences of the disrepair as soon as it occurred regardless of whether he had or should have had notice of the defect.
32.           The second point is not open to the tenants in this court insofar as they base their claim for damages on the line of authority culminating in Gordonv Selico Ltd.  The Court of Appeal has decided in those cases that any liability derived from the position of the landlord as an adjoining occupier is based on negligence and notice and we are bound to follow those decisions.  If an implied obligation to repair regardless of notice is to be established then it has to be contractual and to be based on some other factors beyond the landlord’s control of the external and upper parts of the building in which the demised premises are situated.  And in that alternative context (whatever it may be) it is still necessary to consider Ms Bhaloo’s argument that the implication of any such term is precluded by the scheme of the lease.
32. The writer of the draft says that the second point “that the implied obligation to repair should be absolute in nature in the sense that the landlord became liable for the consequences of the disrepair as soon as it occurred regardless of whether he had or should have had notice of the defect” is not open to the tenant to plead as the writer suggests that the claimants follow the line of authority ofGordon and Teixeira v Selico Co Ltd but as stated before, in this case the fraud was committed by a third party and I cannot see how now saying that the claimant is now not open to arguing the implied obligation of clause 5(22) by the landlord has anything to do with this one authority. As a matter of fact the defendant brought the authority at a later stage on day 2 to the court of appeal and the claimant was given little if any time to argue it. I reiterate that the leases obligations are that of the landlord and tenant or their servants or agents. The landlords third party has little if anything to do with the fact that they the landlord vitiated the insurance. Had it been a case where the insurers had done wrong then we together with the landlord would be suing the insurers the landlords agent. In terms of our relationship to the insurers it has been strictly through the landlord and any contact we have with them has been through the landlord so far as was limited to assess the claim in this case. In the lease it says other than rent all monies will be received by the landlord to make good. The special fact that the insurance reimbursed the claimants directly for some material damage is because the landlord did not repair the material damage on some occasions and the claimants were put to paying to mitigate further consequential losses and to be able to trade without effectively going out of business due to the landlords failure to repair so we were therefore reimbursed.
 
The second point therefore remains in that the landlord was absolutely liable because insurances were in place for liability for damage including business interruption because of any of the insured risks outside of the demise affecting the demised premises. That is quite clear and should not be made out to be something that makes it different from what was pleaded at the court of appeal.

The writer says of the “The Court of Appeal has decided in those cases that any liability derived from the position of the landlord as an adjoining occupier is based on negligence and notice and we are bound to follow those decisions.”
Further with regard to the Gordon and Teixeira v Selico Co Ltd case notice was given and there is a serious failing here to address it and as stated has not been assessed in common law at the court of appeal even on the basis that we may have followed that line of thinking which we did not and said we did not seek to.

“If an implied obligation to repair regardless of notice is to be established then it has to be contractual” we contend that is is contractual in that we were insured for absolute liability under the insured risks we had paid for if damage was to come from sources retained by the landlord such as a neighbours flat but not occupyer as that would suggest a common household for which has been established there was none and no easements either.

Futher Ms Bhaloo has not suggested an alternative she has argued on the grounds of notice and a reasonable opportunity to repair. She has not once argued that the instrument is complete without an implied covenant to not cause the insurance to be vitiated under 5(22) she merely defendended the argument by saying that it may have been deliberately left out by the architect of the lease and that is not a good argument. The landlord breaching the terms of the insurance has left the claimant without compensation for business interuption yet they still paid the bills, rent and business rates as well as were put to taking out loans to sustain there position without being able to trade due to the landlord being unable to compensate them or making any application for cessor of rent. This unduly enriched the landlord whilst they were covered by insurances for which they contractually made the claimants pay towards. There can be no argument that the landlord breached the terms of the insurance as all Judges to date except the court of appeal (who have in the draft judgment failed to state it) have said as fact that they did, therefore an implied covenant to clause 5(22) is necessary to the instrument of the leases to ensure it is not absurd and that in this case and any future case a landlord cannot commit an act of ommission and in doing so vitiate the insurance and make the leaseholder pay for it by further consequential losses.

If it were to be the case every leaseholder in Great Britain should be worried that a landlord can simply break the terms of the insurance of their house and put them through a court case to prove tort with their insurer backing them to save a claim, which I am sure the court of appeal could not be responsible for in law as this would be then a case for.
 
33.           Reference was made in the Advocate’s Statement to the judgment of Carnwath LJ in Earle v Charalambous [2006] EWCA Civ 1090 who, in the context of a claim for damages for breach of a lessor’s covenant to repair the roof of a building containing residential flats, said (at [8] of the addendum) that:
In applying a standard lessor's repairing covenant, the law draws a distinction between disrepair in the demised premises themselves, and disrepair in other parts of the building within the lessor's control. In the latter case the "general rule" applies: that is, the covenant requires the lessor to keep the premises in repair at all times, and he is in breach immediately a defect occurs (British Telecommunications plc v Sun Life plc[1996] Ch 69). In the former case, by contrast, there is no breach until the lessor has had notice of the defect and a reasonable time to carry out the necessary remedial works (ibid; O'Brien v Robinson[1973] AC 912). In BT(at p 79), Nourse LJ accepted that there might be other exceptions to the "general rule", for example if the defect is caused by an occurrence wholly outside the lessor's control.”
33. The writer of the draft of Judgment goes on to mention British Telecommunications plc v Sun Life plc[1996] Ch 69 which is a case about the writing of a lease and the actual meaning in construction of leases of the words ‘to keep in repair’ and so it was judged in that case and now is accepted in law as to be the ‘general rule’, that ‘to keep in repair’ means, the landlords retained premises are to be kept in repair “at all times”.

The writer then mentions as stated ‘by contrast’, an authority that is actually an ‘exception’ to the rule as the writer must know and says it is the ‘standard rule’.  It is the case of O’Brien v Robinson which is a case where the claimants suggested to their landlord after complaining of noise that their bedroom ceiling may fall down due to dancing above. In effect by saying that the ceiling might fall down to the landlord it was regarded as ‘notice’ of the possiblity that the dancing could cause their bedroom ceiling to fall down and established in this excetional case with ‘special facts’ that ‘before a breach of duty can arise notice must be given’. But this ruling has often has been critised as being the exception rather than the standard rule.  A hairline crack on the ceiling was not visible for 3 years to the tenant nor the landlord before the ceiling actually fell down and the landlord pleaded that they had to give notice if the defect was on their own premises and the landlord could not see it to make any investigations or had had a resonable opportuniy to fix it . Therefore notice was based on it being invisible which was never our case if we are to use an exceptional authority as the contrast, that is just unacceptable. The general rule therefore must be in contruction with regard to the insured risks clause 7(2) to keep in repair ‘at all times’ insured risks. This is then an absolute liability as covered with liability insurance for damage that comes from outside of our premises where notice in our case has been given/ and or notice is not necessary as the defects are in the retained parts.

The writer then says quoting LJ Norse that there can be exceptions to the rules like when the occurrence of damage is wholly outside of the landlords control.

34.           But the general rule referred to is one derived from the construction of a landlord’s express covenant to keep the retained premises in repair.  The general rule is that this should be interpreted as imposing on the landlord a duty to keep the retained premises in repair at all times so that liability depends upon disrepair and not upon notice of disrepair.  But the issue here is not how one construes such a covenant but rather whether a covenant to that effect can be implied into these particular leases.
34. The writer wonders if in the case of British Telecommunications plc v Sun Life plc[1996] Ch 69 above which is about ‘construction’ of the lease/instrument, whether or not this construction in that case as an implied covenant can be used in our leases in reality, ‘to keep in repair, at all times’ parts retained by the landlord.

In clause 5(22) of the leases it says as a leaseholders obligation that if we break the terms of the insurance by any act that vitiates the insured risks, we shall forthwith pay the cost of re-building or cover any would be insured risks ourselves as a natural consequence of us voiding the policy which would only be fair and we signed the leases as such to accept those potential events.

It follows that insurances are in place for the development as to amount to an insured repairing covenant of parts of the building not demised to us and that we should in no way affect those parts in becoming un-insured or we would be responsible for that in the contract of the lease clause 5(22).

We conclude that the same implied covenant should apply because of the expressed covenant to keep the rest of the building, the development, in repair “at all times” covered by an insured risk.
35.           Quite apart from the general point relied upon by CHAL about the scheme of the two leases, there are, I think, obvious difficulties about attributing to the parties an intention to impose on the landlord an implied obligation to repair which is stricter in effect than would be imposed by law based on his control of the building.  As already explained, that obligation is based on notice and corresponds in scope to the landlord’s obligation to repair defects in the demised premises themselves which only arises when facts come to his attention which would put a reasonable landlord on inquiry as to whether works of repair are needed: see O’Brien v Robinson [1973] AC 912. 
35. The writer begs the question if the liability is stricter than common law by the implication of a clause then it there is difficulties for the writer to impose an implied clause on those grounds. However the writer has never explored notice given in the draft judgment nor applied a ‘duty’ in common law which the lease does not have due to there being no expressed repairing obligations. So it goes without saying that the lease to any reasonable person, does not cater for the eventuality that the landlord’s scheme of repair could be vitiated by the landlord meaning an implied term would be necessary to give the commercial lease business efficacy or else in the event of disrepair the landlord could repair at any time rendering the premises worthless if a succession of leaks were to occur as was our case. They have a duty by the general rule to comply with the expressed terms of the insurance to keep the premises and retained parts in repair ‘at all times’.

The writer of the draft judgment says, “As already explained, that obligation is based on notice and corresponds in scope to the landlord’s obligation to repair defects in the demised premises themselves which only arises when facts come to his attention which would put a reasonable landlord on inquiry as to whether works of repair are needed: see O’Brien v Robinson [1973] AC 912.” But I think that that is sufficiently dealt with above.

36.           It is noteworthy that in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 the implied contractual obligation imposed on the City Council to repair the common parts which they retained such as the lifts, staircases, rubbish chutes and passages, took the form of an obligation to take reasonable care to keep them in reasonable repair even though they were crucial to the tenant’s enjoyment of the building and their own flats.  Lord Wilberforce (at page 256) said that:
“It remains to define the standard. My Lords, if, as I think, the test of the existence of the term is necessity the standard must surely not exceed what is necessary having regard to the circumstances. To imply an absolute obligation to repair would go beyond what is a necessary legal incident and would indeed be unreasonable. An obligation to take reasonable care to keep in reasonable repair and usability is what fits the requirements of the case. Such a definition involves - and I think rightly - recognition that the tenants themselves have their responsibilities. What it is reasonable to expect of a landlord has a clear relation to what a reasonable set of tenants should do for themselves.”
36. However the writer draws our attention to the point again and in doing so quotes Lord Wilberforce as perhaps qualifying the above with the case of Liverpool City Council v Irwin and concludes with Lord Wilberforce saying about the necessity to have an implied clause as opposed to what an occupier can reasonably do for themselves. In that case the landlord owned a block of flats and did not keep the common parts lifts, staircases, chutes in good order so the contract was incomplete to allow everyday living absent of an implied repair covenant by the landlord to repair the common parts to be liveable for the tenants. Perhaps this case shows necessity for an implied clause as does our case.
37.           At page 269B-D Lord Edmund-Davies said that:
“The next question that arises is: what is the nature and extent of such obligation? In other words, is it absolute or qualified? If the former, any failure to maintain (save of a wholly minimal kind) would involve a breach of the landlord's obligation, and in Hart v. Rogers [1916] 1 K.B. 646 Scrutton J. considered, at p. 650, that such was the view taken by the court in Miller v. Hancock [1893] 2 Q.B. 177. But later decisions, such as Dunster v. Hollis [1918] 2 K.B. 795 and Cockburn v. Smith [1924] 2 K.B. 119, treat the duty only as one of reasonable care, and such is the conclusion I have come to also. To impose an absolute duty upon the landlords in the case of buildings in multiple occupation would, I think, involve such a wide departure from the ordinary law relating to easements that it ought not to be held to exist unless expressly undertaken and should not be implied.”
37. Further the writer quotes Lord Edmund-Davies who ponders on the question of whether that is an absolute duty to repair the common parts or whether it is qualified by special facts as to amount to a breach in the landlords obligations.
He looked at the case of Hart v Rogers (which is no longer an authority) where the landlord did not repair the roof which leaked into the claimant’s premises and this was outside of their control so was seen as an absolute liable case. LJ Scrutton in the Hart v Rogers case looked at another case of Miller v Hancock when deciding the outcome. This was a case where the claimant’s visitor fell down the stairs because they were worn and defective and it was held that there was a duty to keep the staircase/common parts in repair, as the landlord must have known that visitors may attend. However later cases, which the writer quotes, say that there is only a ‘duty’ to take reasonable care. Lord Edmund-Davis conclude that in a building of multiple occupations with easements (meaning of use to all) there can only be a ‘duty’ to take reasonable care.

In our case there was no easements and we were commercial leaseholders for which section 11 does not apply. We happen to have leased shops underneath a multiple occupation development but that is a far cry from being ‘in’ a building of multiple occupation where special facts and enjoyments are applicable as to the residents tenancy agreement. Most commercial premises (as we were here with three stories above us) are underneath flats of some sort or other on every high street and the landlord may be the same for both premises but that does not lump them altogether as each entity has special rights that are contractually based or tenancy based. Therefore neither contract can affect the other. If however the landlord insures as a whole, it must be noted as fact in this case, that each insurance as with our building insurance is seen as being separately insured as if no relationship existed except to make claims through the landlord. It must also be noted that the lease forbids us to take out separate building insurance except through the landlords scheme, which is seen as wholly separate.

38.           It is said that the judge should have held that the tenants’ express obligations under the leases to repair the demised premises were matched by a correlative implied obligation on the part of the landlord to keep in repair the retained parts of the building.  Reference was made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Barrett v Lounova (1982) Ltd [1990] 1 QB 348 where the tenant covenanted to keep the interior of the demised premises in good repair but there were no covenants by either tenant or landlord in relation to the external structure.  The court implied a covenant by the landlord to repair the exterior on the basis that, without it, the tenant would over time find it physically impossible to comply with his own covenant.  I do not think that we get much assistance from this decision.  There is no suggestion that the implied obligation to repair was absolute in nature and the court was not faced (as in this case) with a lease which imposed on the landlord the insurance obligations contained in clause 7(2).  In this case it cannot be said that the tenant is left without remedy in the case of any disrepair of the structure.  That constitutes an insurable risk and the landlord is required under the terms of the leases of 104 and 106 to apply the insurance monies in making good the damage and disrepair. 
38. Starts with “It is said” and this does not make sense, who said it? Actually it was referring to clause 5(22) and Barrett v Lounova was cited to suggest an implied covenant to cluase 5(22). This does not indicate at any stretch of the imagination that another case and their special facts ie Barrett v Lounova required our case to have the exact same correlative implications. The case was used as an authority to show that sometimes an implied obligation is necessary to give business efficacy as was held, in the special facts of the case of Barrett v Lounova, where the leaseholder as with our case had repairing obligations to repair the interior of the premises alone and the landlord as in this case and ours had none to repair the exterior and thus failing any repair of the exterior, which had to fall on someone and that someone was judged to be the landlord, the interior could not be kept in repair. So the same principle is in our case. If the landlord breaches the terms of the insurance and we cannot get repairs done or claim compensation when put out of business by an insured risk, there should be an implied covenant to keep the building insured and not invalidate the insurance or the contract has no business efficacy and therefore needs an implied clause to 5(22) for the landlord to comply correlatively with their expressed covenant to keep the premises insured at all times. This is similar to an implied repairing covenant as in the case of Barrett v Lounova because in the absence of one, a disrepair condition of the premises makes the commercial premises unworkable in contract without insurance being in place for the disrepair/risks.

However after mentioning the above case the writer says;
“There is no suggestion that the implied obligation to repair was absolute in nature and the court was not faced (as in this case) with a lease which imposed on the landlord the insurance obligations contained in clause 7(2).  In this case it cannot be said that the tenant is left without remedy in the case of any disrepair of the structure.  That constitutes an insurable risk and the landlord is required under the terms of the leases of 104 and 106 to apply the insurance monies in making good the damage and disrepair.”
That is absolutely correct and failing to keep the premises in repair by vitiating the insurance means they have broken a contractual obligation!

39.           Of much greater assistance are the decisions of this court in Gordonv Selico (supra) and in Adami v Lincoln Grange Management Ltd [1998] 1 EGLR 58.  In Gordonv Selico the court accepted that the imposition on the tenants of a scheme under which they each contributed to a maintenance account to be used in the repair and maintenance of the structure of a block of flats was sufficient to exclude the implication of any obligation on the part of the landlord to carry out such repairs.  Slade LJ said that:
“Mr Sunnucks has submitted that, having regard to the comprehensive nature of the provisions of the lease relating to the repair and maintenance of Flat C and of the block, Court Mansions, as a whole, this is not a case where the learned judge was justified in implying any covenants relating to these matters. The lease, he pointed out, is in an unusual form, providing as it does for the repair and maintenance of the building by a system of express covenants and trusts. If the defendants are in breach of any of those express provisions relating to repair and maintenance, the proper remedy, in his submission, is by reference to the agreed system and not by reference to suggested implied covenants to which the parties never agreed.
We think this submission is correct and indeed in this court Mr Brock, on behalf of the plaintiffs, has not sought seriously to challenge it. Where a written tenancy agreement relating to a flat, forming part of a larger building in multiple occupation, manifestly does not embody the complete agreement between the parties the court may well be willing to supplement the written document by implying terms placing obligations on one party or the other. Such a case was Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, where the “conditions of tenancy” which tenants were required to sign related only to the obligations on the part of the tenants, not of the lessor council. However, as Lord Wilberforce observed in that case (at p 254), “such obligation should be read into the contract as the nature of the contract itself implicitly requires no more, no less: a test in other words of necessity”. Lord Cross in the same case said (p 258) that the court “must be able to say that the insertion of the term is necessary to give — as it is put — 'business efficacy' to the contract and that if its absence had been pointed out at the time both parties — assuming them to have been reasonable men — would have agreed without hesitation to its insertion”. The repair and maintenance scheme provided by this lease is a very cumbersome one and we agree with the learned judge that, even if the lessors and their agents were duly to carry out their obligations, the scheme might not always suffice to give the lessees necessary and timely protection — for example, as he pointed out, through the continued inability or refusal of other lessees to pay their proper contribution. Nevertheless, on a reading of the lease, we feel little doubt that it was intended, by all parties, to provide a comprehensive code in regard to repair and maintenance of the block. We are by no means satisfied that the implication of any further terms in this respect is necessary to give the lease business efficacy, or that the lessor, assuming it to have been a reasonable person, would have “agreed without hesitation” to the insertion of the suggested implied additional terms relating to the repair and maintenance of the block.”
39. Again the writer refers to repairing obligations (that were not pleaded) in referring to the case of Adami v Lincoln Grange Management Ltd and Gordon v Selico, where there is as is with our case a comprehensive insurance scheme to deal with repairs.
The writer quotes LJ Slade (many of the LJ’s quotes are from LJ’s at enterprise chambers of the defendants counsel it should be noted) as referring to Mr Sunnucks saying,  “If the defendants are in breach of any of those express provisions relating to repair and maintenance, the proper remedy, in his submission, is by reference to the agreed system and not by reference to suggested implied covenants to which the parties never agreed.” And we utterly agree with LJ Slade’ sentiment we are not looking to seek an implied covenant to repair we are seeking an implied covenant with regard to the insurance repairing scheme being kept in place at all times. Further we agreed with Justice Clarke at the original hearing when he said that we were to match disrepair with the insured risk and take the claim to the county court to assess. That is what we have done throughout and yet are constantly being put to justifying common law repairing obligations instead of contract is what has bedevilled this case throughout. Every single Particular of the Claim and further in great detail in the claimants submissions on liability states that the landlord failed to keep the insurance in place and/or make claims. Even the writer digresses to another allegation of repair implications as if the requested implied covenant of clause 5(22) and its corrective application did not make any appearance in the proceedings at the appeal whatsoever. Ms Flores was clear she had two points in law which were an implied covenant should applied and that should make the case absolute in liability from the moment of damage from the retained parts as covered by the insurances under the POL scheme. It would seem by a clever use of wording and many delay tactics throughout this 5-year case we have departed from the real issues of liability, that we all were insured for it.

Back to LJ Slade he went on to say;
Where a written tenancy agreement relating to a flat, forming part of a larger building in multiple occupation, manifestly does not embody the complete agreement between the parties the court may well be willing to supplement the written document by implying terms placing obligations on one party or the other. Such a case was Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, where the “conditions of tenancy” which tenants were required to sign related only to the obligations on the part of the tenants, not of the lessor council.”

However Lord Wilberforce then said; “such obligation should be read into the contract as the nature of the contract itself implicitly requires no more, no less: a test in other words of necessity”

And Lord Cross Chelsea of which Ms Flores also cited in the court of appeal said
that the court; “must be able to say that the insertion of the term is necessary to give — as it is put — 'business efficacy' to the contract and that if its absence had been pointed out at the time both parties — assuming them to have been reasonable men — would have agreed without hesitation to its insertion”.

The two cases quoted have special facts but the sentiment of the Lords above remain the same so as to judge those individual cases on their special facts.

The facts therefore in the case of Gordon v Selico are that a third party covered up dry rot before the leaseholders took on the lease. There could be no implied term for fraud of the third party that covered the contract between the two parties.

In the case of Adami v Lincoln Grange Management Ltd this was a subsidence case where new management Grange took over a long lease of the claimant and put in a provision for subsidence. The original lease was preferred and referred to throughout the trail by the claimant, who as Ms Flores said in court quoting the case seemed like a cantankerous man who wanted the lease to remain the same and the insurance scheme with it but by adopting the scheme by payment he had even though he objected to it inadvertently gone along with it. He decided to use insurance monies laid out when subsidence occurred to fix this problem himself but then made a claim for extras. It was decided that no implied term in either lease should apply as the scheme for which he went along with provided for subsidence and all the other residents were happy to go along with the scheme. The case was dismissed.

In each case the request for an implied covenant to repair does not merit one as the insurance provides remedy but in our case what should be the case with the insurance has been affected by the actions of the landlord to make us un-insured.

It is therefore essential that an implied covenant to 5(22) protects our position for all the above reasons cited by the Lords above and as is seen as authority in the once final court the House of Lords.

If this draft does not address that then the claimants are applying now in time to take the case to the Supreme Court. They should not be put to doing this is the light of comments to this draft. They also seek permission to address judicial influences in this case as stated they would do if the issues are not addressed.

In the Adami case J Vinelott said at the end of judgment “More generally, I can see no ground for importing any obligation on the part of the lessor to carry out works of repair to the block from causes which are not covered by an insurance policy effected pursuant to the terms of the lease (modified in practice by the substitution of a block policy and its extension to cover damage by subsidence), in particular damage which might result from the gradual deterioration of the structure during the term of the lease. In Duke of Westminster v Guild [1985] QB 688, Slade LJ, at p697, approved a passage in Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant 28th ed (1978) vol I, para 1/1465 p618 in these terms:
In general, there is no implied covenant by the lessor of an unfurnished house or flat, or of land, that it is or shall be reasonably fit for habitation, occupation or cultivation, or for any other purpose for which it is let. No covenant is implied that the lessor will do any repairs whatever …”

In our case it is an absolute requirement to keep the demised premises and the development in repair and most especially I might add fit for human habitation, with fire certificates (which there were none) and with business efficacy with regard to the structure according to the terms of the insurance, forming an integral and expressed covenant of the landlord to keep the premises insured and in repair at all times, in accordance with the lease.

40.           Similarly in Adamithe tenants of various blocks of flats were required under their leases to repair the demised premises and to maintain an insurance policy against risks to be specified by the landlord.  The landlord maintained a block policy for the development which included the risk of subsidence.  When this occurred the issue arose as to whether the landlord was required to do more than to lay out the insurance monies to repair the damage caused by the insured risk.
41.           The court rejected the submission that an obligation by the landlord to repair the structure of the building should be implied into the lease.  Vinelott J said that:
“In my judgment, the contention that it was an implied term of the 1990 lease that the lessor would be liable to make good any damage to the structure of the block whatever might be the cause of the damage, is simply untenable. The lease contains an elaborate scheme under which exceptional damage to the structure is to be covered by insurance effected in the joint names of the lessor and the lessee and maintained at the expense of the lessee; similar obligations are to be imposed upon the lessee of every other maisonette or flat in the block. The lessor is given power to enlarge the scope of the policy beyond fire and damage by aircraft, so as to enable the insurance to be extended at the expense of the lessee if it becomes apparent that damage to the structure may result from other causes. After 1971 damage by subsidence following a succession of dry summers became a common experience and it was, no doubt, for that reason that the lessor (who by this time had effected insurance in its own name under a block insurance policy with the consent or acquiescence of the lessees) extended the insurance to cover subsidence. In so far as damage to the structure results from an insured risk, there is simply no ground for importing any implied obligation to do more than lay out any insurance moneys coming into the hands of the lessor, in making good that damage (any deficiency in the insurance moneys being made good by the lessees).
More generally, I can see no ground for importing any obligation on the part of the lessor to carry out works of repair to the block from causes which are not covered by an insurance policy effected pursuant to the terms of the lease (modified in practice by the substitution of a block policy and its extension to cover damage by subsidence), in particular damage which might result from the gradual deterioration of the structure during the term of the lease. In Duke of Westminster v Guild [1985] QB 688, Slade LJ, at p697, approved a passage in Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant 28th ed (1978) vol I, para 1/1465 p618 in these terms:
In general, there is no implied covenant by the lessor of an unfurnishedhouse or flat, or of land, that it is or shall be reasonably fit for habitation, occupation or cultivation, or for any other purpose for which it is let. No covenant is implied that the lessor will do any repairs whatever …
In the context of a lease for a term of some 260 years at a nominal rent granted by a corporate lessor originally incorporated as a management company, in which shares are held by the lessees of all the maisonettes and flats comprised in the development and which contains detailed provisions governing the repair of the individual maisonettes and flats, the levying of a service charge to meet the costs of the maintenance of the community land and for insurance to be effected and maintained at the expense of the lessees to cover damage from any catastrophe affecting a block as a whole so far as reasonably foreseeable, it is, in my judgment, impossible to presume an intention that the cost of maintaining the structure of each block should fall on the lessor. No such implication can be founded on the obligations on the part of the lessee under clause 9(b)(iv) to permit the lessor to view the property and to effect work necessary for upholding the building (see Sleafer v Lambeth Borough Council[1960] 1 QB 43) and the same principle must apply also to the covenant by the lessee in clause 9(b)(ix) to co-operate with the lessor and other lessees in carrying out repairs to the block.
Mr Marshall relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Barrett v Lounova (1982) Ltd [1990] 1 QB 348.
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Barrett v Lounova is, of course, binding on this court. However, in my judgment, it must be taken as decided upon the special facts of that case and no principle can be discerned which requires the implication of an obligation on the part of the lessor to keep the structure of the block in good repair. I would dismiss the appeal.”
42.           I take the same view in relation to the leases of 104 and 106.  Although there is no express repairing covenant imposed on the landlord, the repair of the structure of the building is catered for through the provisions of clause 7(2).  In the face of these provisions there is no reason based on necessity or business efficacy to alter the balance of the scheme by imposing an implied covenant to repair on the landlord, let alone one under which his liability to repair is made absolute.  If one applies the modern approach to the implication of terms as a process of construction (see AG of Belize v Belize Telecom [2009] 1 WLR 1988) to do so would be to seek to improve the contract from the point of view of the tenant rather than to give it the meaning and effect which both parties must have intended given the terms and structure of their contract.  The reasonable man looking at the matter with all the relevant background information would not in my view assume that the only meaning which could reasonably be given to the contract was that CHAL should be responsible for any defects in the repair of the retained parts irrespective of any negligence on its part.
42. The writer take the same view about an implied repairing covenant for which none was asked for. Yet the writer does not deal with the implied covenant request to clause 5(22) to keep the development and the demise insured at all times.

Somewhat ironically the writer goes on to say; “Although there is no express repairing covenant imposed on the landlord, the repair of the structure of the building is catered for through the provisions of clause 7(2).  In the face of these provisions there is no reason based on necessity or business efficacy to alter the balance of the scheme by imposing an implied covenant to repair on the landlord, let alone one under which his liability to repair is made absolute.”

The writer quotes the case of Belize v Belize which is about a companies articles of association, (so a construction case of what is meant by the words in a particular contract), that by way of these articles of the company let two people of little or no consequence to the company, in charge, if others resigned, it was basically seen as absurd when an actual situation arose so the court decided that its intervention to alter the instrument/contract/articles was necessary as it had obviously been left out in error by the architect of the contact who did not think of an eventuality that actually did occur. The reasonable men argument was used to give the instrument the correct intention as would have been be done if both parties had thought of that situation and those special facts at the time.

The writer in our case goes on to say;

“The reasonable man looking at the matter with all the relevant background information would not in my view assume that the only meaning which could reasonably be given to the contract was that CHA should be responsible for any defects in the repair of the retained parts irrespective of any negligence on its part.”

But that is not what we contend we simply are all insured and the landlord is responsible to make claims to have those parts repaired at all times, POL covers business interuption when the damage is from outside and can be claimed for.

Now interestly, this is the only mention throughout the case of potential negligence on the landlords part. What does that sentence mean? What is the writer referring to?

It is our case and has been agreed by the trial judge that the insurers said the landlord committed an act of omission which had the direct consequence of us being stopped from claiming on the POL and that the landlord failed to claim on cessor or rent for times when the premises as the claimants contend were either partially or wholly unfit as set out in the schedule of loss.

The writer suggests and has used much law above to do so that no implied repairing covenant should be in place but that has never been pleaded.

Is the writer going to address what has been pleaded as an implied covenant in the clause 5(22) of the leases; that insurance monies not received by the landlord due to an act of omission by the leaseholder, should too be a correlative obligation and an implied covenant as was pleaded? As Lord Cross of Chelsea said that the court; “must be able to say that the insertion of the term is necessary to give — as it is put — 'business efficacy' to the contract and that if its absence had been pointed out at the time both parties — assuming them to have been reasonable men — would have agreed without hesitation to its insertion”. And to the modern day case of Belize v Belize which is then cited by the writer as giving advantage to the claimant by an implied term to repair than with respect is not what was pleaded but since the case has been cited it is important to say that without the implied term the contract would and did become unworkable with the landlord claiming rent at times of unfitness and by their own default making the claimants un-insured under the POL scheme in place under two insurers and the structure indisrepair under three insurers and contiuing to leave the claimants in a position of indifference whilst lying to them that they were chasing POL when they had already been told they breached the policy.
I therefore do not think that Belize v Belize would unfairly improve the contract it would be utterly fair and correlative in obligation not to breach the insurance.

43.           For much the same reasons, the existence of what the parties obviously intended should be a comprehensive scheme for the repair of both the demised and the retained parts of the building is sufficient to exclude from their legal relationship any liability at common law in tort which the landlord might otherwise be subject to in relation to its retained premises.
43. We very much agree that the existence of what the parties obviously intended should be a comprehensive scheme for the repair of both the demised and the retained parts of the building is sufficient to exclude from their legal relationship any liability at common law in tort which the landlord might otherwise be subject to in relation to its retained premises.

44.           It follows from this that the judge was wrong in my view to have held that CHAL even came under a duty to repair the retained parts including the stack pipes and the pavement lights and therefore to award the tenants damages of £100 for the breach which he found to be proved.  In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider the landlord’s alternative argument in relation to the pavement lights that they were covered by the principle of caveat lessee.  The issue of quantum does not therefore arise but I observe that although the judge is criticised for his award of a nominal £100 for loss of profit in the three week period in April 2005, the independent joint expert (Mr Hall) reported that there was no evidence that, but for the delay in repairing the leak, the tenants’ business would have earned income in the relevant period.
44. The writer says here due to the above comments in 43. that in these circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider the landlord’s alternative argument in relation to the pavement lights that they were covered by the principle of caveat lessee.

That is a good decision as we have said all along that the priciple of caveat lessee had no application in a case where the defects were in the retained parts and covered by the insured risks.

The writer says also that since there was no ‘duty’ the finding of negligence and the award of £100 for three weeks, more than should have been for the nine foot of shit down the walls, cannot now be held and the defendants therefore succeed in their counter claim in this court of appeal to quash the £100 compensation awarded for those three weeks.

The writer also adds in isolation that the judge found that no bookings had taken place in that time and simply takes an imbalanced view despite the claimants contending in their skeleton that the assessment of damages at £100 is extraordinary on the judge’s own findings of fact (not least that at one point the smell was really bad in 106-108”and the recurrence of repeated ingress of water must have been “quite enough to daunt the bravest of spirits”). In his judgment on quantum,the judge approached the assessment at a simple matter of looking at the lost
income for bookings during the exact three-week period when he found that
the premises could not be used for display/hire. Such approach takes no
sensible account of the impact on the tenants’ ability to attract customers, to
display their art or hire the exhibition area, of the fact that the premises
recurrently had a foul or damp smell and/or were damp as a result of ingress of
water, foul water or sewage.

Further, on the judge’s own findings, the tenants had had to make repeated
claims on the insurance policy.In relation to each claim there had been a
£100 excess. That excess was a loss which they suffered by reason of the
landlord’s default and for which they were awarded no damages.

The writer in so far as acknowledging in common law that the defendants have no expressed repair duty or any duty to take reasonable care or have not caused an actionable nuisance or have not been negligent, so as to retrieve in the court of appeal in this judgment the award of £100, then at the very least it should be acknowledged that the excesses paid for by the claimants of £100 per incident were not the excess of the claimants as contended as the damage came from the retained parts so those excesses were the landlords. It would be odd if not only the claimants suffered the damage from the retained parts but had to pay for the suffering at £100 of each occurrence and this should be stated as such in relation to the laws on who pays excesses.

Cesser of rent
45.           This point is now only relevant to the amount of arrears of rent for which the tenants are liable.  Absent any liability on the part of CHAL for substantial damages for loss of profits, there were outstanding arrears at the time when the landlord re-entered in October 2008 and both leases were therefore validly forfeited on that date.  It follows that CHAL is entitled to possession as ordered by the judge and to mesne profits in the sums he awarded.

45. As contended no rent was owed at the time of re-entry. If it followed that 5(22) clause was to be implied for the landlord to observe the same and not vitiate the insurances then not only was rent not owed but £39,000 in rent was paid and unduly enriched the landlord.

46.           The cesser of rent clause is only triggered when the demised premises “or any part thereof” are destroyed or damaged so as to be “unfit for occupation or use”.  Although the judge is criticised in the grounds of appeal for concentrating on whether the demised premises as a whole were ever unfit for occupation or use, this was because a case based on partial unfitness was never pursued at the trial.  The tenants’ case was that the demised premises had become wholly unfit for use and their damages claim was based on that factual premise.  Since both experts were agreed that this was not the case, it was obviously open to the judge to reject the contention that clause 6(3) had come into operation.  There is nothing in this ground of appeal. 
46. The writer says “this was because a case based on partial unfitness was never pursued at the trial.” But if the writer checks the schedule of loss partial unfitness was pleaded as well as the premises being at times wholly unfit. And if it follows that the scheme of insurance is to be upheld then the partial unfitness is also covered by the terms of the insurance as pleaded.

The writer says “Since both experts were agreed that this was not the case, it was obviously open to the judge to reject the contention that clause 6(3) had come into operation.” It is not clear as to which two experts the writer is referring to and the fact that their was a third and forth expert. This needs to be made clear as we contend that our own expert surveyor said the place was unfit. The expert froensic accountant assessed the damages as such and the joint surveyor said that the places were unfit for ocupation. So this is not at all acurate.

Costs
47.           The judge ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the action on an indemnity basis including the reserved costs of the hearing before Christopher Clarke J. and various pre-trial interlocutory hearings before Judge Cowell himself.  Two points are taken in the amended grounds of appeal.  It is said that the case did not justify the exercise of the exceptional power to award indemnity costs particularly in relation to the period before CHAL made various offers to settle.  The tenants also say that they should not be required to pay the reserved costs of all the interlocutory applications given that in a number of them they were successful. 
47. The writer says “It is said that the case did not justify the exercise of the exceptional power to award indemnity costs particularly in relation to the period before CHA made various offers to settle.” Firstly as Ms Flores said in court improper inducement to fix a £5,000 repair or have your rent doubled is not an offer to settle.  The writer continues, “The tenants also say that they should not be required to pay the reserved costs of all the interlocutory applications given that in a number of them they were successful.”

The writer says the indemnity costs were from the start of the £25,000 offer made the day before proceedings commenced. That we contend was an insulting offer and was based solely on the insurers not wanting to pay £100,000 in lawyers fees at the trial and takes no consideration of the fact that the claimants had by then in the two years leading up to trail had to pay out £50,000 in legal costs on top of the already outstanding claim. Matt Kelly QC who was at the mediation said it was a cheap shot of saving the costs of the trial and agreed to settle at that point at £450,000 for which was rejected by the defendants and their insured who were paying for the proceedings. Incidentally this cheap shot cost the claimants £8,000 in counsel and solicitors fees and further added to their costs how then does £25,000 cover this. It is not by a long shot reasonable and should not be seen as such to give additional indemnity costs from the point of this offer, which for the record is only not stated as starting from this point. Where this evidence came from is unknown and should be made clear.
The claim is for in the region of £600,000 and is backed by expert evidence and qualified by years of disrepair when the claimants could command as much as £800 for an evenings hire and did and also could hire the place for £5,000 a month at a discount rate and did too as Ms Flores said in the court of appeal. To quote big figures as if it were out of the ordinary and to use that as an excuse for indemnity costs is to patronise the ability and scope of the claimants business. Further the claim for £1.9 million is for exceptional damages in relation to the work of the social enterprise New NAYPIC Youth Parliament and their loss of opportunity especially at the present time, which can only serve to raise the claim if this continues.

48.           In ordering the appellants to pay the costs on an indemnity basis the judge took into account a number of factors.  The claim had at one stage been put as high as £2m but in the end resulted in an award of £100.  The precise nature of the claim was never made clear in the pleadings and the defendants incurred expense in, as the judge put it, fighting in the dark.  As to the starting point for indemnity costs, the judge had to consider whether they should commence from the date of a Part 36 offer on 16thJuly 2009 when CHAL offered to pay to the appellants £25,000 and their costs or from the start of the proceedings.  In relation to that, the judge took into account the fact that in 2007 the landlord had offered to continue the lease of 104 at the same rent for another five years.  Although not a Part 36 offer, this was influential in persuading the judge to order indemnity costs from the start.
48. The writer says, “The reality of the claim in this case is that it was always exaggerated.” Which suggests the writer agrees with the defendants when they suggest this but it has to be taken in the context that the word exaggerated is the only term of the insurance that can void it on our part. This word is used deliberately to implicate us as having done something wrong in terms of the claim. It is false and unfounded. The writer needs to qualify not just by using the figure of 2 million to come to an exaggerated conclusion but favts too as the claimants have only ever been able to claim for what they have lost which is in that region when looking at the special facts of the social enterprise. Ms Flores whilt working for NAYPIC raised half a million pounds from the age of 17 to 21 years old and that this helped develop a national structure for NAYPIC, she a professional fundraiser. This evidence proves that she could and was, doing more than that long after her employment to ensure the organisation became independent and to create an independent youthg economy. Essestially those are special facts and could be seen as remote if judged to be too remote however Ms Flores contends that the breaches of the landlord effectively ruined her chances of doing business in this venture for which the shops had been set up to achieve.
49.           The appellants are right, of course, to submit that the judge’s power under CPR 44.4(3) to award costs on the indemnity basis is exceptional in the sense that the circumstances relied on to justify the order must take the case out of the norm.  But it is not necessary to show some kind of misconduct on the part of the paying party and unreasonable conduct on the part of the tenants, coupled with their refusal of reasonable offers to settle, can in my view engage the court’s power and make the exercise of it proportionate.  The reality of the claim in this case is that it was always exaggerated.  Although the incidents of water and sewage leaking into the tenants’ premises were undoubtedly distressing and inconvenient, they never justified a claim for damages in excess of £2m and were, for the reasons I have given, in fact legally unfounded.  Mere failure in the action is not enough to justify an award of costs on the indemnity basis but here the inflated nature of the damages claim was matched by a failure to limit the basis of the claim both factually and legally so that the judge was required, as he put it, to conduct a kind of inquiry instead of trying a case based on defined issues.  Although some allowance has to be made for the fact that the tenants acted in person, that does not justify a complete disregard of procedural rules or the making of unfounded and exaggerated claims.
49. The writer says that the claim was for the reasons of lack duty or want reasonable care of repairing obligations legally unfounded, that as may well be in the legal case for implied repairing obligations but it is not the case for the landlord voiding the insurance which was the case pleaded. It therefore stands that applying indemnity cost for a valid case cannot apply. It says in law in CPR indemnity costs 44.4.3 indemnity costs are rare and not to be used as a tool with regards to mediation. This landlord has never once at any juncture offer to seriously mediate and was asked many, many times to do so starting with Alan Harris and ending with Veale Wansborough and Matt Kelly QC. They have simply used legal might to try to crush us out of the claim hence why it is so high now and rising every day it goes on. We would never even at this juncture turn down a serious offer of mediation reflecting our real costs and taking even a fraction of potential losses to date. No offer has been made to do this only tactics to save costs have been used. You have to understand from the beginning none of them wanted to pay because of their dispute with each other. We will not spend the rest of our lives paying for their act of omission and if we are put to doing so that is simply injustice and there really is no law that does not address at the very least the real issue.

The writer goes on to enhance the line that the claimants did not make the case clear. This is legal poppycock and a poor excuse for indemnity costs.

50.           I therefore consider that it was within the legitimate ambit of the judge’s discretion for him to make an award of indemnity costs in this case and to do so from the start of the proceedings.  The only remaining question is whether the order should have included the reserved costs.
51.           It is, of course, true that the appellants were successful before both Wilkie J. and Christopher Clarke J. in being restored to the premises and resisted a subsequent attempt to vary those orders.  But the judges who decided those applications reserved the costs to the trial so that the ultimate burden of the costs would be decided having regard to the outcome in the action.  Had it been appropriate for the tenants to receive the costs of the applications regardless of that, an order would have been made in their favour at the time.  As things have turned out, the landlord’s re-entry into the premises was lawful and the appellants had no right to remain in possession thereafter.  In these circumstances it was within the trial judge’s discretion to direct that the costs of those applications should follow the event.
Conclusion
52.           For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal and allow the Respondent’s cross appeal against paragraph 2 of the judge’s order.
Lady Justice Black:
53.           I agree.
Lord Justice Mummery :
54.           I also agree.







Propaganda Wars

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I personally do not like Ben and Kenny's ice-scream, unlike sub-what sand-witches, it's more the real

One must see that in line of duty we are asked to question all the time

Especially in propaganda wars, where what seems so obvious, is actually not the crime

Many years ago I was told a sorry tale of psychiatric wards and high society abusers who had access to these jails

So when the media exploded and someone in immediate power was on plate tectonic footing, it seemed to me, they orchestrated the desired effect quickly, to avoid a prolonged public looking

These clever media spins, the victim exposure so all of them win, with mistaken identity a repeated play that did the job anyway

Where money changes hands and actors play out plans, to instill fear, that's clear and collect information, you hear, doing their job for them, my dear

I sued the police force for assault and battery once and won, as even the top brass can get done, in this here England's fair and safe land, make no mistake there is nothing to run from

So while they run with the story, don't trust anyone might seem boring but wait till we have the power and you will see your hour...

Don't go talking to 'them' unless you trust 'them' that say they were abused are also telling the truth as they might be the Devils brood...


Watching me, Watching you!!

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"Just hit 25,000 International Viewers" g+ 98,577 

"Hall of Fame" g + 91,971

"So how’s it going in Europe" g+ 33,595

What does g+ this mean and it changes every week?


Time Line to being Outcast...

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Before & After... We decorated to corporate artistic style beautiful total refurbishment with 9ct gold leaf, £5,000 wood floor, flower newal post, glass bar, Haddon stone fountain etc

We had stack pipes from outside our premises bursting into the space, flooding from outside the space, and no air holes from the beginning breaching building regulations, illegal to trade from day 1.

Oct 2008 - Owner of two galleries - Paid rent for 3 months in advance - Trespassed - Galleries Stolen

Nov 2008 - I re-enter my stolen property and all my goods with a professional locksmith - Proof of payment was shown to landlord - yet Trespassed again - Galleries stolen again

Nov 2008 - Went to High Court - Showed proof of payment - I Took back both shops

Dec 2008 - High Court Hearing of both landlord & I - I won and held the shops - Payment established

Jan 2009 - High Court order me to produce a claim that the landlord failed to make insurance claims when the shops were flooded and breached building regulations so were illegal to trade from, yet still they wanted rent!!

July 2010 - County Court Trial 10 days Judge fails to allow me to give evidence, does not read claim

Sept 2010 - Judge gives pro-landlord Judgment and confiscates both my galleries - First Corruption

Sept 2010 - I prove Judge did not read my case and he admits it - He then gives a second Judgment

Sept 2010 - He still is pro landlord but has now cleaned up his mess and still confiscates both shops

Sept 2010 - I apply for permission to appeal - The Judge refuses - He says if I get the transcripts yes

Sept 2010 - The Judge then does cost hearing and fixes laws to take shops & apply £500,000 costs

Sept 2010 - I apply for the transcripts in order to appeal - No transcripts are produced by Oct 2011

Nov 2011 - The Civil Appeals Office has a brain wave and asks for the landlords solicitors notes

Dec 2011 - The Permission to Appeal Judge reads her notes and refuses permission to Appeal second corruption

Jan 2012 - I ask for an oral hearing as it is my right to -

May 2012 - At oral hearing Judge says I still have a case! - Lots of press are there & I get interviewed and photographed outside but no story appears.

May 2012 - Judge says I have to have legal representation, I get proof he has asked his friend to do it, third corruption

Dec 2012 - I approach another lawyer to the courts dismay - The lawyer wins - but leaves bits out. Lots of Press there and I get interviewed by 3 top journalists but no story appears.

Dec 2012 -  I ask that I can put bits back in, as have only heard pleading today and the Judge says yes

April 2013 - I put it back in the case that I had asked for the structure to be repaired as it was illegal

April 2013 - I showed proof I asked for the structure to be repaired as it was insured but no reply

May 2013 - Appeal hearing day changed to the next day, the day before the two day appeal no notice 

May 2013 - I ask to add in my points of asking for repair but despite proof in emails this is denied so fourth corruption

May 2013 - I present case, I show proof I am insured in my lease/contract and claims weren't made

May 2013 - The landlord presents their case saying they have no repairing obligations (not my case). Instead of me replying to this, as is my right, day two is abruptly cut short by lunch, mid me speaking when the Judges without any warning stood up and walked out! Press there but no press appears.

May 2013 -Despite landlords obligation to make insurance claims, Judge say no obligation to 'repair'

May 2013 - I ask to adjourn Judgement - I have not pleaded the landlord to 'repair' but to make claims

May 2013 - Judgment landlord had 'no repairing obligations' in the lease - Fifth Court Corruption. Press inside and outside but no story.

May 2013 - Having asked for implied obligation' for landlord not to breach insurance by saving on not making claims, notwithstanding I was insured anyway in lease/contract, they made it up that I had asked for a repairing implied obligation - I have never pleaded this at all and would never as neither of us repair - We are both insured with joint insurance, where they make the claims and I tell them if repairs needed

June 2013 - I apply to Supreme Court - Follow the rules - Court has 28 days to reply - No reply

Nov 2013 - I apply to European Court of Human Rights keeping six months since last judgment rule

Dec 2013 - Reply from ECHR application correct & get barcode stickers from them for future letters

Dec 2013 - ECHR's only ask me to resign the application as they think signature is photocopied

Feb 7 2014 - I get an 8 months late reply from Supreme Court (so I now have till Aug 2014 to apply to ECHR with the 6 months rule and I might have to reapply with a lawyer at this rate within time, if they throw me out or just don't reply like all the courts thus far, its so corrupt to litigants in person) that permission to appeal be refused because the application does not raise an arguable point in law. But the law is BT v Sun Life and they know it..

Feb 10 2014 - ECHR say they got my resigned application & need the Supreme Court Judgment now

Feb 10 2014 - I already had sent the Supreme Court Judgment in post on the same day to the ECHR

Feb 17 2014 - Just to be on safe side I send another letter to the ECHR's asking if they need anything

Mar 6 2014 - Phoned ECHR and told that my case was not important so couldn't speak to registrar. She also says that a decision was made on the 7th Feb and I would get it soon.

Mar 6 2014 - I send supplementary medical proof of stress but say I am not a victim, I'm a survivor

Today I am left with no reply and the last letter that says if all the relevant doc's are not sent by 4th April 2014 the file will be destroyed... but all they asked me for is the Judgment from Supreme Court

I look forward to some joy soon in this case although I feel like an outcast.. Perhaps there is only now divinity... Happy Mothers Day XX

The shop last week, it's across the road from me, it is now empty but has been badly trashed rent free!



ABC in applications to ECHR

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Supplementary table to the statement of facts II 

1.     On the month of June 2000 and the month of April 2004 Mary Josofar Valdivieso Fortuno Flores (further referred to here as MJVFF) took on the two leases of two commercial properties at 104 & 106-108 Cromer Street, London WC1H 8BZ. Both were art galleries and events spaces. Put shortly MJVFF was out of Business on at lease a dozen occasions from 2004-2008 because of defects in the building not in her control and covered by building insurance repairing scheme, held jointly by MJVFF and the landlord Community Housing Association LTD.   
How the convention was breached
1.    Article 1 Protection of property.


2.     On the month of October 2008 the landlord trespassed 104 & 106-108 Cromer Street premises due to an outstanding liability claim on the insurance, for which they backed by our joint insurers, hoped to avoid. Because they had failed to make claims so the insurers would not pay and neither party wanted to pay so they attacked us.
How the convention was breached
2.    Article 1 Protection of property.

3.     MJVFF took an injunction on both premises and on an order from the High Court the case proceeded to the County Court for a ten days trial held in July 2010.
             How the convention was breached
        3.  N/A

4.     The lead up to the trial was unfair because the Judge responded only to the landlords solicitors for disclosure, there was an inequality of arms, the particular of claims were rejected by the judge and then accepted wasting thousands of pounds and there was no speed in getting to court even though the High Court had ordered it to be speedy. The judge also allowed more expense for us by entertaining a section 25 notice when it was clear that the outcome could only be decided upon completion of the trial. All issues in detail of the unfair lead up to the trial are placed in the appendix sent to ECHR as the facts for permission to appeal.
How the convention was breached
       4.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

5. The trial was unfairly heard and MJVFF was disallowed to put her case orally where as the landlord had 4 days with MJVFF in the witness box. This was a mismanagement of the trial time and allowed no more time for MJVFF to plead her case so after waiting for two years her case was never heard. In fact MJVFF was asked by the Judge to put her case in an email at that the end of the trial.
              How the convention was breached
       5.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

6.  Both parties were asked instead of a furtherhearing at the end of the incomplete trial to put written ‘submissions on liability’ to the County Court. The allocated time for this was unfair with an advantage to the landlord.
            How the convention was breached
Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

7. Judgment was given which was based only on the landlord’s case and this was glaringly obvious. MJVFF put in an application to the courts with evidence from her notes of the first judgment that the judge had firstly, not heard her case orally and secondly had not read her ‘submissions on liability’. Her notes proved her case so well that the judge admitted he had not read her case either. He decided to read the ‘submissions on liability’ 92 pages and 245 paragraphs, with 350 exhibits referred to, the next day and to do another judgment he following day. We are suggesting he did this to cover himself for his failure to conduct a fair trial.
            How the convention was breached
       7.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

8. The second judgment was equally unfair using just one law to cover over a dozen issues and permission for appeal was refused. Again all the detailed appendixes of this have been sent to the ECHR.
                    How the convention was breached
       8.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

9. MJVFF sought permission to appeal on liability before the costs hearing but the same judge told her that she would need to obtain the transcripts of the two judgments before she could get permission. The costs hearing should not have been allowed to go ahead whilst this process had not yet taken place as the costs hearing was dependent on liability being established. Meanwhile she applied for the transcripts to the appellant court. All details of this are also in the appendix’s sent to the ECHR. The cost hearing unlawfully went ahead.
            How the convention was breached
       9.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

10. The transcripts took two years to be produced by the civil appeals office. Without them permission to appeal could not be processed. MJVFF constantly requested them.
            How the convention was breached
       10.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

11. In the end the civil appeals office took an illegal step in process of asking for the solicitor’s unapproved notes of the other side. I had to challenge this by going through her notes and pointing out that they were inaccurate and also saying that this could have been done two years earlier with my notes which I sent in for approval to the judge but there was no reply. I had asked for her notes under the CPR before and they were not given over I was simply ignored by the courts. Permission to appeal was not given based on the solicitor’s notes! MJVFF then applied for an oral hearing.
              How the convention was breached
       11.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

12. On May 10th 2012 the Judge ordered that the hearing of the renewed application for permission to appeal be brought back before him but with the assistance of a pro-bono lawyer. The clerk took a loud telephone call during the hearing whilst MJVFF was giving her legal plea for permission to appeal. Permission to appeal should not have been dependent on a lawyer being present as MJVFF’s arguments were very concise and clear.
            How the convention was breached
       12.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

13. This delayed the case for a further 7 months and the lawyer reformulated the grounds of appeal.
How the convention was breached
       13.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

14. MJVFF’s case was now not very much in her control and she suspected behind the scenes deals going on as might be for a tactical game to conclude the case but perhaps with not all points covered. In short she felt her case was being hacked to pieces. She has evidence it was and has presented it to the Supreme Court as seen in the appendix’s in detail given to the ECHR.
How the convention was breached
       14.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property



15. At the 5th Dec permission to appeal hearing she orally asked the judge that if, when she gets the advice from the pro-bono unit she does not agree with it or wants to add further grounds that may have been taken out by the lawyer volunteer, she can do so. The judge agreed. MJVFF did not know how the lawyer was playing it as she only met him once for half an hour. He did get permission to appeal on 7 0f 10 grounds.
How the convention was breached
       15.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property


16. When another lawyer from the pro-bono unit finally gave the advice it was late and MJVFF wholeheartedly disagreed with it.  The volunteer counsel and MJVFF parted ways and MJVFF proceeded to appeal having put all the issues back into the case and applying officially to add two more grounds in where there was irrefutable evidence that for example she asked for the structure to be repaired for which the county court judge had said she had not and for which if she had, was insured and liability would be established. The court refused the 2 new grounds without any reason given, effectively taking out bits of her case unjustifiably and underhandedly.
How the convention was breached
       16.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

17.  The Appeal date was changed without notice to the day after it was allocated. It was also cut from two days to one day and up until lunchtime, when the three appellant Judges walked out mid MJVFF pleading her case and without any warning from the clerks. The appeal was dismissed and the trial was corrupt in that it stated in Judgment that MJVFF had asked for an implied repairing covenant when she had asked for no such thing she had asked for an implied covenant that the landlord should not breach the terms of the insurance 5(22) not withstanding she was in contract insured already and contract was simply breached by the landlord making her uninsured.
How the convention was breached
       17.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property


18. MJVFF sought to stay the judgement on the grounds that this was not her case that had been judged. This was officially refused. She then sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was rejected with no grounds for the rejection.
How the convention was breached
       18.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property


19. Judgement was given on May 24th 2013 where MJVFF stated that clause 5(22) (which she had based all of her argument on at the appeal using Barrett v Lounova as the needed ground for an implied obligation as the contract would make no sense without it) had been ignored in judgment. The judge said that it was in the Judgment, which it is not. The judgement was about a repairing obligation which is a case she never pleaded so they just made it up as they went along to suit the judgment and rid themselves of my  case.  I asked the Supreme Court to provide the transcripts to prove my point but they said they were not necessary at the reception desk. I went to the High Court to get them but they said I could only get them at the Supreme Court. So catch 22. Anyway the Supreme Court completely ignored me.
How the convention was breached
       19.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

20. A cost order of about half a million with interest gaining by the day is pending and both premises have been stolen.
How the convention was breached
       20.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property

21. Article 1 & 6 of the European Court of Human Rights has been breached by the UK. MJVFF has evidence of corruption, be it somewhat political that is of no interest to her case or her personally. However the President judge of the Supreme Court in the UK and as was at the time the Master of the Rolls had his judicial assistant writing reports to the presiding judge to reject permission to appeal from the county court and also the original president of the Supreme Court had his judicial assistant writing reports too of the same nature. There is a conflict of interest as that is a family connection that should have no part in my case and that is not due diligence to have that take place. The Baroness Neuberger was the chairperson of the large social landlord who trespassed my premises and the leading judge is her brother in law Lord David Neuberger.
How the convention was breached
       21.  Article 6 Right to a fair trial & Article 1 Protection of Property



             


lets not forget

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The media can be mean with their theories of conspiracy straight off the back of a persons death but she was also well known recently for exposing child abusers in the press and may have faced a prison sentence - who knows - just throwing it out there since the media seem to be covering a big fear theory - so why not - where as this is some common sense.. I thought she was a very brave girl and liked her for what she did.. Maybe she was researching a bit too much on whats going on like us all... RIP Peaches


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9057643/Hundreds-of-thousands-of-criminals-to-get-clean-slate-in-law-change.html

 http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/courts-service-sorry-for-watkins-naming-error/5039036.article

http://www.olswang.com/articles/2014/01/section-5-defamation-act-2013-it%E2%80%99s-decision-time-for-website-operators/

THAT IS ODD

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Just got this through the post dated the 3rd April even though the deadline was 4th April and I faxed and posted the below ABC.. perhaps it was a bit sarcastic but really if anyone can fill out an application I think I can.. so.. it's all over... or is it... it ain't over till the phat lady sings.. Time for one brave MP to call for a public inquiry - Any political party -
3rd April 2014 letter just sent in the post but deadline was the 4th April for all submissions.

Dear Madam,

I refer to your application that was lodged on 15th November 2013 and registered under the number referred to above.

I write to inform you that European Court of Human Rights, sitting in a single-judge formation (P. Hirvela assisted by the rapporteur in accordance with Article 24 & 2 of the Convention) between 13 March 2014 and 27th March 2014, decided to declare your application inadmissible. This decision was delivered on the last-mentioned date.

In the light of all the material in it's possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within it's competence, the court found that the admissability criteria set out in Articles 34 & 35 of the convention have not been met.

This decision is final. It is not subject to an appeal either to the Grande Chamber or to any other body. The registry is unable to provide you with any further details concerning the Single Judge's decision. Consequently, you will not receive any further correspondence from the Court in connection with this case. In accordance with the Court's instructions, the file will be distroyed one year after the date of the Single Judge's decision.

Release the HOUNDS

Appearance in Court of Monique

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IN THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT                                                             CHY09015                                    
     

26/28 Park Crescent
London W1N 3PB
Wednesday, 21st July 2010


Before:

HIS  HONOUR JUDGE POWELL


B E T W E E N :

GAVIN & Anor.Claimants

-  and  -

            COMMUNITY HOUSING ASSOCIATION LIMITED  Defendant

__________


Transcribed by BEVERLEY F. NUNNERY & CO
Official Shorthand Writers and Tape Transcribers
Quality House, Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP
Tel:  020 7831 5627     Fax:  020 7831 7737
info@beverleynunnery.com

__________



THE CLAIMANTS appeared In Person.

MISS Z. BHALOO  QC appeared on behalf of the Defendant.


__________



P R O C E E D I N G S






I N D E X

                             Page No.

 JAMERA, Ms. MONIQUE, Sworn

Examined by Miss BHALOO                        3
        Cross-examined by Miss FLORES                   5

UKHUELEIGBE, Mr. RICHARD, Sworn

       Examined by Miss BHALOO                   47
       Questioned by JUDGE                             48
       Cross-examined by Miss FLORES                         73


__________





(TRANSCRIBED FROM  A POOR RECORDING)



MISS BHALOO:  Your Honour, I call Monique Jamera.

JUDGE COWELL:  Who?

MISS BHALOO:  Monique Jamera.  I thought that was the plan for this morning.

JUDGE COWELL:  Just before you do, I do want to say something about the witness statements and it is certainly not your fault, but what is so difficult is that, in large part, they state again, sometimes not very accurately, what is in the emails.  They are what I call "local authority statements".  We have this again and again.

       Instead of exhibiting the documents and giving real evidence such as to say, "After I received such-and-such an email, I did this, that and the other," it is a turgid re-statement, as I say, not very accurately, of what is in the email.  Do you see what I mean?

       Can I just give you an example?  It is the way in which solicitors prepare witness statements, which is wholly unhelpful.  Let us go to the statement itself.  The top of p.90, if you please, is an example, in B.1.  At the very first line, there is a statement: "The contractors repaired the pipe and then removed the damp‑boxing on 26th June 2008."  That is not her evidence, as I understand it, because, on reading the email of 7thJuly, it is simply summarising what Miss Flores said in her email.

       Do you see why it is not evidence?

MISS BHALOO:  Your Honour, it is referring to documents --

JUDGE COWELL:  The email, yes.

MISS BHALOO:  -- and it is summarising for the court what that document says.  Your Honour, I note your comments and will take them into account in future, but ---

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, it is something which I am invariably saying in local authority matters because, somehow, solicitors believe that what they should do in a statement is to recite what an email says and it is there.

MISS BHALOO:  Yes, your Honour, I am afraid some judges do find that helpful, so it is rather difficult because one never knows.  In this case, your Honour, we knew, at an early stage, that you had reserved this matter to yourself.

JUDGE COWELL:  I know.

MISS BHALOO:  But I did not know that that was your Honour's preference.  I have to say, your Honour, that some judges say, "Well, couldn't you summarise in this what the email says?"  So, from the point of view of the solicitor, it is - and we will certainly note that, from your Honour's point of view, it is not helpful so summarise.  But one of the difficulties when one is trying to present a picture, if one just says, "There was an email and then I did whatever," some judges get irritated because they have to go to the email, they have to work out what the email says and then they have - so what the witness statement is trying to do is to present an overall picture, and the email is there as well.  I am sorry your Honour did not find it helpful but I do ...

JUDGE COWELL:  I see, and I feel very bad having made the point.

MISS BHALOO:  No, your Honour, is of course perfectly entitled to make the point.  All I can say is that we do do the best we can and ...

JUDGE COWELL:  I am very sorry if it was deliberately done to help.

MISS BHALOO:  Your Honour, it is quite difficult to know.  It is the same with skeletons: some judges want two lines and the authority mentioned, and other judges want - the Court of Appeal saying, in one case, "I don't want all these authorities cited to me," and then you turn up to court and you cite what you think is just the main authority and they say, "Well, there are lots of other authorities, aren't there?"  So, your Honour, it is quite difficult to know in advance, but I am sorry if they were not helpful to your Honour and certainly, your Honour, that is noted.

JUDGE COWELL:  I am sorry to make a fuss.

MISS BHALOO:  No, no, not at all, your Honour. 

JUDGE COWELL:  I found it so difficult to know where this lady and also Mr. Knap were actually giving evidence.

MISS BHALOO:  Yes, your Honour, of course, part of the evidence is to exhibit the - this is the difference which I have been trying to point out to some of the earlier witnesses, that what - your Honour wants to know what is from personal knowledge that someone has witnessed oneself and what is from the documents and perhaps it is that which one needs to make clearer.  But, your Honour, one of the purposes of witness statements is also to put in - I know your Honour says it is not evidence, but it is, it is documentary evidence, and one of the purposes of the witness statement is to put that in, too.  I do hear what your Honour says and we will ...

JUDGE COWELL:  Then I will hear the evidence of Ms. Jamera.

                                       Ms. MONIQUE JAMERA, Sworn
                                       Examined by Miss BHALOO

JUDGE COWELL:  Ms. Jamera, feel free to sit or stand from time to time ... whether you are reading something.  And may I make it quite clear that I am in no way making any criticism of you in relation to your statement?  You undoubtedly just read it through, thought it was helpful and signed it.

MISS BHALOO:  Ms. Jamera, could you give his Honour your name and business address?
A  Yes, sure, it's Monique Jamera and the address is at 1 Housing Group, 100 Chalk Farm Road, London NW1 8EH.

Q  And, Ms. Jamera, there should be a bundle somewhere near you, which is labelled "B.1"  If you could turn to tab 16, first of all, in that bundle?
A  Yes.

Q  Is that a statement made by you in relation to the injunction application made by the claimants?
A  Yes, that's correct, yes.

Q  And is the signature on p.84 --?
A  Mine?  Yes.

Q  Is that signature yours?
A  That's correct, yes.

Q  And are the contents of the statement true?
A  That's correct, yes.

Q  And could you then turn to tab 17?
A  Yes.

Q  Is that a further statement of yours?
A  Yes, it is.

Q  And is the signature on p.92 yours?
A  That's correct, yes.
Q  And are the contents of that statement true?
A  Yes.

Q  Your Honour, I would ask that the statement stands as Ms. Jamera's evidence‑in-chief.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes.

MISS BHALOO:  Ms. Jamera, if you wait there, there will be some questions.

JUDGE COWELL:  One of the things I have noticed is that there is a counterclaim and, at some stage, I will be asked, will I not, to say what you claim is owing?

MISS BHALOO:  Yes, your Honour, I am afraid I completely overlooked an up‑to‑date rent statement.  I will get that produced, perhaps tomorrow, by Mr. Barnet.

JUDGE COWELL:  In relation to what has been paid, I want to be quite clear that there is agreement about it, if there is agreement, or what is the issue between the parties.

MISS BHALOO:  Your Honour, I do not think there is disagreement about what has been paid.  Ms. Jamera deals with when it was paid and certainly that is not challenged in the witness statement or indeed in the particulars of claim.

JUDGE COWELL:  I would be enormously relieved to know that there is no issue about something.

MISS BHALOO:  Yes, that would be good.  Your Honour, as far as any rent which has accrued since that ... mesne profits, that will be a matter for (a) calculation, really, because there is no dispute that, since Clarke J's order, nothing has been paid for the occupation of the property, because he said that - your Honour will recall that was one of the things which was raised in that s.25 application.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes.

MISS BHALOO:  And then, your Honour, the final point will be that if mesne profits arise, rather than then rent payments, then there will be the evidence that the market value has risen.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, and that is nothing to do with this witness.
MISS BHALOO:  No, your Honour.  She does, however, deal with the payments which were said to be made at or around the time of the forfeiture, and you have her version of that.

JUDGE COWELL:  At p.77, onwards.

MISS BHALOO:  Yes, your Honour, and then it is picked up again --

JUDGE COWELL:  In the second statement.

MISS BHALOO:  -- in the second statement, because that first statement was prepared ...

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, some time ...

MISS BHALOO:  It was prepared for the injunction, so it was picked up again at p.91, and the letter of 24th October, which preceded the re-entry, and the application for an injunction is now exhibited because it was in the application bundle in front of Clarke J but now it is put in and some comments are made about it.

JUDGE COWELL:  Thank you very much.

Cross-examined by Miss FLORES

Q  Sorry, your Honour, on the subject of the rent, obviously we submit that the s.25 was an improper inducement to fix the floor; also that we had been promised a rent of 5½ thousand from the defendant, which we will further show, and that it was an act of harassment.  We also think that, although the market value has gone up, a lot of the improvements are ours, which we were told by Jacqui Greene would not be included in any kind of rent review.   God forbid we get these premises back, but ----

JUDGE COWELL:  My remarks were that I hope it will be agreed between the parties as to what in fact you have paid, that was all.

MISS FLORES:  Up to ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Paid, full stop, ever since ...

MISS FLORES:  The beginning of time, I see.  So, basically ----

JUDGE COWELL:  And so, in due course, Miss Bhaloo will provide some account, if it is not already - I think it probably is here, is it not?

MISS FLORES:  We could do that, your Honour, as well.

JUDGE COWELL:  And you can do that.  But you may very well agree as to what you have paid.

MISS FLORES:  Yes, and Ms. MacIntyre and Ms. Cracy could swap notes on the rent situation.  And we believe we have got 49,000 outstanding to be paid back to us.  The defendant's case is that they do not pay back, but we say it was held in trust.  There was one other point on that.  We also feel it was a very damning omission that they did not immediately go for rent after that order.

       Ms. Monique Jamera, you are from St. Lucia, are you not?
A  Yes, that's correct.

Q  And you were educated there and you came here, did you not?
A  At the age of 14, yes, I came there and back, so ...

Q  Monique, you do not know me ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Sorry, I did not actually hear the question.

MISS BHALOO:  The question was: "You are from St. Lucia?  And you were educated there and came here after that."

JUDGE COWELL:  Sorry, I did not hear.  Educated in St. Lucia.

MISS BHALOO:  And I just was not clear as to the relevance of that.

MISS FLORES:  I do not think there was really relevance in that I know Monique, and Monique knows me a bit and I think a lot - sorry, the witnesses: I like to put a little bit of background on people.  And, also, I believe that myself and Monique got on rather well, only on the telephone but we met at the High Court and it is all a bit unfortunate, I think.  But, I do not know, I just started like - it is breaking the ice, one would call it, maybe, and I did not have it written down, it just come off the top of my head.

       Right, okay, Monique, so you started the job in 2007, or was it ---
A  February 2008.

Q  2008.
A  Yes.

Q  Yes, so it is the same year as we got into the dispute with the defendant.
A  That's correct, yes.

Q  And you were pretty much in the thick of it.
A  Yes.

Q  Yes, okay.  What I wanted to ask you was - I suppose what I am trying to get at is a sort of misleading of a new person on the job.  I am not answering your question, and I do not admit - I do not imagine you might say that.  But, when you were interviewed for the job, were you in any way made aware of the current dispute, since you were taking over the commercial properties and there is just 18 of them?
A  No, I mean, obviously, it was more than 18 properties because obviously it was not just Community Housing Association.  There's a further two RSLs under the one housing group management, so it was more than that, but we never went into detail on what outstanding issues at interview stage when I, you know, was interviewed for the role.

Q  Yes, because Toynbee and Grange - was it Grange?
A  It's Toynbee and Island Hones.

Q  I always forget that third one: Island Homes.  Just out of interest, nosiness, call it, how many more properties did Island Homes and --?
A  In total, we've got just over 100 commercial units, yes.

Q  So a much bigger outfit --
A  Yes.

Q  -- now; hence, you know, two proper commercial managers ----
A  That's correct.

Q  And you had worked in housing associations before, so you were very aware of ‑‑‑‑
A  No, I'd worked in - for private property management companies that dealt with the block management, as well as commercial, previously, but not a registered social landlord, no.

Q  Okay, so it was pretty much the same basis --
A  Yes, pretty much the same, yes.

Q  -- Oliver coming from, more risk - property management, straightforward property management.
A  That's correct, yes.

Q  Right, okay, cool.  So, Monique, on page - sorry, I am going to cut to the chase - D.3, 669.
A  669?

Q  Yes, 669, D.3.

JUDGE COWELL:  This is an email: D.3, 669.

MISS FLORES:  Sorry, maybe I have got the wrong file.

JUDGE COWELL:  I think you may have because we are back in 2007.

MISS FLORES:  Sorry, your Honour, it is the same file.  It is actually 819, which is June 2008.  I am sorry, I was referring to a note beside it, sorry, your Honour. 

       So it is the same file: 819.
A  Yes.

Q  That is a June 2008 email.
A  819?

Q  819.

JUDGE COWELL:  It is 13th May.

MISS FLORES:  819, here we go, yes, 13th May.  Now, the third paragraph in.  Put a bit of background on it.  Basically, Farr was the broker.  You were communicating with Farr with regards to the floor, which had been taken up in January --
A  Yes.

Q  -- which - and you maybe just want to say in your own words why you believe that it was not dealt with as a claim.
A  Basically what had happened was, when I joined, you know, Oliver was dealing with yourself in regards to the floor which you had taken up over Christmas and New Year.

Q  That is right, yes.
A  From what Oliver told me, he wanted me to make a claim to the insurance company for you, and whether or not it was going to be with Farr or Zurich, he wasn't 100 percent sure because he wanted me to ascertain from Miss Gavin/Miss Flores whether or not it was definitely something which happened as consequential damage from the flood that had happened in the previous years, or whether or not it could be dealt with a new claim with our new insurers, Zurich, because Farr had not acted as us as a broker for a couple of months and he felt that maybe it would be ----

Q  Really?
A  Yes.

Q  I was not aware of that.
A  Yes, I mean, they weren't - we were no longer covered with them.  Obviously everything that had happened in the preceding years then, yes, they would be dealing with ----

Q  They were the broker?
A  They were the broker, but it was actually Zurich that we were with.

Q  Zurich being more local authority insurers, is it not, really?
A  I don't know whether or not, but ----

Q  The whole of Camden Council's with Zurich.
A  I don't know.

Q  So you had a new broker.
A  No, I don't know how ----

Q  Or just direct with Zurich.
A  I don't know how it was brokered but I don't know how they got with Zurich but, yes.

Q  Fine, so you were going back to Farr PLC --
A  Yes, I was going back to Farr ----

Q  -- who really now were not even the broker.
A  No, they weren't, they weren't dealing with any other insurance matters on our behalf.

Q  God, so dealing with Matthew.

JUDGE COWELL:  Who did Farr deal - which insurance company?
MISS FLORES:  Farr was the broker.
A  Farr was the broker and they ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Of --?
A  RSA and UKU.

Q  Just a moment.  Farr broker of RSA and --?
A  UKU.

Q  UKU.
A  Yes.

Q  But not of the Zurich.
A  No.

Q  I have got it.

MISS FLORES:  So they must have come off cover about April, probably when the renewal ‑‑?
A  I don't know when exactly they came ...

Q  So would you say that they were not the broker when you arrived in February?
A  I don't think - I don't believe they were, because we weren't - all new insurance claims weren't dealt with by Farr; it was dealt with directly with Zurich.

Q  Yes, I see now where you are coming from.  It must have been quite difficult to go back to a broker who no longer had an interest really in the claim, I suppose.
A  Possibly.

Q  Possibly, yes.
A  Possibly.

Q  Yes, which, hence, why Matthew was maybe a bit strange.  And you were not aware of that, obviously.  Now, going to you being new to the situation, 819 on that page.  On the third paragraph down, it is Matthew saying, on 13th May, which is five months into the floor being up - he is saying: "Should the flooring pre‑date the tenants' residence in the property, I shall happily add the details to the material losses claim."  Now, the material losses claim - What was it called? - MLS, or something like that.  There is two.  There is POL, which is property owner's liability, and then there is material damage claim, MDC, or something like that.  Anyway, just to be clear for your Honour, that he would happily add details to the material losses claim and arrange an adjuster.  "We are, however, slightly concerned that this damage was never raised before.  I note reference to the photographs of this flooring, taken in January," so there is photographs from Jim, they must be from Jim, "following a surveyor's visit [so it must be Jim].  These have never been supplied to ourselves."  Sorry, I have made a mistake there.  The photos have never been supplied, but he has noted that there were photographs taken in January. "Nor has the report [which is the surveyor's report].  Presumably this surveyor was able to ascertain that the matter linked to the original claim," which I think I was saying a lot at the time, was I not, because I was a bit afraid of being - filling out a Zurich form and then writing stuff that would not be true?  And I think I really said  that to you at the time.  I said, "I'm not getting done for fraud."  It was difficult for me.  I had to chase the original people.
A  Sure, yes.

Q  So, "Presumably this surveyor was able to ascertain that the matter linked to the original claim."  Do you remember what you said about that, about some of your previous claims, whether you thought it was usual or unusual?
A  Yes, when I had the original discussion with Miss Flores, I said to her, "I find it strange" ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Just a moment.  When you had the original discussion with who?
A  With Miss Flores, I said to her I found it unusual that, at the time, the loss adjuster didn't take into account the floor, as the previous claim that I dealt with with my previous employer was actually ----

Q  Do not go too fast because I want to make a note of what you are saying.
A  Sorry.

Q  It was unusual the loss adjuster did not take into account the floor.
A  Yes.

Q  Yes, sorry, and do you want to say a bit more?
A  A previous claim that I dealt with from a previous organisation, the loss adjuster had made a note that obviously the floor had been under water for some time and it could start to, you know, soak up - could have soaked up the water and it could - it may need replacing.

MISS FLORES:  It was common sense.  I think that is what was your approach.
A  Yes.

JUDGE COWELL:  That was wholly unrelated.
A  That was a totally - it was an unrelated claim.  That's what I'd experienced in the past, so I found it, you know, unusual that they hadn't, at the time of the leak, taken it into consideration.

Q  Yes, I follow.

MISS FLORES:  So just to end that email: "Can you confirm or deny all of the above?  Please supply the report/photographs in any event."  Now, if we then jump a few pages along to 831 - sorry, there is one before that.   You say, on 4th June --

JUDGE COWELL:  Let us just find it.

MISS FLORES:  On p.828.  There has been a lot of talk about that claim.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, just a moment.

MISS FLORES:  I think you are exasperated by that point, are you not, with the whole thing?
A  I think, at that point, it was, you know, taking advice from Farr that, you know, the matter had to be dealt with and for our protection.

JUDGE COWELL:  Sorry, wait a minute.

MISS FLORES:  So we then had to ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Wait a moment, I want to hear the evidence.

MISS FLORES:  Sorry.

JUDGE COWELL:  You had taken advice from Farr, do you say?
A  Farr.  I'd taken advice from Farr, Matthew at Farr, that we shouldn't really be communicating with the claimants on matters because ----

Q  Just a moment, "I'd taken advice from Farr," presumably over the phone.
A  Yes, that's correct.

Q  That --?
A  We shouldn't be in direct communication with the claimants in regards to ----

Q  "We shouldn't be in direct communication with the claimants."
A  Yes.

Q  Yes, I see.
A  Yes, in regards to the claim, because, you know, RSA and UKU had wanted to them to deal with it directly.

Q  In regard to the claim, because what?
A  RSA and UKU, the insurers that Farr represented, wanted them to deal with them directly.

Q  Because RSA and UKU what?
A  Wanted the claimants to deal with Farr and their representatives.  It was Plexus Law.

Q  Wanted claimants to deal directly with Farr PLC and Plexus Law.
A  That's correct, yes.

Q  Yes, I see.

MISS FLORES:  But I think because at that stage obviously it had got much higher than we even knew about.
A  Yes.

Q  And so therefore it was ...
A  Yes, obviously, I can't comment on what was going on in the background between Farr and the insurers, but I know that, obviously, communications that I'd had with yourself, I, you know, stated, "Jo, you need to speak to them, give then, you know, give them what they want because, you know, that's what, you know, that's what they want, that's what they want to be able to deal with it, so, you know, just" ----

Q  It was not a normal relationship, landlord and tenant relationship, between us any more; it was pressure from their ...
A  That's correct, yes.

Q  And also because there is a clause that says you are within - with the insurer, which is your third party, there is a clause that says that they are actually allowed to tell you not to communicate with us.
A  Yes.

Q  A bit like if you have a car accident: you do not admit to anything because your insurers says "no".
A  I think probably, at that point, Farr just wanted, obviously, even though they weren't no longer under cover, no longer the broker, they wanted to make sure that we didn't put ourselves in a predicament, so they said the best thing for us to do was not to communicate with yourselves directly.

Q  Did you find that frustrating at all?
A  Obviously, from my point of view, I wanted to ----

Q  The human point, yes.
A  Yes, I wanted to help you out, the best that I could.

Q  Yes, and you did, a few times.
A  And, you know, through the best of my ability, you know, I was chasing them and, from my point of view - I know you mentioned that you felt that it was kind of like giggly between me and them, but the way I saw it, it was like I couldn't be stern with them.  It was more of a kind of like be softly softly approach to try and get it resolved instead of like saying, "Why aren't you doing this?  And why aren't you doing that?  Get it sorted."  I was saying, you know, "What's happening?  Is there any more - you know, you know, is there any movement?  Can you let me know?" because, like, obviously, I didn't know Matthew any more than I knew you, so it wasn't ----

Q  Yes, precisely, it is all phone relationship.
A  Exactly.

Q  And, in a way, you are playing the middle guy.
A  Exactly.

Q  And you was trying to ...
A  Piggy in the middle, basically.

Q  Yes, but also having to be nice to each party.
A  Yes.

Q  But I think you are very genuine as a person, you come across very genuine.

JUDGE COWELL:  So you were then writing an email to Matthew Greenland and he was - who did he represent?
A  He represents Farr.  He was, basically, the account manager for - at Farr PLC.

Q  Greenland was account manager at Farr.
A  That's correct, yes.

Q  At Farr.  And, in this 4thJune email, you were saying to him, "I've asked her time and time again to speak to you, but she has refused.  Take a look at her email.  Please advise me as necessary."
A  Yes.

Q  Because, at that stage, you had been told, as I understand it, that you should not be involved in the ----
A  That's correct, yes, that's correct.

Q  Although, from your point of view, you were anxious to assist.
A  Absolutely, absolutely.

MISS FLORES:  And, just to make this clear, Monique was dealing with a floor, not an old claim, and been caught up in a liability claim which she had no real knowledge of, that is fair to say, and the ins and outs of what had happened to us, or even the leaks themselves, like the stack pipe, the ----
A  You see, everything that I knew was secondary, from reading files or speaking to yourself about it.

Q  Yes.

JUDGE COWELL:  You never went along to the premises?
A  No.

MISS FLORES:  New to the job.
A  No, I hadn't been to the premises.

JUDGE COWELL:  You never saw the premises.
A  No, no.

MISS FLORES:  And obviously did not really know who was right and who was wrong --
A  That's correct.

Q  -- only from a guess, really.
A  Yes.

Q  You have never seen the photos of the stack pipes, the stuff down the walls.  You had never seen the flooding.  You had never - although I told you.
A  Yes.

Q  Right, okay.
A  Miss Flores making aware of the previous incidents of water ingress and various sewage leaks into the property, but, obviously, I wasn't with the group at the time, so I didn't have first-hand knowledge of what had happened; it was just file notes and obviously ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, I quite follow.

MISS FLORES:  So, regarding the outstanding liability with Farr PLC, and we have acknowledged that they were not on cover there, nor was RSA, nor was UKU, so really you are dealing with a bunch of people that have no particular interest in the Housing Association or the claimant.
A  Well, they should because obviously they were under cover at the time of the incident.

Q  At the time.
A  At the time of the incident, and obviously what ----

Q  And that follows through, does it not?
A  Yes, and obviously what you were saying is that it was a result of that leak.  I think what they were trying to get at was, "How do we know?"  It wasn't noted that, it, this, that the floor ...

Q  Which we agree.

JUDGE COWELL:  You understood that that was their concern.
A  That's correct, yes, and obviously I think ----

MISS FLORES:  Do you think they just wanted to get out of it.
A  I can't comment on, you know, how they wanted to get out of it.  I mean, as an organisation, you would think not, because obviously they were the ones that would be responsible.

Q  But if you are no longer paying them.
A  But we paid them for the periods that were ----

Q  You paid ----
A  Where it happened, so there shouldn't be an issue as to whether or not - they were under cover at the time, so they were the insurers.

Q  There should be almost like a guarantee that they would effect, you know, continue - in fact it is in the policy, is it not, that if an incident happens within the period of cover, that, whether or not --
A  Exactly, so ----

Q  -- a few years later, that that insurance company will cover all aspects of that claim to the time?
A  Yes, so I had no ...

Q  So you expected something from them, but ...
A  Yes, but I would have expected them to resolve it, as the incident occurred under cover.  As I said, I think they were - the biggest issue with them was that ...

Q  The liability.
A  No, I think, in regard to the floor, was that, you know, "How comes this wasn't noted?  How comes this is the first we're hearing about it?  How do we know?  It's been such a long time and it hasn't been noted."  It's been X amount of years since the original leak happened ----

Q  No, I think they were talking about the fact that the claimant - sorry, you being the claimant at the time, the insurers, which was just a month before you arrived, had not notified the insurance, because in the event of any kind of claim, the insurers - which could be insured - the insurers have to be notified as soon as it happens. That would be ----
A  Yes, absolutely.

Q  And, in actual fact - I mean, let us skip past p.828 where you say, "I'm losing my patience with her.  I've asked her time and time again to speak to you but she refuses," but we go past that, to 840 on the same file.  Right, so that is you saying to Matthew - it is how long after the first email?  It is a month later anyway.  Right, you say: "Miss Gavin contacted our surveyor," and I say that because I think there was some confusion as to what to say back to them, so hence the late reply, but: "Miss Gavin contacted our" - sorry, your Honour, it is p.840.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, I have got it.

MISS FLORES:  It is the second line in: "Miss Gavin contacted ..."

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, I have got it, thank you.

MISS FLORES:  "... our surveyor, who originally inspected the property in January.  She claims pictures were took and a report that she was supposed to send to you months ago."  I think Jim took that surveyor's report.  I do not think that would be me, would it: that I am meant to be sending any ----
A  I can't remember.
Q  It would just be that the floor was taken up, so that Jim, the surveyor, came out in the January of the incidences with - talking to Chris Natt.  So, on p.845, the second line in: "This is all the necessary evidence, alongside the evidence gathered from Jim Gorman."

JUDGE COWELL:  Is this near the bottom?

MISS FLORES:  Near the bottom, the second - and then "further evidence can be obtained by the loss adjuster". Because what we forget is there was a whole other issue going on with the same people - well, do not forget it but we know that that was going on in the background anyway.

JUDGE COWELL:  Can you remind me, Miss Flores: who was the surveyor who came to witness the flood damage?

MISS FLORES:  Mr. UK.  The original ceiling flood?

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, the ceiling flood.

MISS FLORES:  Mr. UK.

JUDGE COWELL:  And who was the loss adjuster?

MISS FLORES:  That was Mr. Alan Hines of QuestGates.

JUDGE COWELL:  Hence his reference.

MISS FLORES:  But the person who came out to visit was his assistant, Mr. Jessie Cooper.

MISS FLORES:  He was the only person who ----

JUDGE COWELL:  That was on 14th October.

MISS FLORES:  That is exactly right, your Honour.  Just skipping to p.850 - sorry, your Honour, can I make it clear that Jim Gorman, January 2008 --

JUDGE COWELL:  He was January 2008.

MISS FLORES:  Yes - came out to survey the floor, which was a consequence of the same ceiling flood, so there had been a ----

JUDGE COWELL:  And just remind me: who was he?
MISS FLORES:  Jim Gorman, who is going to give evidence, is one of the surveyors of the maintenance, residential maintenance, team.

JUDGE COWELL:  Not a loss adjuster.

MISS FLORES:  No, Jim is an employee of the CHA maintenance team.

JUDGE COWELL:  He saw damage in January 2008.

MISS FLORES:  In January 2008 and he took photographs but he was the official surveyor that came out.

JUDGE COWELL:  Thank you very much.

MISS FLORES:  Sorry, Monique, moving on to 850: "Please forward this to Matthew and ask him" - sorry, that was from Oliver Barnet, so I should not have referred to that.  I am just trying - Monique again, that is 865 and that is from you, at the top there.

JUDGE COWELL:  Can I just ask you this so that I have got the matter clear?  You did not at any stage send any claim form to any insurer on behalf of Miss Flores.  Is that right?
A  What we did was we obtained two quotations for the floor.

Q  You took two quotations ----
A  And we sent two of our contractors round.

Q  You took two quotations.  Yes, that is something you mention in your statement.  Two quotations from two contractors.
A  Yes.

Q  You forwarded those --?
A  To Farr PLC for their consideration.

Q  Forwarded them to Farr's.   Tell me whose quotations were they?  Do you remember?
A  It was a company called Cube --

MISS FLORES:  Construction.
A  -- Property Services.

JUDGE COWELL:  Cube Construction.
A  And the second one was for All Done Design.
MISS FLORES:  Which I have to say were very good contractors which you brought in yourselves, did you not, from previous ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, you agree with that.
A  Yes.

Q  You or --?
A  Yes, well, there were contractors that weren't under one housing group's books at the time.  Contractors were ... 

Q  Contractors brought in by CHA.
A  Yes.

Q  Yes, and somewhere no doubt there is an email showing when you sent those quotations in.
A  Yes, I've seen it somewhere but I don't know exactly where it is in the bundles.

MISS FLORES:  It was round about June, May/June.  I met the contractors regarding the leak in the electricity cupboard and the - which they found - floor.  We will check the date of that, so do not worry.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, just so that I - help me, Miss Flores ----
A  Yes, we submitted the claim to Farr.

Q  Sorry?
A  We did submit the claim to Farr for ...

Q  Yes, submitted that.  Did either of them come, or both of them come?

MISS FLORES:  Both then.  Both very good contractors.

JUDGE COWELL:  Both came and, you say, in June.

MISS FLORES:  In and about, but I know that, through the questioning, I will get to the exact date.

JUDGE COWELL:  I see, both came in June.  Did they cure the --?  What did they do?

MISS FLORES:  They just simply surveyed the floor.

JUDGE COWELL:  Surveyed the floor.

MISS FLORES:  They were there to get quotes; it's part of the insurance policy.  So they surveyed the floor.  Each of them made recommendation on actually removing the floor and replacing it and then replacing there upon it floor covering, which we subsequently discovered we ----

Q  And the quotations related to the floor.

MISS FLORES:  They were in and around from 2,000 to 5,000.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, they related to the floor?

MISS FLORES:  They did indeed, your Honour.

JUDGE COWELL:  I got the impression they also did something extra while they were there.

MISS FLORES:  They did, your Honour, absolutely.

JUDGE COWELL:  What did they do extra?

MISS FLORES:  They were the geniuses who discovered the leak was in the electricity cupboard because they ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Discovered the leak in electricity.

MISS FLORES:  After four years.

JUDGE COWELL:  And I think it was 7th July, you sent an email describing what happened when they called on 24th June.

MISS FLORES:  Yes, that was the "How many surveyors does it take to find a leak?" joke.  But they did find it and that was the first time they were on the job and they were contractors brought in specially from Monique and Oliver, as I believe.

JUDGE COWELL:  See email 7th July.

MISS FLORES:  They dealt with private properties, so they knew the viability of a commercial business was more - it needed to be done exceptionally by very good contractors.  I mean All Done Design and Cube Construction: there are brilliant.  They are very efficient.  They are good contractors.

       Seems to be going really slow.  I should try and speed it up, but it is a bit difficult, sorry.

JUDGE COWELL:  It is largely my fault because I just wanted to be clear about certain of the events.

MISS FLORES:  So you say, on p.65, to Matthew Greenland ...

JUDGE COWELL:  Sorry, which page?

MISS FLORES:  Sorry, 865.  You say: "Okay, fine.  Just so we cover ourselves, do you have a copy of what was asked for or any communication that proves that they have been made aware of what it is needed from them?"  Now, I think that is in reference to the liability claim because I think Matthew kind of roped you into knowing about that, which was something that, in a way, was not your business, but he did rope you into the - it became an issue.
A  The fact was that they wanted to deal with the floor and the liability issue at the same time and that's why he kind of like briefed me on what was happening, so what he said to me was that, as soon as they substantiate the claim for the liability, they'll include the claim for the floor at the same time.  That's what I was trying to say, you know, joke, "Give them what they want.  Deal with the floor at the same time."

Q  And we had given them everything we had.
A  Yes.

Q  But you were not in any way aware of that previous liability.
A  No.

Q  You were not aware of the leaks.  You were not aware of anything.
A  No.

Q  Your aim was to get us the floor fixed.
A  That's correct, yes, and I was told that, for them to get the claim for the floor, they've got to ...

Q  Give us what you want from the liability.
A  Yes.

Q  So they are really mixing up two issues which were not really - they should not have been to do with another.  I think the courts have already established that that is an outstanding building claim.
A  That's correct, yes.
Q  And I think, to this day, that it is not disputed one was mixed with the other.
A  Yes, I don't know why Farr took that position but that's, you know, what they - the instructions that they give to me, that, you know, it had to be dealt with as part of the same liability claim.  I don't know why that's the way that wanted to deal with it.  But, in my mind, it was, okay, as soon as they can get what Farr and the insurers that they represented wanted, then everything will be dealt with and I never imagined that it would go this far.

Q  Nor did I.  And, as a professional person who had been in private property management before, your overriding concern was getting this floor fixed --
A  Absolutely.

Q  -- and getting the rent paid and getting - so your interests were the same as ours.
A  Yes.

Q  Page 865, back from Matthew Greenland, that would be the middle email, I think Matthew - what I am trying to suggest, right from the start, is he misled you, to a certain extent, because he had so much knowledge of what they wanted from us.  Anyway, "Like I say, my guess is he asked her for proper documentation and unable to provide it," already he is suggesting wrongdoing on my part, which you have no knowledge of, but, basically, what I am saying is he said: "Like I said, my guess is he asked her for proper documentation ... unable to provide it" - accusatory, and of course you are not in the knowledge of any of this - "she started bothering you."  Can I suggest that this is Matthew - in the hope of getting money, discounts, etcetera, without providing her losses.  So, already, he is turning you, or at least attempting to turn you.
A  Again, I don't think that that was his intention.  I just think that he was trying to deal with the matter ----

Q  Or a £300,000 outstanding liability claim.

JUDGE COWELL:  Just let the witness finish.

MISS FLORES:  Sorry, Monique.
A  As a I said, Matthew knew everything about, you know, what had happened in the preceding years and, you know, he - I remember, in conversations that I had with him and with yourself, was, you know, that you had provided them, you had your business plan, and I remember the insurance saying that a business plan wasn't sufficient to prove these losses; that they needed accounts.

Q  And we had provided cashflow accounts, we had provided business interruption, provided photograph.  We provided so much stuff that in fact I remember sending you 20 attachments - Do you remember that? - when I was trying to sort of - I suppose, at the same time as him trying to persuade you, I was also saying, "We've got a case."
A  It wasn't a matter of persuading me because, at the end of the day, it's down to the insurers.  I could only ----

Q  Well, you were the landlord, in the middle.
A  Yes.

Q  And, in a way, I think that Farr wanted you on their side as the insurers, and we needed you on our side as the claimant, so you were very much stuck in the middle, I think.
A  I think, from my point of view, I was always on your side because obviously I - common sense prevails, at the end of the day.  But, as I said, I don't know why Farr took the position that they did and there wasn't much that I could do about it.

Q  Hands tied.
A  Exactly, there's not much that I can do about it.

Q  But, I mean, it could well be that there were other ways of dealing with it that maybe were not about us having to wait because of that problem, although, as you say, they made it an issue that it was our - everything was our fault.
A  I mean, to - when obviously this - it, you know, started when - we're up to July now and I was getting very, you know, annoyed at the fact - not with you but with the insurers - that it was taking so long to deal with it, and I remember saying to you, "I've never had to deal with a clam that's gone on for this long before," and ----

Q  And we were ... you.
A  Yes, and it got to a point where obviously I was going to Oliver, who's the commercial director, for advice on how to proceed and, you know, he - I know that he had a couple of telephone calls with Farr and Matthew about the incident and, again, Matthew told them the same thing about their position was that they weren't going to deal with the issue of the floor until you had dealt with the liability issue.

Q  Would you say it was sort of a bribery?
A  I can't comment on that.  I don't know what their intentions were.

JUDGE COWELL:  You went to Oliver Barnet to see if he could help hurry things along.
A  Yes, he was my line manager and commercial director.

Q  And Mr. Barnet then telephoned?
A  Yes, he had a few telephone conversations with Matthew at Farr when I felt that I was getting nowhere in trying to progress the claim on behalf of the claimants.

Q  Yes, and, as you understand it, he did not have any success.
A  No, their position was their position and, you know, they weren't going to budge on it, for whatever reason.

Q  And the thing they were not budging on was --?
A  Dealing with the floor as a separate building insurance issue and dealing with the liability issue separately.

Q  They would not budge on refusing to deal with floor as a separate issue.

MISS FLORES:  Yes, but just to say, your Honour, Matthew did say, in May, if it is not - What did he say?  "If it is an old floor, then we'll be happy to deal with it under the material loss."  He did actually say, at one point, that was May ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Was that in an email?

MISS FLORES:  Let us go back to the email.  It is at p.891.

JUDGE COWELL:  I see, it was in an email.

MISS FLORES:  Yes, we have just been through the email.  It is at p.891 where he says - he asks Monique: "Should the floor pre-date the tenants' residence in the property" ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Page 891?

MISS FLORES:  819, your Honour, and that is also linked to p.831, that is the response.  So that Matthew was saying, "If it was an old floor, we can deal with it as a material-loss claim," but he was concerned that it had not been reported, following the surveyor's visit to the premises.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, that is right.  And he was from Farr's?
A  Yes, Matthew's at Farr.

Q  Yes, I follow.

MISS FLORES:  And that links to 831.  What did you say back to that?
A  I think the issue was - because obviously I wasn't there at the time, I didn't know whether or not it was your floor, or the property was like that.  There wasn't a schedule of condition of when you took the property.  So, obviously, Oliver had only started on November 2007, so he didn't know, either.  So I remember having a conversation, after that email, with Matthew saying that, "To be honest with you, we don't know whose floor - whether it's our floor or it was a floor that they had installed," but then I think we made the assumption that it was your floor because we remembered you mentioning of the amount of money that you'd spent on the floor.

Q  That was next door, yes.
A  So we didn't - you know, that's on the basis that we made the assumption that it was ...

Q  But the response was a month later and he then says, on p.831, not only is he concerned that the claim has not been put in in January and the surveyor's report and the photographs but that he cannot trace the response to the email from the month before, that he sent you, regarding the material damage loss.

       That is on p.831, your Honour.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, thank you.

MISS FLORES:  Now, on p.850, that was more a note for his Honour because all the dates and times and everything has got to be established, so ----
A  Yes, because obviously, as I said to you, when that 13th May email came, obviously I didn't know, Oliver didn't know.  I told Matthew that none of us knew.  We went through Jacqui Greene's files to see if we could find a schedule of condition, and I said to him that we will look into it to find out whether or not, and I know, from Matthew's point of view, I think he thought, too, that it was your floor.

Q  Our floor.
A  Yes, your floor.

Q  So maybe there was a bit of confusion there because nobody asked us, and I would not have been able to say it was not our floor.  I think Oliver asked us, though, and I said it was not our floor.
A  I vaguely remember that, but then obviously the insurers were like, "Was there a schedule of condition?  How do we know?"
Q  I think they wanted it to be my floor, to be honest, but, anyway, we will deal with that with Oliver because I think this proves that it is not my floor as well.  We have got the installation dates and the fact that Kingsbury undertook the work and it was CHA's property.  I would not install a floor of vinyl anyway.  More mosaic, myself.  I do it, mosaics - nice gallery there.

       "Please could you forward this to Matthew and ask him how they would demonstrate her losses" - sorry, your Honour, that is p.850.  Oliver writes to Monique, and Oliver says: "Please could you forward this to Matthew and ask him how he would like her to demonstrate the loss.  Cheers, Oliver."  Now, that is Oliver, it sounds like, getting quite exasperated as well, as to how - this liability issue is interfering with the running of your commercial properties and it is also interfering with the running of our business.  Oliver is asking how we are supposed to further demonstrate our losses.
A  Yes.

Q  At this stage, you probably are aware that the council are brought in.
A  Yes.

Q  The housing minister was brought in, maybe the Pope was brought it, I am not really sure exactly.
A  Don't think it went that far but, yes.

Q  You know, that is how bad it got, though.  There were lots of political kicking about at the time and certainly actually that Gordon Brown's office had been brought in as well and the local MP and various people.  So, in the background to all of that, there was politics going down.  I have forgotten my question.

       On this liability claim, yes, so Jonathan's involvement and also the environmental health involvement because, frustrated as I was with the situation - and in no way I blamed you.  You know, to me, you tried to help, but obviously there was little mishaps, you know, bad communication, issues getting mixed up and, as the claimant, I was not getting any service for my rent, if you like.  I have forgot the question again.

       Jonathan involved.  Right, so Jonathan Simpson got involved and the leak, incidentally, was fixed the day before the environmental health, who had written to Mick Sweeney - were you aware of any of this?
A  No, no, no.

Q  Right, okay, so what was going on in the background was - and we can evidence this - Dave Wagg, from environmental health - bit of a geezer - he had come out, had a visit, seen that the foundations of the electricity cupboard - which you did not see, did you?
A  No, no, I've not seen --

Q  -- were absolutely sodden.  In fact if you want to have a quick look, G.1, which is the second folder on your right, at the top - yes, that is the one.  I am sorry, I do not know the ...

JUDGE COWELL:  I think the things to concentrate on with this witness - what I want to know is whether you say - you regard her as having been very helpful to you.  But I just want to know ----

MISS FLORES:  I would say, on a personal level, that there is that humaneness.

JUDGE COWELL:  Was there anything which she did do about which you are complaining?  Or was there anything which you say she should have done which she did not do?

MISS FLORES:  Well, I cannot really cut to the chase that - on this issue.  I would like to, your Honour, but I just cannot.  But there is things that speak for themselves, and I cannot ----

JUDGE COWELL:  I have got the emails and I can read them.

MISS FLORES:  There is more.  I would like to help.  If at any point - I will bear that question in mind - I can cut to the chase, I certainly will, if I have got a chase to cut to.

       Okay, so Dave Wagg was visiting, the environmental health.  We had a case of water and electricity mixing together.  It was in the local paper: picture of me with the electrics and the water.  There was a lot of people in the background.  Must have felt a bit of pressure in the office.  But the leak was fixed the day before Mr. Dave Wagg was due for a site inspection.  He had invited yourselves along to that inspection, and also the electrical engineering, national electrical engineering, people.

JUDGE COWELL:  David --?

MISS FLORES:  Dave Wagg.

JUDGE COWELL:  I will take it from you for a moment that he visited the day after a leak was cured.  Have I got it right?

MISS FLORES:  No, he visited the day before.

JUDGE COWELL:  The day before, sorry, a leak was cured.  And which leak was that?  Was that the electricity cupboard?

MISS FLORES:  Sorry, your Honour, I just need to get some information from ...

JUDGE COWELL:  All right, yes.

MISS FLORES:  Just to say, Miss Cracy was just pointing out that Dave Wagg had written to the defendant to say that he was coming out for an inspection and, the day before that inspection, the leak was fixed.  It was found and fixed.

JUDGE COWELL:  And was that the leak in the electricity cupboard?

MISS FLORES:  That is exactly the leak, your Honour,

JUDGE COWELL:  Leak in electricity.  And I think we know that that was 24th June, when Cube Construction and All Done Design came, and it is mentioned in your email of 7thJuly.

MISS FLORES:  Yes.  Is ...
A  No, no, it's fine.

Q  Okay, so, your Honour, Matthew writes an email to Anna Norrie. As you were earlier on about to suggest, Plexus Law were involved, but I think ... got cut.  Plexus Law: who are they?
A  I think they were the solicitors representing the insures and Farr.

Q  RSA.
A  Yes.

Q  So they are RSA solicitors.  And, around about that time, there was a tri‑party meeting between Barnett of CHA, RSA, UKU who had already sent us a final letter saying that they were not involved.  They had already sent us, in 2007, a final - I do not know if you are aware - response.  It is part of a financial ombudsman thing - "Give me your final response.  What do you say?"  So they actually sent a letter saying they were not involved in 2007 and they were not going to deal with the claim.  So there was this tri-party meeting and Anna Norrie, of Plexus Law, who would you say, organised that?
A  I can't remember who organised it.

JUDGE COWELL:  Were you there?
A  I don't know how many meetings that there were before, but I do know that we did have a meeting.  I can't remember exactly when it was.

Q  You were there.
A  Yes, but I remember attending a meeting to try and resolve the matter and to try and figure out who was actually - which insurers were under cover for the various incidents that had occurred.  I think this happened after the injunction proceedings.  I can't remember.

MISS FLORES:  That was later.
A  Yes, but it was ----

Q  We have not led to that yet.
A  Yes.

Q  Okay, so you met them only much later anyway.
A  Yes.

Q  Okay, but that tri-party meeting that was around that time when Oliver got involved, that is when Plexus Law got involved and that is when everybody decided to club together, if you like: get UKU involved, get RSA involved, get yourselves involved and even us for a short amount of time, until I threatened RSA, which probably was not the best thing to do.
A  I don't know.  All I know is that the aim of the meeting was to try and resolve the various points that you had brought up and to confirm whether or not it had already been dealt with, whether or not it was pending and which of the insurers should be dealing with it.

Q  Yes, but we still did not get the floor fixed as a result of all of it.  Okay, right, so just to say Matthew Greenland, who was is in touch with you, is also, at that time, in touch with Anna Norrie, and he says: "Despite our best efforts, the claimant keeps chasing our client direct on a regular basis," that would be  yourselves.

JUDGE COWELL:  Is this p.850?

MISS FLORES:  Sorry, I did not have a page.

JUDGE COWELL:  I see, you are quoting from something.

MISS FLORES:  I am quoting from just before 13th May 2008: "The claimant keeps chasing our client, direct, on a regular basis, so it does not appear that the matter has gone away.  Can you chase, please?"  So that is when we started getting quite a lot of letters from Anna Norrie of Plexus Law, who wanted us to stay away from yourselves.

       Now, way before that, on 13th May 2008, he says, "Should the flooring pre‑date - I'll be happy to deal with the material losses," and then he goes on about being concerned that this was not raised before January - in January and photos, confirmation denial.  I think we have been through that page.  You reply on 4th June, a month later, and, as I said, you were quite new to it all, so I purport that they were setting you up against us to protect you or them, or both.  Okay, I am nearly finished.

       Now, what is the - QuestGates was involved around that time as well.
A  I didn't even know who QuestGates were.  No, it's not someone - people that I had to deal with.

Q  You had not heard of them.
A  No.

Q  Okay, so, actually, no, you are right, that was before.  Right, Monique, here we go and I have not got much more.  Do you know, as assistant property manager - sorry, assistant commercial manager, sorry I - do you know about the Fire Precautions Act 1971 or orders made under the Act, or under s.78 of the Health and Safety Act 1974?  I know that is a mouthful, but do you know ‑‑?
A  I know of the more recent ones which they put into place in regards to fire‑risk assessments on buildings, on multi-tenancy buildings.

Q  Is that 2006?
A  Yes, 2006, because I remember I was at one of the conferences to get the lowdown on what exactly the requirements were.

Q  But you are aware that there is no fire certificate for that building.
A  From what I've been told.  Obviously we were trying to get in - we contacted ... that deals with it, which is part of our asset management department, and they said that - their response to me was that, as a large housing association, they are allowed some leeway in the timeframe of when they get these assessments done but they're aware that it has to be done and they'd been told to start with the larger properties and work their way down, so one hadn't been done for Cromer Street or the residential areas yet.

Q  Ever?
A  Yes, that was the explanation that I was given, but obviously it's not a commercial management ...
Q  Because I know what you were going to say there.  It's not a commercial, but it is actually integral to the communal part.
A  That's correct, yes.

Q  The fire exit.
A  That's correct, yes.

Q  The fire lighting.
A  Yes.

Q  The fire escape.
A  Yes.

Q  And fire boards in the commercial, which we are not sure are (fireproof *), and ventilation to go (in and out *)- so that in the event you get a fireball and then the building go up because there is no fireboard.  It is a bit dangerous, is it not?  It could be.
A  I don't know the layout of Cromer Street or the residential, so I don't know what's in place and what isn't in place there, but I - you know, as I said, the explanation that I was given as to why it wasn't done is because, you know, the, you know, the authorities give housing associations sort of leeway to get through them as quick as possible and they do the large, you know, 50-floor residential buildings that we have, first, and then they work their way down to the smaller ones and, you know, on doing some searches internally, we couldn't locate a historic fire certificate: whether it's got lost ----

Q  We have asked for it ----
A  Yes, whether it's got lost, whether one ever existed, I don't know.  I can't comment on that.

Q  We have asked for it in, I think, around 2005 when we had the issue of the fire door.  Now, obviously, you are commercial; that is residential.  Two slightly ‑‑‑‑
A  Wherever there's communal areas and then it's going to, you know ...

Q  It is going to affect each other.
A  That's correct, yes.

Q  So what I was going to say, I wonder if the premises were subject to the Fire Precautions Act 1971 orders made thereafter.  Are they subject --?
A  I would assume so because it has a communal, you know - definitely the residential parts upstairs.  Again, I don't know the exact layout of the - of whether or not the commercial premises - because I know that the two units that you've got, they interconnect at the back, somehow.
Q  They do - well, through a corridor.
A  Yes, so I don't know in regards to the other commercial bits at the bottom, whether or not they do or they don't.  I don't know where, if - you know, so I don't know the layout, so I don't know if they're residential, which need access in case of emergency, or what-have-you, so I can't ----

Q  I suppose, us being at the bottom, if a fire took place at the bottom, it would go up.
A  Yes, but definitely the new laws and new regulations would, you know, call for some sort of ...

Q  Fire alarms.
A  Yeah, to be in place.

Q  Smoke detectors.
A  Yes.

Q  Emergency lighting.
A  To be in place.

Q  Fire-fighting equipment.
A  Various things, yes, just to comply.

Q  Fire blankets.
A  I'm not sure about fire blankets.

Q  I am not quite sure about fire blankets.
A  Not sure about fire - but I definitely ----

Q  I know a boy that burned to death and a fire blanket could have saved him.  I always bear that in mind.  But, anyway, we have got those things inside.
A  But anything communal?

Q  That's health and safety.  We have got our own health and safety fire-fighting equipment, electric, you know, all the rights specs.  But go on.
A  Yes, anything that's communal within - between residential and commercial, yes, it would be our responsibility, but anything that's, say, commercial, anything like your own smoke detectors, would be down to the commercial tenant to fit in.

Q  If it is a fitting ...
A  Yes, fixture and fitting and it's obviously ...

Q  But the standards are that those are actually meant to be supplied, as far as I know.
A  I don't know.

Q  Anyway, let us move on from there.  Do you think we were given unlawful tactics to pay rent?
A  What do you mean: "unlawful tactics"?

Q  The doubling of the rent if you don't fix the floor scenario.
A  Oliver was just, you know - I didn't hear that --

JUDGE COWELL:  That is not really a matter you can ...
A  -- conversation but, you know, he wanted - I think, at that point, we got to a point where just "let's just get on with it" and, you know, we can't just double your rent, you know, because it's down to comparable evidence, it's what the market allows for and obviously you could - you know, whatever s.25 notices were served on you, you could always, you know, make representations against that in court because if the comparable evidence wasn't there --

MISS FLORES:  Money, the court, money, solicitors.
A  -- you know, if the comparable evidence wasn't there then, you know, we can't justify charging you a rent that's over and above what everybody else is paying within the area, so ...

Q  But the two were mixed up together.  I fixed the floor ...
A  I can't - you need to ask Oliver why he said that.  When ----

Q  Yes, I will, but I take - unlawful tactics were made.  I called it "improper inducement".  I think I wrote to you a number of times and went bonkers about it.  You probably remember.
A  Yes, but, at the end of the day, he couldn't say, you know - it couldn't be done because again, as I said, it's all comparable evidence.

Q  On 30th October 2008 at 3.19 p.m., I put the subject "disgrace" ----
A  Yes, I remember that one, yes.

Q  Well, I mean, I should not laugh but, you know, obviously I am on antidepressants, so I am all right to laugh.  I point out that we will be billing you for the illegal breaking of our locks, so what is the idea of nailing the backdoor down?
A  This is when we repossessed the property.

Q  Yes, and also threatening court, and I say to you, "Why did you not approach the forfeiture legally and also break in for the second time, especially since I had delivered proof of payment on the 31st, 2008, of £6,125, which I didn't not feel we had to pay because the cessor of rent clause" - there is an email from RSA, which is 21st September 2006, and they are the first people to point out - they say: "Lastly, can the insured [meaning yourselves] advise whether the premises were unusable at the time and whether the rent was suspended.  I assume that there is a cessor of rent clause in the lease."  So, I mean, you know now - I am sure you know all of it now but then, as I do ... and it is really boring, is it not?  But what we are saying is that, even as far back as 2006, that rent was constantly demanded from us, and also that we brought in - and you may have seen the letter from Steeles Law.  Do you remember?
A  Yes, I remember receiving a fax from Steeles Law when we - we you did fall behind in the rent and we - you know, basically what we do is send out generic letters 14 days after the quarter date, to remind those in arrears that, if they don't pay within seven days, then, you know, we will take further action against them.  That's the standard generic letter that goes out to all tenants.

Q  Sorry, back on the same subject of the transfer of the £6,125, you confirmed that the transfer and proof of payment was made on 31st August, in an email to me.
A  Yes.

MISS BHALOO:  September.

MISS FLORES:  October.

MISS BHALOO:  I think you said August.

MISS FLORES:  I said October because it was October we got broke into and then it was November we got broke into, my words.  That is what it felt like.

       31stOctober, you say, yes, proof of payment has been received.
A  I mean, our position was, at the time when the bailiffs were originally instructed, no payment had been received from yourselves, and we had effectively forfeited the lease.  The monies that you sent us, because I remember - because I wanted to kind of like detach myself from the situation.  I got our rent supervisor to give you a call to --

Q  Clarence.
A  Yes, Clarence Smith - in order to ascertain exactly because I remember you said something about you had sent us cheques, which we'd never received.

Q  Clarence said that apparently lots of cheques had recently gone missing from his department.
A  Well, can't ...

Q  That is what he said to me.  When I was rushing into the High Court to get an injunction --
A  Really?

Q  -- that is what he said to me on the phone, lots of - because I was the same as you, checking, "What's going on?  We've paid."  Obviously, we knew you meant business and we thought, "Okay, here we go again.  We'll pay again."  We always say, "As a gesture of goodwill, we will pay the" - but really it is bullying because we do not feel we should pay rent when we cannot use the premises.
A  But I think - I don't know, but I don't recall at that time whether or not you had asked for the cessors of rent clause to be triggered.

Q  Steeles Law.  Steeles Law had written to the claimant in July 2008 - sorry, when was --?
A  I don't - I remember the letter from Steeles Law but it was only to say that  you'll be looking into - they'll be looking into it and then they'll get back to us,  and some months passed.  That was the original arrears letter that was sent in July and then we hadn't heard anything back from Steeles Law again; that's when we went ahead.

Q  I know, the solicitors are completely - I do not even know what we pay.  They tried to charge us £7,000 for sending two letters.  I mean, it is ridiculous. 
A  We were waiting for - obviously, to receive something from you, and when the September quarter came and again no payment, that was when I was instructed to ...

Q  Send out a reminder letter.
A  Reminder letters again and then, if no payment was received and nothing else was received from the solicitors, then to go ahead and forfeit the leases by a peaceful re-entry.

Q  At this time, Steeles Law had written to yourselves in August 21st, 2008.
A  Yes, round about that time, yes.

Q  Yes, so it was two months later we were evicted.  But Steeles Law asked for you to, kindly, confirm such action, because you had already threatened the action, would be held in abeyance.  Do you remember that?
A  Yes, I remember the letter and, as I said, obviously we didn't proceed seven days after the letter and we didn't hear back from them.  Okay, let's given them some time to - and see what they're going to say to - what yourselves are going to say - come to us with.

Q  Yes, well, we had sacked them by then.
A  And we hadn't heard.  I also remember August Bank  Holiday, I rang you and left a message for you and obviously forewarn you, to say, you know, "We need to sort this out," and I remember getting a - I think I went away on holiday that Bank Holiday weekend, too, and you called me.  I think you were in France or something, or you were at a funeral or something like.

Q  Something like that.
A  And you said that, you know, you'd been away and that, when you get back, you'll give me a call, and, yeah, I remember that being the August Bank Holiday because I wanted to speak to you to try to resolve the rent issue because I knew that ----

Q  They meant business.
A  Yes, I knew what was going to happen next.  And obviously we left it.  You know, we were waiting on further communication from Steeles Law, which we never received.

Q  Yes, because I sacked them.
A  As I said, the September quarter came.  September arrears letters went out and that's when I was asked to ----

Q  To do the business.
A  Yes, to effect the forfeiture.

Q  Monique, just to clarify with you, we sacked those Steeles Law solicitors because they tried to charge us £7,000 for what was two letters, and you remember those letters.
A  Yes.

Q  So that was good reason to get them out.  But what we did was we used their template from a letter that they had drafted for us, and we sent that to Mick Sweeney.
A  Right.

Q  Now, the letter to Mick Sweeney was received by Mick Sweeney and Oliver Barnet - it was addressed to both of them - a few days before the first eviction and it made it very very clear to them - I do not know if you have ever seen the letter, or maybe you saw it after, but maybe you were not aware of what was going on.  But we sent what was a very expensive letter - had been paid for and drafted - to Mick Sweeney and Oliver Barnet.   I think it is important to locate that letter just to make you aware of how shocked we were then.

MISS BHALOO:  ...

MISS FLORES:  It is in there?

MISS BHALOO:  Is it the 24th October one?

MISS FLORES:  Could be, could be.  I thought I had it.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, B.2, 345.

MISS FLORES:  B.2, 345. 

MISS BHALOO:  Yes, your Honour, it is also exhibited to Ms. Jamera's statement.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes.

MISS FLORES:  Just to highlight the points that I can remember from the top of my head - would you like some time to read it, your Honour?

JUDGE COWELL:  I am aware of it.  What can this witness say about it?

MISS FLORES:  This witness was ----

JUDGE COWELL:  The letter speaks for itself.

MISS FLORES:  Yes, this witness was the assistant of Oliver Barnet at the time and, as Monique has pointed out, was very much involved.

JUDGE COWELL:  Did you receive this letter?
A  I personally didn't receive it.  I think I can - I remember Oliver speaking to - overhearing a conversation between Oliver and Mick about it but obviously it wasn't something that ----

Q  It was not something you were responsible for dealing with.
A  That's correct, yes, because obviously my name came up in it but - and obviously Oliver - Mick's our chief exec and obviously he wanted to clarify what points in this letter were relevant to ----

MISS FLORES:  To who?  To you or --?
A  To me, to Oliver sort of exactly ...

Q  Did he come to see you about it?
A  No, it was just a telephone conversation between him and Oliver, which, as I said, I overheard and obviously Oliver knew exactly what I had been doing my side because obviously we share an office.  At the end of the day ----

Q  So he got that letter.  He phoned Oliver at the office.
A  Yes.

Q  And he asks, "Okay, what part of this is" - because it is a serious letter and it is also asking for Mick Sweeney to give back 59,500, in total, of rent and it says that it would be brought - the cessor of rent clause would be 'effected'; if action was taken, that it would be brought to the attention of the court.  There is all sorts of proper legal stuff in this.
A  Again, I can't comment on what ----

Q  No, understand very much, now, that you had not even seen it, probably, at the time.
A  Oliver and Mick had decided, but what I do know is that Oliver and myself did go through the lease and, you know, went through the relevant clauses and ...

Q  Tried to ascertain whether or not it was ----
A  Yes, exactly, and, as far as we were - as far as Oliver was concerned - and you can put the questions to him - was that ...

Q  It was a straightforward matter of non-payment of rent.
A  That's correct, yes, without - you know, and it says in the lease, you know, should be paid without set-off, blah-blah-blah.

Q  Yes, but it did not really matter, but, in the same lease, there was a cessor of rent clause and everybody was aware that we could not operate from the business, and RSA have confirmed in 2006 that - are you guys operating the cessor of rent clause, which it seems that was never at any point effected.  Do you see, from our point of view?
A  Yes, I understand what you're saying, but I also - I wasn't - because I remember you were always saying that you had bookings and inquiries and stuff, and whether or not those were being done or not, I didn't, you know, know whether or not you were getting any business or not, and, again a presumption on my part, I was thinking, "Okay, it's been February till" - When was this letter: October?

Q  October.
A  I'm sure they've been, you know, they must have been trading because I'm sure they - you know, we would have - because that's the period of cover where Zurich were under cover, and Zurich weren't even aware of the situation, so, you know - and I think Oliver said that sometimes - again, Oliver will refer to this when he's in the witness stand, that, you know, he, you know, may have driven by and seen events happening, so ----

Q  That would be at the other premises.
A  I don't know, I don't know.  Again, I don't know.

Q  Well, there was no floor in my premise.
A  So we don't know whether or not ...

Q  There was no floor in 104, no floor, that means ugly.  I mean, really, you know, you do not trade.  Next door - and I think maybe that is where the confusion was.  If you have got events going on - I think we had Channel 4, you know, so they are glamorous events, not just - you know, quite outlandish events as well.  So, yes, maybe there was - it sounds like there was confusion to you.
A  Yes, it was our presumption that you guys were still trading.

Q  Still making money.
A  Yes, that was our presumption.

Q  Taking the rise out of ...
A  Yes.

Q  Right, I see, so that was a total assumption that we were making money and really should be paying rent to a residential social landlord, after all.
A  Yes.

Q  Yes, okay, fair enough.  But you acknowledge that, now that I have said to you that there was no floor in the gallery, you do see that there was no trading taking place.
A  Yes, I can understand that, you know, but again, as I said, I haven't witnessed it myself.

Q  Just for his Honour.
A  No, I haven't witnessed it myself, but that was the presumption that was made, but I can understand that, if there was no floor - I don't know what the floor surfaces were like, I haven't witnessed it, so - but that was our presumption, that was our presumption: that you were trading.  But I can understand, if there was no floor and the underlay wasn't suitable, that you were unable to trade, yes.

Q  On the airbricks, which must have absolutely ...(blown*) the heads off the housing association because I notice there is a lot of emails between a lot of very high‑up people, all of a sudden, but - Mike Brooks, various people - I cannot remember offhand.
A  It was people that were there at the time because, obviously, you brought something up about us.

Q  Building.
A  Building regulations and grants that had been given to us to ... and obviously neither myself or Oliver, who hadn't been there at the time, knew anything about it, so it was again a matter of trying to find out what was going on, and I knew that Oliver - that's something again that Oliver was dealing with and I don't know how that ended, but obviously, when I received the email from Chantelle about it ----

Q  We were asking the location.
A  -- yes, about it, I again went to Oliver for his advice and he said, "Well, it's Health and Safety and it's their obligation because the property is old and, again, you know, they took the property as they found it, so it's up to them if they want to ..."

Q  Yes, that was the answer we got.  Good answer.  It gets everyone out of things but, for us, we plead differently, obviously, that it is a structural defect and it was known to the housing association from - certainly foreseeable and it was sold to us as A.3, which needs minimum requirement ventilation, and the place stinks and it has got no air, so I wish you could come down and see - I mean, smell it.  It is pretty bad and a lot of mould.  But, anyway, that is your - that was the line: Health and Safety, your responsibility and do not know if there is any airbricks but obviously, clearly, there was not.
A  Yes.

Q  Right, okay, that was August 2008.  Sorry, another issue: the boxing of the 12 water pipes.
A  That, in the electricity cupboard.

Q  That is right.  Were you surprised, being a new and private commercial ... that that leak had not been found, since it was in the room for - let us think of trace and remedy.
A  I remember you telling me about that it had just stopped by itself and you couldn't remember - you didn't know whether or not someone had come to sort it out, they couldn't - they didn't sort it out ... Thames Water involved and then we were contemplating getting Thames Water to shut off the whole water supply to the block, in order to find out whether or not it - where it was coming from and then, in the end, one of our contractors was able to locate it and fix it, so ...

Q  Was there any communication with Camden Council, Thames Water?
A  Definitely Thames Water.  I can't remember if we had to contact Camden Council about it but definitely Thames Water were involved because I remember I spoke to the guy.  I think it was the same guy who - the same Thames Water surveyor that had been out previously.

Q  That guy went there so many times, you would have thought he was living there but, yes, him.  He is a nice guy.
A  Yes, and I remember I had to send Thames Water an email in order to request - to find out how and when we could do that and, obviously, would need advance notice so that the residents know and give them times and dates and information of when the water's going to be done.

Q  Yes, but is there any communication of all of that because it sounds like it was a big operation, but there is no evidence of it at all?
A  I remember the Thames Water surveyor - it was over the phone.

Q  That was our contact.  I think I gave you that contact because we were in touch with him so often.
A  I believe so, yes, I believe so.  Yes, I spoke to him over the phone and then he told me that if it was a case where we wanted Thames Water to switch off the water then we'd have to send an email to customer services, which I did, but I don't know whether or not there's a reference to that email in the files.

Q  There is really nothing of that whole palaver ----
A  Because I think what happened was, in the end, one of our contractors was able to find the leak and so we didn't need Thames Water, in the end.

Q  But there was lots of stuff being said around the time of, again, the environmental health coming in.  There was lots of stuff being said about £10,000 worth of redirecting.  What was that about?
A  We had a quotation from All Done Design, again.

Q  That is a lot of money.
A  Yes, and obviously ----

JUDGE COWELL:  Sorry, the quotation: who from?
A  From All Done Design.

Q  From All Done.
A  They inspected and I can't remember exactly what the details of the quotation ‑‑‑‑

Q  Was this the quotation for a very large sum of money?
A  Yes, that was for £10,000, because, you know ----

MISS FLORES:  To redirect a leak into a manhole, through some sort of plastic ----
A  And they wanted to dig up the pavement as well, something like that.

Q  No, nothing to do with the pavement.
A  ... I can't remember.

Q  No, nothing to do with the pavement.

JUDGE COWELL:  Anyway, nothing along those lines had to be done.
A  No, because we got a second opinion.

MISS FLORES:  By All Done Design.
A  No, no, we got - All Done Design was the original contractor, that was £10,000.  They found the leak.

JUDGE COWELL:  Who was the second opinion?
A  The second was a guy called Jim Webb.

MISS FLORES:  Yes.
A  Yes, Jim Webb, and he diagnosed it differently to All Done Design and it only cost a couple of hundred pounds and remedied it quite quickly.

Q  What was it?  What was his diagnosis?

JUDGE COWELL:  Just a moment.
A  I can't remember.

Q  Just a moment.  Different diagnosis.  Yes?
A  And it, you know, cost only a couple of hundred pounds for him to fix it.

Q  £200 to fix it.  Was he the man who did fix it?
A  Yes, he was, he ...

MISS FLORES:  Not Jim.
A  Jim or his ...

Q  Jim Webb.  He did not ----
A  Jim Webb, well, his firm.

Q  It was All Done.
A  No, it wasn't All Done that fixed it.

Q  All Done did it.
A  No, definitely wasn't.

Q  It was Cube Construction?
A  No, Cube was the people that did the floors.  Cube weren't involved.

Q  They were not involved.
A  It was definitely Jim Webbs.

JUDGE COWELL:  I am sorry, what was it Jim Webb fixed?
A  The pipe in the electricity room.  It was definitely him.

Q  On 24th June?
A  No, it wasn't on the - it wasn't, because All Done was the quotation for the £10,000.

MISS FLORES:  Really?
A  Yes.

Q  It is just I remember the two guys, and I remember singing the praises of All Done Design, quite clearly.
A  I think All Done ----

JUDGE COWELL:  You were not there.  This is simply from your memory of the letters.

MISS FLORES:  Monique effected the contractors to come out.
A  Actually it was Jim Webb that was instructed to deal with it as the more competitive quote.

JUDGE COWELL:  I see, Jim Webb was instructed.
A  It definitely wasn't All Done.

MISS FLORES:  £10,000: what was that for?
A  I can't remember, Jo.
Q  Did it seem like a lot of money to you?
A  Yes, because I remember emails going back, saying, you know, "We want to get another quotation from another - you know, want to get a second opinion because the quotation was excessive."

JUDGE COWELL:  Anyway, it cost £200 to fix it.
A  And then that was the electricity cupboard.

Q  You sent him out.
A  Yes.

Q  "I sent Jim Webb to do it."

MISS FLORES:  But, as I say, on a lot of that stuff to do with shutting down the block, quotes from these companies, £10,000, they are not in the evidence.
A  Didn't know this was going to happen, so, you know, they could be deleted.

Q  You have got the same excuse as me and it is true: we did not know this was going to happen, so we did not think, "I know, I'll save all the evidence."  But you do not have the evidence of the quotes or --?
A  Everything that we have ----

JUDGE COWELL:  You mean documents.

MISS FLORES:  Evidence of the quotes just to prove that those things did happen at the time. 

MISS BHALOO:  Your Honour, there were contemporaneous emails which we looked through yesterday.

JUDGE COWELL:  Yes, I thought so.  Is the question, "Have you got a quotation from Cube Construction?" was it?

MISS FLORES:  No, it is ----
A  No, it was All Done Design was the first ----

JUDGE COWELL:  All Done.  But have you got the quotation for the £10,000?  Was it in writing?
A  It was in writing.

Q  It does not really matter now because ... was done.  But, as I understand it, that was your question, "Have you got the document?"

MISS FLORES:  Yes, there was a lack of evidence --

JUDGE COWELL:  It really does not matter.

MISS FLORES:  -- but Monique said that - almost, I would say it.  You do not think you are going to need - and it might have been binned or whatever.
A  Possibly, yes, possibly.

Q  And just a proposal that the fireboard in the electricity cupboard - and that is the last question - the environmental wrote a letter to say that the electric should be isolated from the water - Do you remember that? - and that fireboards should be put up with a certain electrical - just isolated.
A  Yes.

Q  You do remember that from ----
A  I vaguely remember a letter filtering through --

Q  From the environmental.
A  -- to us about that, and it was passed on to our maintenance department.

Q  Maintenance, okay.
A  Yes, or surveyors or something like that, and they said that - I think they said that everything complied, and that's when, I don't know, there was some - we were trying to ascertain, you know, who's responsible for that electricity cupboard anyway, so ...

Q  Yes, and, four years later - no, it is not four years later.  7th July 2008, I think we were agreed that the leak was traced.  There is no ventilation in that electricity cupboard, which is a structural defect.  And, just finally, that four years since the very beginning incident, it was traced, which you played a part in.
A  Again, as I said, all I recall is that, you know, you said that it started and it may have stopped and then it started again --

Q  Yes.
A  -- and then we found it and then it was resolved.

Q  All right, thank you very much.

MISS BHALOO:  I have no re-examination.  Does your Honour have any questions?

JUDGE COWELL:  No, thank you very much.
A  Thank you.

MISS BHALOO:  Your Honour, we have Mr.  Ukhueleigbe. coming this afternoon and, although Mr. Barnet has just arrived, he has an appointment this afternoon, so I do not want to start him and have him go off again.

JUDGE COWELL:  Two o'clock.

Civil Rights

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revez le nez En'l'aire francois hardy
Best Wishes

Mary Josofar Valdivieso Fortuno Flores

This case is bigger than me and holds much politics.

It's a lie, it's a lie, it's a lie, it's a lie... it's a sin....

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I think the absolute liability part was something to stop even in ECHR's just saying!

Anyway the case seems to have been written up after the event by a few firms...





So when does a lie become the truth? Here is the truth with evidence to prove this fact;

In was stated in Judgment at the Civil Appeal Hearing that MJVFF had asked for an implied repairing covenant when she had asked for no such thing she had asked for an implied covenant that the landlord should not breach the terms of the insurance 5(22) not withstanding she was in contract insured already and contract was simply breached by the landlord making her uninsured.


Email from Ms Flores (formerly Gavin) litigant in person to Bircham Dyson Bell legal team for the landlord 23rd July 2013

Extract from email;

Sent from Ms Flores

“I wonder if you could tell me whether you recall me advocating two things. 1. That absolute liability was catered for as I was insured for repairs at all times and 2. That I asked for an implied obligation to 5(22) that the landlord could not (like myself) breach the insurance?”

29th July 2013 Reply from Bircham Dyson Bell


In response to your questions, I can confirm that you argued the two points you mention below.  The transcript of the hearing will reflect this. 

However, I should point out that these two points did not necessarily fall within the scope of the grounds for which permission to appeal was granted on 4 December 2012, particularly your point about an implied covenant based on clause 5(22) of the lease.  

30th July 2013 Reply from Ms Flores

Thanks you for your response and for kindly confirming that these were my two points argued.

Just to add that the clause 5(22) related to a repairing obligation under a different construction.

Therefore it falls within the grounds that were accepted for implied obligations to repair.



What kind of legal history are we making when all are prepared to lie even when faced with truth?
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